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The Conservative Tradition

Course Guidebook

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Patrick N. Allitt was born in 1956 and raised in Mickleover, England. He attended John Port School in the Derbyshire village of Etwall, and he was an undergraduate at Hertford College, University of Oxford from 1974 to 1977. He studied American History at the University of California, Berkeley, where he earned his Ph.D. in 1986. Between 1985 and 1988, he was a Henry Luce Postdoctoral Fellow at Harvard Divinity School, where he specialized in American Religious History. Since then he has been on the history faculty of Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia, except for one year (1992–1993) when he was a fellow at the Princeton University Center for the Study of Religion. He has held the Goodrich C. White Chair in History since 2007 and has been the director of Emory's Center for Teaching and Curriculum since 2004.

Professor Allitt is the author of four scholarly books: *The Conservatives: Ideas and Personalities throughout American History* (Yale University Press, 2009); *Catholic Intellectuals and Conservative Politics in America, 1950–1985* (Cornell University Press, 1993); *Catholic Converts: British and American Intellectuals Turn to Rome* (Cornell University Press, 1997); and *Religion in America since 1945: A History* (Columbia University Press, 2003). In addition, he is the editor of *Major Problems in American Religious History* (Houghton-Mifflin, 2000) and author of a memoir about one semester in his life as a college professor, *I'm the Teacher, You're the Student: A Semester in the University Classroom* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004). He has written numerous articles and reviews for academic and popular journals, including recent book reviews in the *New York Times Book Review*. He has made four other courses for The Teaching Company: *American Religious History*; *Victorian Britain*; *The History of the United States, 2nd Edition* (with Professors Allen Guelzo and Gary Gallagher); and *The American Identity*.

Professor Allitt's wife, Toni, is a Michigan native, and their daughter, Frances, is (in 2009) a rising senior at Emory University.

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Scope:

In a world rife with revolution and war, the British and American political systems have enjoyed exceptional political stability over the last two centuries. They trace a common ancestry to the Glorious Revolution of 1688–1689, by which Parliament became the central element of British government. Both nations favor division of powers, both value the existence of an independent judiciary, both recognize citizens' rights and limits to government authority, and both are responsive to popular opinion. Britons and Americans alike, inventive and entrepreneurial peoples, have prospered materially and enjoyed ever-rising standards of living under these conditions. No wonder influential writers and politicians in both societies have sought to preserve their advantages against internal and external threats and have feared that injudicious changes might worsen, rather than improve, their situation. Our collective name for such men and women is "conservatives."

This course is a study of the Anglo-American conservative tradition as it has developed over three centuries. Conservatism is, above all, an attitude about the world, which sees the past as the best guide for navigating our way into the future. It assumes that all the really important questions confronting humanity have already been answered, and that it is generally safest to stick to what is tried and true. Blueprints for transforming society, say conservatives, will not work; they do not pay sufficient heed to the complexity of human nature, and their unforeseen side effects can easily do more harm than the good they intend. Conservatives tend to be skeptical about the possibility of human perfection; even those who are not religious understand the wisdom embodied in the idea of original sin: that we are all capable of evil as well as good. Conservatives think of imperfect human nature as the bedrock of social and political reality; it may seem different under different social and cultural conditions, they admit, but it never changes in its essentials.

Conservatism in the Anglo-American tradition has usually been reactive. Not favoring a general plan for society, conservatives in different eras usually valued the world as they found it, then reacted to what they perceived as threats confronting it. It is therefore no paradox that at different times conservatives have argued for many different policies. Promotion of the free-market economy in the days of Adam Smith, for

example, was a radical project that many conservatives deplored, whereas in recent decades, preservation of the free market has been a central conservative concern. Some prominent figures in the conservative tradition, including Alexander Hamilton and William Pitt, favored increasing the powers of central government while others, such as Herbert Hoover and Margaret Thatcher, favored restricting its reach. Some, such as Winston Churchill and Theodore Roosevelt, were empire-builders while others, such as Robert Taft and Edward Heath, rejected the idea of colonizing other parts of the world. Nearly all conservatives before 1850 denied the assertion of human equality and doubted that democracy was compatible with a healthy society. By the early 21st century, on the other hand, virtually all Anglo-American conservatives were committed to the principle of universal democracy.

A course comparing two societies, especially two societies that once fought against each other in a bitter war of independence, ought not to overstate similarities. The fact that Britain and America have developed independently since the late 18th century has made it inevitable that the leading conservative writers and politicians in each country emphasize different issues, especially when it comes to policy details. Bearing these differences in mind, however, it remains useful to trace their history side by side. British and American conservatives—the writers and the politicians—were regularly in contact, influenced each other's work, used a common language, and shared a fund of general ideas and convictions. At crucial moments, such as the two world wars and the long cold war struggle against communism, the two groups came together in close agreement.

Since the mid-19th century, one of the two major political parties in Britain has been the Conservative Party. In discussing Britain, accordingly, it is important to distinguish between Conservative with a capital "C," meaning affairs related to the party, and conservative with a small "c," which refers to ideas and attitudes more generally. On the American side of the Atlantic, there has never been a nationwide conservative party; sometimes the Democrats and sometimes the Republicans have seemed more hospitable to conservative ideas. Moreover, it can be useful in thinking about America to describe certain historical characters, such as Daniel Webster and John C. Calhoun, as conservatives even if they did not use the word about themselves.

Conservatism has been perhaps the dominant political phenomenon of recent American politics and has aroused passionate emotions, pro and con. In this course I hope to describe and analyze the history of the

Anglo-American conservative tradition, being as objective as possible and keeping the rhetorical temperature low. Historians ought not to take sides; their job is to explain, and to keep their opinions to themselves. I will give the conservatives a chance to explain their ideas, and I will give their critics a chance to explain their response, while also devoting plenty of time to the history of debates and disputes among conservatives themselves.

Lecture One
What Is Conservatism?

Scope: Britain and the United States have been blessed by political stability. There have been no revolutions in Britain in over 300 years, and none in the United States in over 200 years, even though every other industrialized nation has been through the ordeal, sometimes repeatedly. Conservative writers and politicians, impressed by this stability, have been anxious to preserve it and fearful lest it be destroyed by radical new political or social movements. Anglo-American conservatism has a rich and varied lineage and has accumulated a great fund of ideas and principles, while attracting some of the most gifted members of every generation.

In this course I will describe and explain the history of conservative ideas and politics in Britain and America and the connection between the two. My starting point is the Glorious Revolution of the late 17th century, and my end point will be around the year 2000. Along the way, I will introduce the most brilliant theorists and practitioners of conservatism. Among the former are Edmund Burke and Henry Adams; among the latter are Alexander Hamilton and Winston Churchill.

As you watch or listen to these lectures, you'll probably wonder where I stand on the issues—whether I am a conservative too, and if so, of what stripe. I believe a historian's principal concern should be to describe and explain, while keeping his or her opinions as far in the background as possible. With luck you'll be as mystified about my political views at the end as you are at the beginning, but you'll have no doubt that I find the history of conservatism in the English-speaking countries extremely interesting.

Outline

I. At the most fundamental level, there is a strong human propensity to keep things the way they are.

A. Children love familiar people, places, objects, and stories, around which they orient themselves and feel secure.

B. Most people throughout world history have always stayed where they were born; even those given the option to move have preferred to stay with what and who they know.

C. In music, foods, and ideas about clothes and manners, generations clash because older generations tend to favor traditional ways.

II. In politics, however, the world is always changing. Conservatism in politics is an attitude that favors cautious and prudential changes rather than opposing change at all costs.

A. Conservatism is skeptical about radical changes and prefers what is familiar and has withstood the test of time.

1. If the world is the way it is, that must be because we intended it to be this way or because we have found that in practice it works.

2. Conservatism is accepting of moderate changes to redress obvious injustices, but it counsels patience rather than perfectionism.

B. Conservatism is skeptical about blueprints for a new society based on first principles.

1. Planners cannot encompass the complexity of the world.

2. Planned societies are likely to be coercive in practice.

3. They can rarely accommodate the fact of social change.

4. They resist the reality of human variability.

C. Conservatism is skeptical about the idea that human nature can be transformed.

1. In religious or secular guise, conservatism accepts the idea of original sin.

2. Conservatives usually deny that wars will ever cease.

3. Woodrow Wilson's claim that World War I was "the war to end all wars" is exactly the kind of claim conservatives will not make.

4. Conservatives, when they think about economic questions, accept that people are going to be overwhelmingly self-interested and that the economy has to be organized around this truth.

D. Conservatism assumes that all the really important questions facing humanity have already been asked and answered.

III. Conservatism in the Anglo-American tradition has usually been reactive, responding to different perceived threats in different eras.

- **A.** If the perceived threat is fragmentation and anarchy, conservatism sometimes supports strong centralized government.
- **B.** If the perceived threat is tyranny, conservatism sometimes supports decentralization of power.
- **C.** Supporters of the free-market economy were radicals in late 18th- and early 19th-century Britain but conservatives in late 20th-century Britain and America.
- **D.** Conservatism has usually been elitist and hierarchical, but universal democracy has also given rise to populist forms of conservatism.
- **E.** Conservatives often depict themselves as the guardians of an endangered civilization.

IV. One of the two major political parties in Britain for more than a century has been named Conservative, whereas in America conservatives can be found at different points on the party spectrum.

- **A.** It is occasionally useful to label as conservatives people who did not call themselves by that name.
- **B.** In the United States, there was no real conservative movement until the 1950s.
- **C.** The fact that Britain and America have been politically separated since 1776 also means that the particulars of conservatism in each country differ widely, even when the impulse is similar.
  - **1.** They differ widely in the political uses of religion.
  - **2.** Conservatives in each country favor policies that would be anathema in the other.

V. Many dynamic intellectual and political figures in the Anglo-American tradition have espoused conservative ideas.

- **A.** The course will study the work of such writers as Edmund Burke, the first and most eloquent philosophical critic of the French Revolution, and will also consider writers like Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill, who were not conservatives in their own day but later became members of the conservative pantheon.
- **B.** It will also address the work of practical politicians such as Abraham Lincoln and Benjamin Disraeli.

C. Anyone seeking a comfortable conservative heritage has to face up to several difficulties.

1. Conservatism in Britain traditionally included sharp class distinctions, monarchy and aristocracy, the established church, and no votes for women.

2. Conservatism in America long argued against democracy and in favor of slavery.

Suggested Reading:

Muller, *Conservatism*.

Nisbet, *Conservatism*.

Quinton, *The Politics of Imperfection*.

Scruton, *The Meaning of Conservatism*.

Questions to Consider:

1. Is it more useful to think of conservatism as a set of policy positions or a set of attitudes about social and political change?

2. What are the benefits and drawbacks of studying history comparatively, using the British and American cases side by side?

Lecture Two
The Glorious Revolution and Its Heritage

Scope: England was torn by civil war, regicide, and revolution in the 17th century. In 1688, the disastrously inept King James II, having alienated almost every source of support in the kingdom, fled to France. Parliament invited the stadtholder of the Netherlands, William of Orange, to take his place and become King William III. William accepted, but from then on, Parliament (not the king) held supreme political power. Political tendencies, Whig and Tory—not as well organized as modern political parties—formed in the ensuing decades. In Tory ideas about politics, we can find some of the origins of English conservatism. Tories, despite the example of James II, believed in the sanctity of the monarchy as a counterweight to Parliament; they would have preferred the legitimate Stuart line of succession if only the Stuarts had not been Catholics. They were torn because they also believed that the established Church of England, uniting church and state, was vital. When in 1715 the Tory leader Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke fled to France and the service of the Stuarts in exile, he tainted the Tory name with allegations of treason that took a long time to live down. Bolingbroke himself was a shrewd political writer as well as a politician, and a friend of such leading Tory writers of his era as Jonathan Swift and Alexander Pope. His arguments in favor of what would later be called "the loyal opposition," making an honored place for the party out of power in a parliamentary system, was to influence generations of subsequent English and American politicians.

Outline

I. There is no indisputable point at which to begin a history of modern English conservatism, but a strong case can be made for 1688–1689, the last time the nation suffered a revolutionary upheaval.

A. Every society must answer the question of who holds ultimate power and how it is to be circumscribed.

1. Magna Carta (1215) can be seen as the first document in the English tradition to limit the king's arbitrary power.

2. The Civil Wars of the 1640s disputed whether king or Parliament was supreme.
3. Parliament's inability to find a successor to Oliver Cromwell in 1660 led to the Restoration of King Charles II.

B. James II, showing none of Charles II's shrewdness, tried to reverse the English Reformation, alienating all his supporters before fleeing to France.

C. William III and Mary II (who was James II's daughter) ruled jointly, but by the invitation of Parliament.
1. The Bill of Rights (1689) limited royal power and contributed to political stability.
2. The Triennial Act (1694) specified that Parliament would meet every year and that elections would recur every three years.
3. The Act of Settlement (1701) specified that the monarch must always be a Protestant.

II. Several English writers had already begun to outline a political theory that we might recognize as conservative.

A. The theologian Richard Hooker (1554–1600) argued against divine right absolutism and Puritan theocracy.
1. The monarch was not arbitrary but must rule within the traditions of the law.
2. The Puritan claim to rule by the "elect" he regarded as a sinful form of intellectual pride.
3. The unity of church and state were necessary for political stability.

B. Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon (1609–1674) also augured many of the themes of subsequent conservatism.

C. George Savile, the Marquis of Halifax, favored moderation in an age of political extremism.

III. Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke was the most influential Tory of early 18th-century England, and his writing has had a lasting influence on British conservatism.

A. His personal life and political fortunes were turbulent, and he was never conservative in temperament.
1. He was a religious skeptic and a rake in his early personal life.
2. He became chief minister to Queen Anne but fled to join the Stuarts in France when George I became king.

3. Unable to cooperate with the Stuarts for long, he made his peace with the British government in 1723, returned to England, and devoted the rest of his life to supporting Toryism and opposing the Whig leader and Prime Minister Sir Robert Walpole.

B. His political writing discloses a conservative view of society far more than his actions.

1. He regarded the family, not the individual, as the basic unit of society.
2. A religious skeptic, he nevertheless understood the social and moral value of an established Church of England.
3. He espoused the conservative principle that it is important to be realistic about what is politically possible.
4. He feared that the rising power of merchants and bankers was corrupting political life.
5. He made a sharp distinction between the men of landed property (good) and the "moneyed interest" (bad).

C. He romanticized the distant past as an era of true English liberty.

Suggested Reading:

Faber, *Beaconsfield and Bolingbroke*.

Harkness, *Bolingbroke*.

Quinton, *The Politics of Imperfection*.

Varey, *Henry St. John*.

Questions to Consider:

1. How did Britain curb the power of the monarchy and establish Parliamentary supremacy?
2. What did early conservative thinkers like Hooker, Clarendon, and Bolingbroke see as the greatest threats to order and liberty?

Lecture Three
Burke, Tradition, and the French Revolution

Scope: The French Revolution was aimed at the kind of radical new beginning that had fascinated the philosophes and dismayed their British counterparts. Unlike the peaceful British Glorious Revolution of 1688, the French Revolution of 1789 soon became bloody and vengeful, culminating in the Terror of 1793, in which the royal family and much of the aristocracy died under the guillotine. Reacting to the first stages of the revolution, Edmund Burke, an Anglo-Irish Whig politician already famous as a political writer and parliamentary strategist, published *Reflections on the Revolution in France*. Many conservatives, especially in recent years, have regarded Burke's *Reflections* as the founding text of their political creed. Condemning the French revolutionaries for their temerity in believing they could construct a rational society, he asserts the superior wisdom of British tradition, of taking the world as it is, and of recognizing the limits of rationality in social planning. Society is an organism, says Burke, and can no more be remade in the middle of its life than a person can decide to start his life over again. Burke never denied that society changes, but he insisted that change should be incremental, always respecting the accumulated wisdom of prior generations, and that it should always take into account prior customs, traditions, and prejudices. For Burke, prejudice was a positive concept, since he regarded society as bound together by the shared prejudgments, or "prejudices," of its people. His *Reflections* correctly anticipated the bloodletting of the Terror and the rise of a military strongman, though Burke himself died in 1797 just before Napoleon seized power.

Outline

I. Burke's early political life as a Whig shows that he could be sympathetic to political reforms.

- **A.** As an Irishman trying to make his way in England, he favored a policy of tolerance toward Catholics.
- **B.** Burke worked as agent for several of the American colonies before their breach with England.

C. He led the impeachment of Warren Hastings (which lasted from 1788 to 1795), the first Governor-General of Bengal, on behalf of the principles of responsible government.

D. In his speech to the electors of Bristol in 1774, he argued the merits of direct and virtual representation.

II. The outbreak of the French Revolution quickly aroused Burke's fear and anger and provoked the writings for which he is most famous.

A. His *Reflections*, though written in response to the immediate situation, made profound arguments about the nature of politics.

1. It appeared before the Revolution had turned violent, and it emphasized the hazard in apparently benign principles.

2. It emphasized that events in France were in no way comparable to those in Britain's Glorious Revolution.

3. It warned against the illusion of human equality.

4. It used the language of veils and drapery as a contrast to the philosophes' language of enlightenment.

B. Burke emphasized the importance of accepting the accumulated wisdom of the past rather than attempting to start the world over.

1. Change was necessary, but it should be gradual, always mindful of the circumstances preceding it.

2. Society is an organism rather than a mechanism, and it is also a spiritual unity across the generations.

3. We should cultivate particular and local loyalties rather than adhering to grand abstractions.

4. We should be proud, rather than ashamed, of our comparative unimaginativeness, because it safeguards us from utopian folly.

5. We are guided by our prejudices, luckily—which means we don't have to think out each new situation from first principles.

C. *Reflections* generated numerous replies, of which the best remembered is Thomas Paine's *Rights of Man*.

III. The development of the French Revolution after 1790 fulfilled many of Burke's worst fears.

A. Readers who had at first been skeptical began to recognize Burke's prescience as the situation in France deteriorated.

B. Burke recognized the war against France as something qualitatively new in kind.

C. Burke dreaded the outbreak of revolutionary activism in Britain too.

1. His *Letters on a Regicide Peace* (1796) bespoke his fear that an "armed doctrine" of revolution had crossed the English Channel.

2. He argued that the principle of democracy was a dangerous abstraction, and he supported government moves to suppress its advocates.

Suggested Reading:

Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France*.

Hampsher-Monk, *The Political Philosophy of Edmund Burke*.

Lock, *Edmund Burke*.

Paine, *The Rights of Man*.

Questions to Consider:

1. Why did the ideas of democracy and human equality seem so unreasonable to Edmund Burke?

2. How did the development of the French Revolution after 1790 bear witness to his early denunciation of it?

Lecture Four
Pitt and the Wars of the French Revolution

Scope: William Pitt the Younger (1759–1806) was to conservative politics what Edmund Burke was to conservative theory. The historian Norman Gash wrote that "the world of Burke and Pitt remains as the great uplands from which the headwaters of Conservatism descended to the plains of Victorian party politics below." Pitt, son of an earlier prime minister, became prime minister himself at the age of 24 and held the post for about 17 consecutive years, from the end of the American Revolutionary War to the middle of the Napoleonic Wars, and right through the turbulent years of the French Revolution. He took on the job when the nation had just been humiliated by the Americans and when its future was in doubt, but his shrewd financial management and talented leadership soon demonstrated that Britain remained immensely powerful. Pitt built an alliance of conservative European states to combat Napoleon and to counteract the threat that revolution would spread across Europe. He also enacted restrictive legislation at home to forestall the possibility that the revolution might spread from France to Britain. He and his followers came to accept Burke's idea that agitation for democracy inside Britain, especially strong in the new industrial towns, was as dangerous to the settled British constitution as was Napoleon. Pitt often referred to himself as an independent Whig, and he operated in a political world that still lacked party machinery and discipline. Nevertheless he is probably the one man to whom it is easiest to trace the growth of the British Conservative Party.

Outline

I. A combination of strong connections and great political gifts combined to bring William Pitt to prominence in early life.

A. The son of a former prime minister, Pitt was elected to Parliament at the age of 21 and became chancellor of the Exchequer the following year.

1. Winning the favor of King George III, Pitt was able to displace Lord North as premier in December 1783.

2. In his first premiership, Pitt tried to reform Parliament, which no longer adequately represented the population of Britain.

B. Pitt won general elections in 1784 and 1790.
1. He was the most skillful parliamentarian of his day.
2. He had the insight that lowering taxes might reduce smuggling and therefore raise revenue.
3. Throughout his years as prime minister, he acted as his own chancellor of the Exchequer.
4. When George III suffered a period of madness in 1788 (the anniversary of the Glorious Revolution), Pitt nearly lost his position to the opposition Whig faction of Charles James Fox.

II. French aggression forced Pitt to declare war in 1793.

A. He built a succession of coalitions against the French Revolution and then against Napoleon.
1. Pitt underestimated the power of French nationalism and France's reluctance to have its monarchs restored by the national enemy.
2. Britain's armies and those of its allies struggled, whereas the Royal Navy scored repeated victories.

B. Even when the Second Coalition failed, Pitt resolved to fight on alone against France.

C. The Irish uprising of 1798 prompted him to incorporate Ireland into the United Kingdom.
1. French aid to the Irish (an army of 14,000 men) made the 1798 rebellion a moment of supreme danger, comparable to the Boyne campaign of 1690.
2. Pitt reacted to the defeat of the uprising with the Act of Union.
3. His advocacy of Catholic emancipation led to a breach with the king and his resignation in 1801.

III. Pitt represents the strong-government end of the conservative spectrum, as his repressive measures at home demonstrate.

A. In the 1790s, he came to share Burke's judgment about the threat posed by revolution.

B. The early stages of the Industrial Revolution were concentrating new population centers that were potentially destabilizing. In the early days of industrialization, the manufacturers were often dissenters and could not be thought of as conservative.

C. Sedition laws restricted freedom of speech and assembly.
  1. In 1794 and again in 1798, Pitt guided legislation through Parliament to suspend habeas corpus.
  2. Pitt also introduced the Seditious Meetings and Treasonable Practices Act of 1795.
  3. Patriotic societies supported Pitt's government against the France-tainted radicals.

D. The Combination Acts of 1799 and 1800 prohibited all forms of trade unionism.

IV. Pitt's brief period out of office coincided with the Peace of Amiens, a brief peace in the Napoleonic Wars.

A. Pitt was a friend of Henry Addington, who succeeded him.

B. Public opinion and the king agreed that when the war resumed, Pitt must return.

C. His premature death at age 46 in 1806 ushered in a period of political instability.

Suggested Reading:

Coleman, *Conservatism and the Conservative Party*.

Dickinson, *Britain and the French Revolution*.

Duffy, *The Younger Pitt*.

Hague, *William Pitt the Younger*.

Questions to Consider:

1. Was Pitt's alarm over domestic radicalism justified?

2. Why was it difficult for Britain to defeat revolutionary and Napoleonic France?

Lecture Five
The American Revolution

Scope: We know that the American Revolution created a republic that, by 1820, was the most democratic country in the world and a source of inspiration to revolutionaries everywhere. Most of the American leaders in the 1770s had no intention of bringing about that situation. From the Stamp Act crisis to the Declaration of Independence, many of them justified their conduct as an attempt to preserve their traditional English liberties against a king and a ministry that, they believed, were threatening innovations that would make them tyrannical. When Patrick Henry declared "Give me liberty or give me death," he was appealing explicitly to a long British tradition of liberty under limited government, the heritage of the Glorious Revolution. Many of the American leaders saw themselves more as restorationists than as revolutionaries, even when they came to believe that only independence would enable them to restore the conditions of the old order. They did not anticipate, and often did not relish, the drastic internal changes that followed from their victory. In this sense, they were conservatives from the outset.

If the leaders were not in most cases full-blown revolutionaries, how much less so were the Americans who favored loyalty to the British cause, fought on the British side, and went into exile when the war was won and lost? These loyalists, aptly nicknamed "Tories," are probably the least known major group in American history, but their story is integral to the history of Anglo-American conservatism.

Outline

I. In the escalating crises of the 1760s and 1770s, American colonial leaders argued that their rights and liberties as Britons were under threat from an innovating king.

A. They venerated the Glorious Revolution as much as most Englishmen.

B. They identified closely with the opposition Whigs in England who had criticized the Hanoverian kings and Prime Minister Robert Walpole.

1. The Stamp Act offended them because they were denied the chance to participate in assigning taxes they would have to pay.

2. They argued that their colonial assemblies, under the king, played the same role for them as did Parliament under the king in England.

C. Many looked back to the austere classical heroism of Cato.

D. Even after Lexington and Concord, 15 months passed during which the rebels claimed to be fighting for their rights as Englishmen.

E. John Adams, George Washington, and Alexander Hamilton did not believe in equality or democracy.

1. Washington modeled himself on another classical hero, Cincinnatus.

2. All the Virginia leaders were aware of the paradox that they, as slaveholders, were fighting to prevent their "enslavement."

II. Loyalists numbered about half a million people, or one-fifth of the white colonists of North America.

A. They identified emotionally and materially with Britain.

1. Joseph Galloway of Pennsylvania hoped to create yet closer ties.

2. Similarly, William Franklin, Benjamin's son, became and remained a loyalist.

B. Loyalists denied the revolutionaries' intellectual claims. Charles Inglis and Samuel Seabury denied the theoretical basis of the revolutionaries' claims, the contract theory of society.

C. Some, as officials, governors, and clergy, were directly dependent on Britain for their livelihood. Anglican clergy such as Jonathan Boucher were prominent conservative loyalists.

D. Thomas Hutchinson, the last royal governor of Massachusetts, deplored the British government's conduct but still remained loyal to it.

E. The fighting forced people to take sides, including those who would have preferred to stay out of harm's way.

III. The Constitution was an attempt to make America more stable by strengthening its central government and curbing its radical tendencies.

- **A.** The Senate and judiciary were designed to be insulated from the electorate's transient passions.
- **B.** The Founders accepted slavery, in practice, and agreed not even to raise the question of abolishing the slave trade until 1808.
- **C.** The Bill of Rights embodied in the first 10 amendments was a close facsimile of the English Bill of Rights from the Glorious Revolution.

Suggested Reading:

Brown, *The Good Americans*.

Morgan, *The Birth of the Republic*.

Nelson, *The American Tory*.

Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic*.

Questions to Consider:

1. Is it possible to be a conservative revolutionary? If so, were the American leaders cases in point?
2. What factors persuaded about a fifth of all Americans that they could not join the revolutionary cause?

Lecture Six
The Federalists

Scope: The U.S. Constitution, drafted in secret in 1787, was designed to replace the Articles of Confederation when it became obvious that the latter was too weak to hold the new nation together. The Founding Fathers were, so to speak, looking both ways—forward to a government run under explicitly codified rules but backward to the accumulated political wisdom of the ages. The Constitution was strongly marked by the cumulative insights of the Western political tradition; it should be seen as a very conservative kind of revolutionary document. *The Federalist*, an anthology of essays by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay (written to persuade voters to adopt the Constitution), has become a durable conservative classic in American political philosophy.

No sooner had the Constitution gone into operation, with the majestic President George Washington, than the French Revolution began. An early division in the republic developed between the Federalists (notably Washington, Hamilton, and John Adams), who detested the French Revolution and everything it stood for, and the Republicans (notably Thomas Jefferson), who saw events in France as essentially liberating, despite their excesses. Federalists favored a foreign policy sympathetic to Britain, were skeptics about the idea of human equality, and hoped to restrain the development of popular democracy. Largely successful in the 1790s, they lost the election of 1800 and then watched in dismay as Jefferson and his party undertook dramatic steps in the direction of democracy and equality.

Outline

I. *The Federalist* persuaded enough voters throughout the nation to endorse the Constitution as the basis of America's government.

A. Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay drafted the essays at high speed in the summer of 1787, under the pen name of "Publius." The essays were published in newspapers. The anti-Federalists, who wanted to keep the Articles of Confederation, often published their replies on the same pages.

B. The Federalists argued that the extent of the republic was a strength, not a weakness.
  1. Different interests would counterbalance one another, preventing the development of permanent factions.
  2. A larger pool of citizens would facilitate the choice of virtuous representatives.

II. The Federalist politicians of the 1790s did not like the idea of political parties, but in practice they formed one and dominated the politics of the decade.

A. Washington's willingness to accept the presidency at once gave it high prestige. His willingness to relinquish it after two terms, on the model of Cincinnatus, was symbolically essential for the future of American political stability.

B. Alexander Hamilton, the first treasury secretary, set about building a strong federal government that could inspire confidence in America's economic leaders.
  1. He accepted the burden of the federal and state governments' debts and resolved to pay them in full.
  2. His *Report on Manufactures* sought to set America on the road to industrialization and protectionism.

C. The Whiskey Rebellion of 1794 tested the resolve of the new federal government, which more than met the challenge.
  1. Hamilton persuaded Washington to lead a large military force against the rebels.
  2. The ringleaders of the rebellion were rounded up and convicted, but then pardoned to show that the new government could mix clemency with resolve.

III. The outbreak of the French Revolution, and its rapid descent into chaos and terror, dismayed the Federalists and prompted them to seek a pro-British foreign policy.

A. Federalists, skeptical about democracy, feared the spread of revolutionary contagion to America.
  1. John Adams, elected president in 1796, dreaded democracy.
  2. His Republican vice president Thomas Jefferson, by contrast, had been in France in 1789 and found the Revolution, at least at the beginning, inspiring.

B. Federalists supported the passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts (1798), which tried to suppress free political speech and hinder the immigration of European radicals.

1. Jefferson and James Madison wrote the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions (1798–1799) in protest against the Alien and Sedition Acts.

2. They reasserted anti-Federalist claims from 10 years before and anticipated the Nullification Crisis and the eventual Confederate secession.

IV. Federalists lamented their defeat in the election of 1800, but in the long view, it is possible to see that defeat as a vital contribution to the durability of the Constitution and the American conservative tradition.

A. Federalists regarded the election of Jefferson and his "Jacobin" Republicans as a catastrophe. Taken in by their own propaganda, they thought of him as a dangerous radical.

B. The Federalists became a regional New England party after 1800 and reluctantly adopted democratic electioneering techniques.

C. Before leaving office, President John Adams appointed John Marshall as chief justice of the Supreme Court.

1. In a series of influential decisions, Marshall established the principle of judicial review and judicial supremacy, which have characterized the role of the Supreme Court ever since.

2. Even Republican appointees like Justice Joseph Story came to share Marshall's view of the court.

Suggested Reading:

Allitt, *The Conservatives*.

Chernow, *Alexander Hamilton*.

Earle, *The Federalist*.

Ellis, *Passionate Sage*.

Questions to Consider:

1. Why were the Federalists so suspicious of democracy?

2. How did Washington and Hamilton work to establish the stability and durability of the Constitution?

Lecture Seven
Conservatives in the American South

Scope: Conservative Southern plantation owners wanted to be left to their own devices and resented the power of the Federal government over their states, a resentment they expressed in the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions of 1798–1799. Favoring the country over the city and agriculture over industry, the authors looked on the rising commercial power of the North with jaundiced eyes and helped create a tradition of states' rights. First under the leadership of John Randolph of Roanoke, then of John C. Calhoun, they interpreted the Constitution strictly, denying the doctrine of implied powers. Calhoun led South Carolina to the brink of secession in the Nullification Crisis of 1832 in protest against what he saw as the overmighty claims of President Andrew Jackson.

Slavery was the motor of the Southern cotton economy. In the early years of the republic, it seemed possible that slavery would be abolished gradually and peacefully. After 1830, however, conservative Southern intellectuals and politicians began to make positive arguments in favor of slavery and to insist that it was more humane than the free-labor system of British and Northern factory towns. They were explicit and unashamed racists. Slavery, they said, was a natural and time-honored system found in all the world's civilizations. It had brought the blessings of civilization and Christianity to African savages, protected a group whose natural inferiority made it impossible for them to be able to live independently, and looked after them from cradle to grave. They compared plantations to happy extended families, asserted that God himself gave no evidence in the Bible of objecting to slavery, and depicted themselves as the moral superiors of the hard-driving Yankee industrialists.

Outline

I. Southern conservatives in the early national period resented the Federalist attempt to strengthen central government power and diversify the economy.

A. John Randolph of Roanoke and John Taylor of Caroline represented the old-fashioned independent plantation owners, who sought patriarchal independence. Randolph, a captivating orator, regarded himself as an aristocrat and disdained the development of democracy.

B. They shared Jefferson's view that farmers are intrinsically more virtuous than city dwellers.

C. Randolph supported the Louisiana Purchase at the time it took place but later realized he had compromised his own belief in strict constitutional interpretation.

II. The Nullification Crisis, in which South Carolina acted on John C. Calhoun's arguments, was a trial run for Southern secession.

A. The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1797–1798 had asserted the sovereignty of the states over that of the federal government and argued that states were entitled to nullify unconstitutional federal laws.

B. South Carolina's attempt to nullify a federal law led President Jackson to threaten military reprisals.

1. A state law of 1832 ordered South Carolinians not to pay the Tariff of Abominations and raised 25,000 volunteers to fight if necessary.

2. President Jackson retaliated by pushing the Force Bill through Congress, authorizing military action against a nullifying state.

3. Henry Clay of Kentucky brokered a compromise, preventing the outbreak of hostilities.

C. Calhoun's *Disquisition on Government* and *Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United States* elaborated his views.

III. After 1830, defenders of slavery began to argue that their system was not just a necessary evil but a positive good.

A. Slave uprisings and pressure from radical abolitionists in the North combined to stimulate the production of proslavery literature.

B. Proslavery writers argued that the racial difference between whites and blacks made slavery appropriate.

1. Early ethnologists argued that to free slaves would be an act of unkindness because racial differences made it impossible for them to live independently.

2. Slave owners often referred to slaves as members of their families.

C. As ardent Christians, proslavery writers ransacked their Bibles to show that slavery was common in Biblical times and that God, though he had many opportunities to denounce slavery, never did so.

1. In the Old Testament, the Children of Israel escaped from slavery in Egypt but later enslaved other peoples in the Promised Land.
2. Jesus never condemned slavery.
3. Saint Paul actually directed Onesimus, an escaped slave, to return to his master in the Epistle to Philemon.
4. Was it not a kindness to Africans to save them from "savagery" and bring them to a Christian land, where they were converted?
5. Christian abolitionists appealed to the spirit of the Gospels, but usually got the worst of the argument when it came to chapter and verse.

D. The Christian message cut both ways, however, in that it also held slave owners to a high moral standard that they often failed to meet.

E. George Fitzhugh argued that slavery was infinitely superior to industrial labor in the free North and proposed spreading slavery among poor whites.

Suggested Reading:

Bartlett, *John C. Calhoun*.

Genovese, *The World the Slaveholders Made*.

Kirk, *John Randolph of Roanoke*.

Tate, *Conservatism and Southern Intellectuals*.

Questions to Consider:

1. Why was the principle of state sovereignty so important for Randolph and Calhoun?
2. Which arguments in favor of slavery seem to you the most and least compelling?

Lecture Eight
Northern Antebellum Conservatism

Scope: By 1820, the United States was becoming a white men's democracy, as states amended their constitutions to abolish property qualifications for voting. Remnants of the Federalist Party in New England and prosperous businessmen throughout the Union formed the nucleus of the Whig Party, whose twin concerns were fears of presidential tyranny under Andrew Jackson and fears that democracy might turn into mere demagogy. They suffered a jarring defeat in the Bank War (1830–1832), when Jackson vetoed legislation for the charter renewal of the second Bank of the United States. To them the veto was an assertion of tyrannical power and an unscrupulous appeal to citizens' class resentments. The event seemed almost a textbook illustration of their thinking: If unpropertied men are allowed to vote, is it not likely that they will seize the property of men who have it? Is it not likely, also, that demagogues will arise to manipulate their fears and whip up hatred against the rich? Jackson, in their view, was the tyrant, and the destruction of the bank augured economic chaos. Daniel Webster and Henry Clay became the great Whig leaders, eager for responsible government, national economic improvements, and preservation of the Union. Webster's speeches on the sanctity of the Union created a profound impression on a young Illinois Whig, Abraham Lincoln.

Outline

I. Andrew Jackson alarmed Northern conservatives by manipulating popular passions, ignoring the Supreme Court, and destroying the second Bank of the United States.

- **A.** His inauguration looked to conservatives like a disgraceful mob scene.
- **B.** Jackson defied the Supreme Court over the fate of the "five civilized tribes."
- **C.** Regarding the Bank and its president, Nicholas Biddle, as examples of economic elitism at its worst, Jackson vetoed legislation for the extension of its charter in 1832.
  - **1.** Biddle interpreted the veto message as a declaration of Jacobinism.

2. The nation entered a period of chaotic financial upheavals in the late 1830s.

II. The Whig Party, growing up in opposition to Jackson, represented the principles of hierarchy, social stability, nationally assisted economic growth, and respect for the Union.

A. Calvin Colton ably outlined the Whigs' political and economic theories.

1. Colton deplored the emotional excesses of the Second Great Awakening.
2. He regretted the moral absolutism that often went with revivalism, especially that of the abolitionists.

B. Daniel Webster, among the greatest of American orators, encouraged a sense of veneration for the Union.

1. His rhetorical skill, as in the "Second Reply to Hayne" (1830), induced tears in audiences and a sense that he had almost superhuman powers.
2. He influenced a young Abraham Lincoln, whose vision of the Union was closely modeled on Webster's.

C. Prominent Whig Henry Clay's advocacy of compromise on behalf of the Union antagonized fire-eating Southerners on one side and abolitionist absolutists on the other. Clay played a leading role in promoting three great compromises of the antebellum era, over Missouri (1820), over the Nullification Crisis (1832), and over the admission of California to the Union as a free state (1850).

D. Rufus Choate explained the Whig idea of reverence for the law.

E. Alexis de Tocqueville visited America in 1831–1832 and wrote a conservative classic about his experiences. He asserted that liberty and equality were opposites and that the passion for equality might destroy liberty.

III. An elite group of conservative Whigs regarded themselves as guardians of civilization, whose task was to bring to America and nurture there the highest achievements of Western civilization.

A. George Ticknor, an outstanding linguist and author, tried to improve Harvard University and built cultural institutions in Boston.

B. Edward Everett devoted his career half to education and half to politics as he endeavored to civilize the rough-and-ready democracy of New England.

Suggested Reading:

Ashworth, *Agrarians and Aristocrats*.

Bartlett, *Daniel Webster*.

Howe, *The Political Culture of the American Whigs*.

Wilentz, *The Rise of American Democracy*.

Questions to Consider:

1. What qualities in Andrew Jackson made him so threatening to American Whigs?
2. Is cultural or political elitism compatible with democracy?

Lecture Nine
Opposing the Great Reform Act

Scope: From 1793 to 1815, Britain was almost constantly at war against the French Revolution and against Napoleon. It emerged victorious, not least because of its growing industrial and commercial power. During the war, however, many British conservatives venerated the old way of life that was passing away—the life of hierarchy, honor, faith, and personal loyalty—rather than the new commercial, urban life that was taking its place. Romantic conservatism helped to shape the mood of Victorian Britain and to temper some of its utilitarian harshness.

In the late 1820s and early 1830s, Britain repealed its anti-Catholic laws and reformed its undemocratic, unrepresentational Parliamentary system. Conservatives opposed both changes. They opposed Catholic emancipation because they thought that the unity of church and state was the bulwark of British political stability, and because for nearly three centuries Catholicism had carried overtones of sympathy for Britain's enemies, Spain and France. Conservatives opposed the Reform Act because they foresaw that it would shift political power away from the landed gentry (their source of greatest strength) and toward the new middle classes. Their great strength lay in the House of Lords, which repeatedly vetoed the Reform Act. When the Whig prime minister Lord Grey directed King William IV to begin appointing new pro-reform Lords until they outnumbered the old ones, the upper house finally relented and the reform became law. Despite the conservatives' passionate opposition to the Reform Act, their descendants would look back fondly to it as evidence that Britain, unlike France, could reform itself procedurally and without violence. In that sense, it served the same function in Britain as the election of 1800 served in America.

Outline

I. Influential writers in the early 19th century created a mood of romantic conservatism that affected English literature and politics throughout the Victorian era.

A. Walter Scott, in a succession of wildly popular novels, evoked a lost world of chivalry and honor.

B. William Wordsworth, who had welcomed the French Revolution as a young man, turned away from it to a contemplation of the beauty and stability of England.

C. Wordsworth's friend Samuel Taylor Coleridge similarly eulogized the established Church of England.

D. William Cobbett deplored the decline of benign patriarchy in the countryside.

II. Catholic emancipation, vetoed by George III in 1801, finally became law in 1829 despite energetic conservative resistance.

A. Daniel O'Connell in Ireland led the movement for emancipation. He won a seat in Parliament in 1828 but was unable to take it because of his religion.

B. Robert Peel in the House of Commons and the Duke of Wellington in the House of Lords reluctantly introduced the Catholic Relief Act of 1829. Peel was the most gifted conservative in the House of Commons and had already given his name to the new Metropolitan Police Force, the "Peelers," by his legislation of 1828.

III. Conservatives showed even more reluctance to pass the Great Reform Act of 1832, which began the long, slow process of making the British government a parliamentary democracy.

A. William Pitt's attempted reforms in 1786 had failed.

B. George Canning spoke consistently against extending popular representation because of what he saw as the fickleness and ignorance of the electorate.

C. When in 1830 the Duke of Wellington, a Tory, expressed his complete confidence in the old system, a public outcry forced him to resign as prime minister.

D. The Reform Bill, first introduced in March 1831 under the Whig leader, Lord Grey, proposed to give seats to the new industrial towns and to take them away from about 140 "rotten boroughs." Grey won a large Whig majority in the election of 1831 and reintroduced the bill.

E. Passage of the bill through the House of Commons presented a painful dilemma to the conservative-dominated House of Lords.
   1. Many avoided the first vote, aware that to vote against the bill would be to defy popular opinion.
   2. The Anglican bishops voted solidly against it.
   3. Pro-reform riots swept through England.
   4. Grey resigned in protest when King William IV refused to swamp the House of Lords, but the Duke of Wellington was unable to form a government of his own.

F. Widespread popular protests led conservatives to fear an outbreak of revolution.
   1. Petitions called for the abolition of the monarchy and aristocracy.
   2. The king, reluctantly recalling Grey, assented to the proposal of swamping the House of Lords.
   3. His letter to the Tory lords finally persuaded them not to oppose the Reform Bill any further, and it became law in June 1832.

Suggested Reading:

Blake, *The Conservative Party*.

Butler, *The Conservatives*.

Coleman, *Conservatism and the Conservative Party*.

Rubinstein, *Britain's Century*.

Questions to Consider:

1. Did the conservative objections to democracy have any merit? If so, why are these arguments so rarely voiced today?

2. Why did Catholic emancipation arouse such strong emotions?

Lecture Ten
Robert Peel and the Conservative Revival

Scope: After the Reform Act, Robert Peel set about building a conservative political party in the modern sense. Its members would work together on commonly agreed policies, provide united opposition to the Whigs when in the minority, and give united support to their leader (the prime minister) when in the majority. Peel was an excellent parliamentarian and manager who presided over a great conservative revival. He was, however, distinct from most of his followers. Most Conservatives in the 1830s and 1840s were country gentlemen, whose income came from rent and the sale of crops. Peel himself, by contrast, was the son of a wealthy manufacturer who had bought his way into the upper classes. Aware of the landed classes' obsessions, Peel was also aware of the need to conciliate, and legislate in the interest of, the industrialists and manufacturers whose enterprises were changing the face of Britain. He became prime minister in 1841 after a great electoral triumph and led the nation during the tense years of the "hungry '40s." Fear of social revolution from below, anxiety about the industrialists, and recurrent Irish crises prompted Peel to make concessions to his adversaries. But these concessions, culminating with the Maynooth Grant and the repeal of the Corn Laws, led many Conservatives to regard their own leader as a betrayer. The party split irrevocably in 1846, with one group following Peel, another group following Disraeli (the decade's rising star), and a third group following William Gladstone to join the Whigs. This rift would not be healed for more than two decades.

Outline

I. Peel's early career demonstrated his exceptional abilities.

A. His father's success in business enabled the young Robert Peel to grow up like an aristocrat.

B. Rising rapidly through the ranks in the 1810s and 1820s, he was already the Conservative leader in the Commons under the Duke of Wellington.

C. His guidance of Catholic Emancipation through the Commons in 1829 sowed the seeds of suspicion in the minds of conservative "Ultras."

II. After the Great Reform Act, he set about organizing the Conservative Party in something resembling its modern form.

A. He saw the possibility of attracting moderate Whigs who, after the Reform Act, were concerned to preserve political stability. His core constituencies were the Church of England, the Tory squires, the lawyers, and the old-wealth merchants.

B. He was able to insinuate that Lord Melbourne's Whig government of the late 1830s was encouraging lawlessness.

III. Peel, victor of the election of 1841, ruled capably but increased some of his party's suspicions by making concessions on issues that were, to them, nonnegotiable.

A. He failed to recognize the importance of the squires' support and sometimes failed to conceal his disdain for their narrow outlook.

1. He made another mistake by failing to give office to another ambitious young Conservative, Benjamin Disraeli, whose exclusion from the cabinet was a source of lasting bitterness.

2. Peel's introduction of the income tax in 1842 made economic sense but was politically unpopular.

B. He won support for his firm resistance to the Chartists.

C. The Maynooth Grant of 1845 was designed to reduce Irish Catholic resentments, but its practical effect was to inflame English Protestants.

1. It prompted Gladstone to resign from the government; he joined the opposition and went on to become a Liberal prime minister.

2. Queen Victoria was dismayed at the outpouring of bigotry the grant provoked.

D. The repeal of the Corn Laws provoked an even greater outcry and led to the fall of Peel's ministry.

1. The Corn Laws, passed in 1815 and modified in 1828, openly upheld the interest of the landowning classes over against those of the urban and working classes.

2. The Anti–Corn Law League, under Richard Cobden and John Bright, represented the interest of the business community and the principle of free trade.

3. Peel understood the benefits of free trade and was already looking for a pretext to abolish the Corn Laws.
4. The outbreak of famine in Ireland, with the failure of the potato harvest, gave Peel the opportunity he sought.
5. In the vote of February 1846, 112 Conservatives voted with Peel but 242 others voted against, shattering the party.

Suggested Reading:

Blake, *The Conservative Party*.

Butler, *The Conservatives*.

Coleman, *Conservatism and the Conservative Party*.

Hurd, *Robert Peel*.

Questions to Consider:

1. Why was Peel, normally so shrewd, unaware of the storm he would provoke over the Maynooth Grant and the Corn Laws?
2. Is yielding graciously to new social forces a genuine merit among conservatives, or is it a regrettable weakness?

Lecture Eleven
Smith, Ricardo, Malthus, Mill

Scope: In their day, the pioneers of free-market capitalism were widely regarded as radicals—some of their admirers still call them "classical liberals." It is appropriate to consider them at this point in the course, however, for chronological reasons and because the ideas they developed were to become central to 20th-century conservatism. Adam Smith's *Inquiry into the Wealth of Nations* (1776) argued against protective tariffs and government monopolies and in favor of the free market. The invisible hand of the market, wrote Smith, will adjust the economy more accurately and equitably than the interfering hand of government; entrepreneurs will flourish, and consumers will enjoy ever-improving goods at ever-decreasing costs.

David Ricardo, a wealthy businessman who took up economics after reading Smith's great work, explored the advantages to the nation of economic specialization just at the time that Britain's textile magnates were learning how to mass produce goods, subdivide labor, and enjoy massive economies of scale. He and his friend Thomas Malthus feared that constant pressure of population would leave most people poor and that landowners would ultimately gain the most from these great economic changes. John Stuart Mill, a principal figure in the early history of utilitarianism, dismayed the conservatives of his day by denouncing paternalism, favoring the separation of church and state, and arguing that women should have political rights. His central belief, however, that individuals should be left to their own devices as much as possible and should have the right to do whatever harms no one else, has made him a luminous figure in the history of libertarianism as well as the history of liberalism. He is an important figure in the history of both sides of today's political divide.

Outline

I. There is nothing natural about capitalism; it had to be invented, and its inventors had to overcome many practical and intellectual obstacles.

A. British life in the 18th and early 19th centuries was only gradually emerging from tradition-bound relationships.
  1. The idea of the just price was still widely accepted.
  2. Economists assumed that the poor must be kept poor or they would do no work.

B. Mercantilism assumed that one nation's gain was another's loss.

C. Important economic ventures were usually undertaken through the grant of royal charters that excluded competition.

II. Adam Smith, in *An Inquiry into the Wealth of Nations* (1776), brought together the insights of numerous writers on economics, philosophy, and politics to create a general theory of capitalism.

A. He showed that individuals serving their self-interest will also provide everything that society needs.
  1. Competition will ensure a steady fall in prices and a steady rise in the quality of goods on sale.
  2. Price mechanisms will ensure that supply meets demand.

B. He assumed that societies are dynamic, not static, and that their economies will develop.
  1. Even poor men in industrializing Britain were living better than ever before.
  2. Smith noted that population was rising as productivity increased, partly because improved wages tended to reduce infant mortality.

C. He demonstrated, with the example of pin makers, the immense gain in productivity that comes with the division of labor.

D. He rejected the ideas that government-granted monopolies were necessary or beneficial and that the government should impose tariffs on trade. He also favored the repeal of legislation that limited the mobility of laborers or restricted the size of enterprises.

III. Smith's successors studied the complexities that developed in an industrial system and the class conflicts they were likely to produce.

A. Thomas Malthus argued that growth in population, rising geometrically, will always outstrip growth in food supplies, which rise only arithmetically. Malthus doubted whether moral restraint (or delays in the age of marriage) would be sufficient to counteract his logic.

B. David Ricardo explored the rising conflict between landed and industrial wealth.

C. John Stuart Mill brought together insights of libertarian philosophy and classical economics.

1. He argued that the laws of economics apply only to the phase of production, not distribution, and that societies always decide how wealth should be distributed.

2. His classic work *On Liberty* made the case for the maximum freedom of speech and action for all, so long as it did not impinge on others' freedom.

IV. The rise of socialism in the early and mid-19th century gradually converted the advocates of capitalism into conservatives.

A. Karl Marx (1818–1883) saw capitalism as essentially exploitative of labor and prophesied an inevitable class war that would annihilate it.

1. He argued that the enlargement of the proletariat, and its immiseration, would lead it to overthrow the bourgeoisie.

2. The *Communist Manifesto* of 1848 forecast the doom of the bourgeois world, and that year's revolutions briefly made the threat seem real.

B. After about 1850, British holders of landed and industrial wealth recognized that they might all suffer at the hands of lower-class revolutionaries and that more factors bound them together than sundered them.

1. The comparative fluidity of the British class system enabled growing numbers of aristocratic and industrial families to intermarry.

2. The rise of socialism and the relative decline of landed wealth left the defense of capitalism as a defining characteristic of 20th-century conservatism.

3. The libertarian side of American conservatism finds its historical antecedents among the once-radical British economists.

Suggested Reading:

Ebeling, *The Age of Economists*.

Heilbroner, *The Worldly Philosophers*.

Mill, *Principles of Political Economy*.

Smith, *An Inquiry into the Wealth of Nations*.

Questions to Consider:

1. Why is it reasonable to describe the defenders of capitalism, who were once "radicals," as conservatives today?
2. To what extent were Smith, Ricardo, Malthus, Mill, and Marx influenced by what they saw around them in Britain?

Lecture Twelve
Conservatism and the American Civil War

Scope: Southern conservatives, afraid that the North would strangle the slave system, seceded from the Union after the election of Abraham Lincoln in 1860. Northern conservatives, raised on Daniel Webster's eulogies to the indivisible Union, refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of secession and declared the South to be in rebellion. The war, in this sense, was the clash of two conservative philosophies. Northern patrician writers like Francis Parkman and John Templeton Strong gloried in the war at first, seeing it as an opportunity for martial virtue in place of what they thought of as the money-grubbing commercial life that was making America rich but degraded. White Southerners' self-identification as chivalrous defenders of an endangered and honorable way of life also led them to rejoice at the coming of war—at least to begin with. Conservative aims soon had to give way to emergency wartime conditions, however, and the political logic of the conflict became progressively more drastic. Both sides curtailed the rights of critics, both used conscription and martial law, and at last Lincoln moved to abolish slavery. Union victory brought the Old South to an end, but ex-Confederates did everything they could to venerate the Lost Cause and rebuild a society that looked to the values of the past rather than the values of the triumphant, commercial North.

Outline

I. The seceding Confederate states of 1860 and 1861 were even more reluctant than the American revolutionaries of the 1770s to think of themselves as innovators.

- **A.** The election of Abraham Lincoln, candidate of the all-Northern Republican Party, led influential Southern leaders to believe there was no other way to conserve their way of life.
- **B.** They reiterated John C. Calhoun's theory of state sovereignty.
- **C.** Jefferson Davis arranged for his inauguration as president of the Confederate States of America to take place beneath a statue of George Washington, on Washington's birthday in 1862, to emphasize the Confederate States of America's continuities with the past.

D. Some Southern conservatives, such as Alexander Stephens, had grave misgivings about secession but eventually went along with the state.

E. If it hoped to prevail in the war, the South could not be too loyal to its conservative founding principles.

II. Lincoln undertook the most basic of all conservative tasks, preserving the nation itself.

A. A former Whig in the Henry Clay and Daniel Webster tradition, he was not an abolitionist and certainly never imagined that he would be remembered as the Great Liberator. His great speeches argued that not only the Union but also American democracy was now part of a venerable tradition.

B. Conservative Northern patricians welcomed the onset of the war, believing it would revive the martial virtues that had been stained by commercial greed.

1. War, they hoped, would break the power of the Southern "slave power" aristocrats.

2. They were almost as revolted by radical abolitionists as were the Southern leaders.

3. They did not shrink from the prospect of a long and bloody war, and they advocated absolute obedience to the commander in chief.

C. The reality of fighting and winning the war soon compelled Lincoln to undertake radical steps.

1. Conscription augmented federal coercive power.

2. The suspension of habeas corpus led Lincoln's critics to accuse him of tyranny.

3. Freeing the slaves was, in Lincoln's eyes, a war measure rather than an act of principle.

D. Northern Democrats doubted the justice of Lincoln's cause and condemned his conduct of the war as tyrannical.

III. Southern white intellectuals explained their defeat, the Lost Cause, in a rhetoric and symbolism that mixed conservative and religious imagery.

A. They compared their suffering and defeat to that of Jesus Christ.

B. Their nostalgic evocations of the Old South drained it of conflict and social tension.

C. They established a backward-looking and hierarchical society that maintained a high degree of repression against African Americans.

D. The Ku Klux Klan evoked for them the romantic Scottish clans of the novelist Walter Scott.

E. Henry Grady and other advocates of New South ideas presented them with a patina of tradition that proved palatable even to Northern white audiences.

Suggested Reading:

Donald, *Lincoln*.

Frederickson, *The Inner Civil War*.

Gallagher and Nolan, *The Myth of the Lost Cause*.

Wilson, *Baptized in Blood*.

Questions to Consider:

1. Is it reasonable to look at the Civil War as a clash of two forms of conservatism?

2. Why did fighting the war force leaders on both sides to take increasingly drastic actions despite their conservative intentions?

Lecture Thirteen
Industrialists, Mugwumps, Traditionalists

Scope: After the Civil War, American industrialization accelerated until, by 1890, the United States was rivaling and beginning to surpass Britain in productivity. A generation of industrialists and their sympathizers in law and politics argued that optimal conditions for business benefited the nation as a whole. They shuddered at the rising specter of socialism, with its challenge to the legitimacy of capitalism. Andrew Carnegie, the iron and steel magnate, justified his wealth with arguments that borrowed from Darwinian evolutionary theory. At the same time, however, he insisted that the creation of great wealth brought great responsibilities. His "Gospel of Wealth" argued that entrepreneurs must now be charitable and paternalistic, distributing their largesse to the less fortunate in the same way aristocrats had done in former ages. Carnegie was conservative in a paradoxical way, since his way of life was profoundly innovative.

Meanwhile, intellectuals whose family fortunes had been made earlier shrank in distaste from what to them was the ostentatious vulgarity of Carnegie and the other robber barons. Mocked in their day as "mugwumps," they were conservatives of a different stripe, lamenting the eclipse of old republican virtues and looking back nostalgically to the quieter days of their youth. Henry Adams, whose grandfather and great-grandfather had both been presidents, looked even farther backward. In *The Education of Henry Adams* and *Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres*, his best-remembered books, he wrote a scathing indictment of industrial society, describing it as inferior to the society of faith that had created the great cathedrals of the Middle Ages. Conservatives in his own day and since have admired his style but found little or nothing of value in his vision of society.

Outline

I. The new industrial giants and their intellectual supporters argued for a political and economic system that maximized their opportunities.

A. Owing more to Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill, they were conservatives only insofar as they were trying to forestall socialism.

B. Andrew Carnegie preached the gospel of wealth.
  1. He used Darwinian ideas to explain and justify his success.
  2. He argued that possession of great wealth also conferred responsibilities for enlightened redistribution.

C. William Graham Sumner offered an intellectual rationale for free-market capitalism.
  1. Antiphilosophical, aggressively materialist, he saw himself as a scientist of economics.
  2. Never a mere flack for the great entrepreneurs, he condemned tariffs and spoke on behalf of what he called "the forgotten man."

II. The mugwumps, educated patrician intellectuals, deplored the rampant corruption of city government and campaigned for urban and civic reforms.

A. George William Curtis campaigned to end the spoils system and introduce civil service examinations.

B. At the same time, E. L. Godkin, editor of *The Nation* after the Civil War, campaigned against currency manipulation.

C. The mugwumps became advocates of immigrant exclusion when the new immigration from southern and eastern Europe brought to America people with no experience of republican government.

III. The post–Civil War years gave rise to an antimodernist movement. The movement's nostalgic traditionalists eulogized earlier eras in American and European history over what they saw as the frenzy, bustle, and heartlessness of their own industrial society.

A. Brooks Adams theorized the cyclical rise and fall of civilizations in a way that denigrated his own era and exalted the Middle Ages.

B. Brooks's brother, Henry Adams, wrote two masterpieces on the antimodernist theme.
  1. In *Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres* (1904), he argued the superiority of the great northern French cathedrals over any modern structure.
  2. In *The Education of Henry Adams* (1907), he lamented what he saw as the decline from grace of his world in his lifetime.

C. Other American traditionalists condemned democracy and sought superior past ages to eulogize.
   1. A practicing architect, Ralph Adams Cram, built in the neogothic style and agreed with the Adams brothers about the superiority of medieval styles.
   2. Barrett Wendell, a Harvard literature professor, believed that democracy would destroy the precious but fragile heritage of Western civilization.

D. Art collectors began to scour Europe for treasures, implicitly paying tribute to the superiority of an older civilization. Isabella Stewart Gardner's Renaissance-style palace was among the most conspicuous of these new collections.

E. Henry James expatriated himself, asserting the incompatibility of raw young America with high literary art.

Suggested Reading:

Allitt, *The Conservatives*.

Bannister, *On Liberty, Society, and Politics*.

Carnegie, *Autobiography*.

Tucker, *Mugwumps*.

Questions to Consider:

1. Did the traditionalists and the post–Civil War defenders of capitalism have anything in common apart from a shared fear and hatred of socialism?
2. Do you agree with Carnegie and Sumner's claim that inequalities of wealth benefit society as a whole?

Lecture Fourteen
Disraeli and Tory Imperialism

Scope: Benjamin Disraeli (1804–1881) is one of the larger-than-life figures of British history. Starting as an outsider to British life, he converted from Judaism to Anglicanism and enjoyed a meteoric ascent through the ranks of the Conservative Party, many of whose members never entirely trusted him, even when they found him too useful to discard. A brilliant speaker and a talented writer, he made a reputation as a novelist and as leader of the romantic Young England movement of the 1840s. Embittered by his exclusion from the government of Robert Peel in 1841, he rose to prominence after Peel's discredit in the Corn Law Repeal crisis of 1846. Disraeli was leader of the Conservatives in the House of Commons for nearly 20 years, then became prime minister in 1868, just after supervising passage of the Second Reform Act in Parliament. He and the Liberal leader William Gladstone vied for power over the next 13 years, with Disraeli benefiting from the support of Queen Victoria, whom he appointed Empress of India. He understood that as Britain became more democratic, the Conservatives would only flourish if they could win the support of the working-class majority. Unlike his predecessors, he encouraged popular support of the British Empire, and he tried to enlarge Britain's imperial holdings during the scramble for Africa of the 1870s. He also borrowed millions from the Rothschilds in order to buy for Britain a major share in the Suez Canal, which a French engineering company had completed in 1869. Much of the structure of the modern Conservative Party was created by Disraeli, who remained an inspirational figure to the party for more than a century.

Outline

I. Disraeli's life bears witness to the permeability of the British class structure to people of outstanding talent and determination.

- **A.** His *Vindication of the English Constitution* (1835) criticized utilitarianism and reasserted Burke's principal ideas.
- **B.** The Young England movement of the 1840s aspired to a romantic ideal of national unity.

C. Lacking the conventional formal education of his peers, Disraeli came to prominence first as a popular novelist.

1. *Coningsby* (1844), *Sybil* (1845), and *Tancred* (1847) advanced the ideas of Young England.

2. Disraeli liked the idea of the extreme antiquity of the Jewish people, which coincided with his respect for the old aristocracy.

D. Exclusion from Robert Peel's government in 1841 turned Disraeli into a lifelong enemy of Peel.

II. From the late 1840s to the late 1860s, Disraeli organized the minority Conservatives in the House of Commons while benefiting from the patronage of Edward Stanley, the Earl of Derby.

A. Stanley in the Lords and Disraeli in the Commons led the old Protectionist Conservatives, who had split irrevocably from Peel in 1846.

B. After opposing Liberal proposals for a second Reform Act in 1866, Disraeli guided one through Parliament, greatly extending the franchise.

C. Disraeli lost the election of 1868 but then set about overhauling the Conservative Party's organization throughout the country.

III. As prime minister from 1874, Disraeli presided over the expansion of the British Empire and induced a popular enthusiasm for it among the fast-growing industrial working classes.

A. His rivalry with William Gladstone was one of the great political combats of the 19th century.

1. Disraeli's government undertook social legislation as a way of preempting the Liberals and preserving working-class support.

2. An 1876 controversy over the "Bulgarian atrocities" offered a foretaste of 20th-century political debates over foreign policy morality.

B. British troops overcame defeats in Afghanistan and South Africa, and Disraeli used their exploits to encourage imperial jingoism.

1. He delighted Queen Victoria by naming her Empress of India in 1876.

2. He was the first prime minister to link together the great themes of conservatism, empire, and national greatness.

C. He emerged triumphant from the Congress of Berlin (1878).

D. Disraeli lost the election of 1880, during an economic recession.

Suggested Reading:

Butler, *The Conservatives*.

Hibbert, *Disraeli*.

Jenkins, *Disraeli and Victorian Conservatism*.

Rubinstein, *Britain's Century*.

Questions to Consider:

1. Was principle or pragmatism the guiding force in Disraeli's political life?
2. Why would British working-class people take pride in their nation's colonial empire, which most of them had no prospect of ever seeing?

Lecture Fifteen
The Rise of Labour and the House of Lords

Scope: British and American conservatives were afraid of socialism in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The American trade union movement never created a political party of its own, but the British union movement did, founding the Labour Party in 1900, which declared its explicit allegiance to socialism in 1917. In the early 20th century, the Liberal Party (afraid of Labour competition) tried to hold on to its voters' loyalty by passing social welfare legislation. The Conservatives—whose landed estates would be taxed to pay for it—indignantly opposed the legislation, which was nicknamed the "people's budget." When the Conservative-dominated House of Lords refused to approve the budget, Prime Minister Herbert Asquith threatened to pack it with pro-budget sympathizers. The old Lords backed down and were forced to accept a permanent reduction in their constitutional powers by the Parliament Act of 1911. Alarmed by the rise of socialism, the Conservatives were also horrified by the possibility of Irish Home Rule. They tiptoed to the brink of treason in trying to prevent it and renamed themselves the Unionist Party as an expression of their belief that the union of England and Ireland was vital.

Outline

I. A hostile political and legal environment prompted the growth of trade unions and Labour politics in late 19th-century and early 20th-century Britain.

- **A.** Britain's rising industrial working class began to organize in trades unions in the second half of the 19th century.
- **B.** The first independent labor candidate elected to Parliament, Keir Hardie, took his seat in 1892.
  - **1.** He defied parliamentary convention by refusing to wear a frock coat, high collar, and top hat, appearing instead in a tweed suit and socialist red tie.
  - **2.** He advocated a graduated income tax, universal free education, votes for women, and abolition of the House of Lords.

C. The Trades Unions Congress (TUC) decided to create its own political party in 1900. The Labour Party won 29 seats in the election of 1906 in alliance with the Liberals.

II. The rise of the Labour Party strengthened Conservative bonds between landowners and businessmen.

A. Victorian-era disputes between landed, commercial, and industrial wealth were now offset by the common threat of socialism.

1. Conservative leadership passed from Lord Salisbury to Arthur Balfour at the beginning of the 20th century.

2. Winston Churchill, who was to be one of Balfour's most distinguished successors, began his career in Parliament in 1900.

B. Liberal prime minister Herbert Asquith and Chancellor David Lloyd George presented the "people's budget" in 1909, partly to mollify their Labour supporters.

1. The budget was openly redistributive in intention, taxing the wealthy to support the beginnings of a welfare state.

2. The House of Lords rejected it, violating a 300-year tradition of not asserting itself against the Commons on money bills.

C. Asquith called two general elections on the question in 1910, retaining office both times but not winning overall Liberal majorities. Labour's representation increased again, while Irish nationalists held the swing votes.

D. The Parliament Act of 1911 sharply curtailed the power of the Lords, reducing their role to a two-year veto. If they refused to cooperate, Asquith ordered the new king, George V, to create new pro-reform Lords, repeating a threat that had been effective in 1832 in the First Reform Act crisis.

III. Home Rule for Ireland was a second galvanizing issue for Conservatives in 1910–1911 and increased the intensity of the Parliament Bill debate.

A. William Gladstone's proposal for Irish Home Rule in 1886 had fragmented the Liberal Party by moving key members of his party over to the Conservative side. Lord Randolph Churchill (the father of Winston) exhorted Irish Protestants to resist Home Rule at all costs.

B. Irish Nationalist members of Parliament would only cooperate with Asquith's Liberal government in return for the promise of a new Home Rule bill.

C. Andrew Bonar Law, the new Conservative leader who replaced Balfour after the Parliament crisis, was himself a Protestant Ulsterman.

D. The onset of World War I postponed the resolution of the Irish question and bore witness to a conservative revival.

Suggested Reading:

Cannadine, *History in Our Time*.

Churchill, *Great Contemporaries*.

Dangerfield, *The Strange Death of Liberal England*.

Wells, *The House of Lords*.

Questions to Consider:

1. What arguments, if any, can be made in favor of a hereditary House of Lords in a modern democracy?
2. Why were the Conservatives so intransigent about Protestant Ulster in the face of Irish agitation for Home Rule?

Lecture Sixteen
The Idea of Anglo-Saxon Supremacy

Scope: Racism was intellectually respectable in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and one version of it—popular on both sides of the Atlantic—was the idea that the Anglo-Saxons were destined (either by God or by nature) to rule the rest of the world. Cecil Rhodes made a fortune in the South African diamond and gold business and then built a semiprivate empire (Rhodesia) based on this idea. The Rhodes Scholarships, to which he bequeathed his fortune, were originally designed to create a secret society of Anglo-Saxon rulers who might unify the world around a nucleus of Britain and its colonies. Theodore Roosevelt, meanwhile, was one of the Americans who aspired to create a colonial empire for United States that could vie with Britain's, and he too believed it would carry the blessings of Anglo-Saxon commerce, Christianity, and good government to the benighted parts of the earth. Roosevelt, though a politician familiar with the rough and tumble world of democratic politics, also held a high ideal of public service and a sense of noblesse oblige toward the less fortunate; like fighting aristocrats of earlier times, he exalted the warrior virtues and despised the "softness" of a peaceful commercial world. Anglo-Saxon conservatives in Britain and America alike dreaded socialism and advocated a kind of race purity that would later come to seem sinister and disgraceful.

Outline

I. Many British and American conservatives shared the idea that, as Anglo-Saxons, they belonged to a master race that was destined to dominate the world.

- **A.** There was nothing new about racial discrimination in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, but now it enjoyed the support of science.
- **B.** It was central to conservatives' intellectual justification of the British Empire.
  - **1.** The idea drove Cecil Rhodes, whose diamond and gold businesses and political adventures expanded the British presence in southern Africa.
  - **2.** Lord Curzon saw traditional ideas as the key to maintaining a grip on British India.

3. These ideas also appear in the poetry of Rudyard Kipling.

C. American advocates of empire-building shared this outlook. Albert Beveridge denied that conquest of the North American continent ended the mission of Manifest Destiny.

II. Theodore Roosevelt longed to emulate Britain's empire-building role for the United States, and his outlook bore a striking resemblance to that of Britain's conservative imperialists.

A. An unashamed elitist, he regarded himself as one of the natural rulers in his community. He deplored patrician New Yorkers who shirked the duty of political leadership.

B. Roosevelt detested socialists, anarchists, and utopians, and he believed that all of them misunderstood the hard, unchanging realities of human life.
1. As a historian of the early republic, he praised the Federalists and scorned the Jeffersonians.
2. He favored the summary execution of anarchists.
3. He was dismissive of William Jennings Bryan and deplored the Free Silver campaign of 1896.

C. Roosevelt believed that war was a permanent part of the human condition and that men were destined to fight.
1. His writings always glorified warriors and denigrated pacifists.
2. When he had the chance to fight, in 1898, he abandoned his political position of assistant secretary of the navy to raise the Rough Riders.

D. Roosevelt honored tradition and the old virtues of fidelity, self-reliance, bravery, and hard work.

III. Other Anglo-Saxon conservatives in America shared many of Roosevelt's opinions and enthusiasms.

A. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, who had earlier studied under Henry Adams, feared the decline of the Anglo-Saxon race in the face of mass immigration.

B. Alfred Thayer Mahan, the naval historian, agreed with Roosevelt that war is a permanent part of the human condition and that the ability to win naval battles was the key to world domination.
1. His book *The Influence of Sea Power upon History* (1890) became immensely influential on both sides of the Atlantic.

2. At a disarmament conference in The Hague shortly before World War I, Mahan favored voting against a motion for the international outlawing of poison gas shells.

C. Elihu Root resigned his seat in the U.S. Senate after the 17th Amendment (1913) rather than submit to the indignity of having to campaign for reelection.

Suggested Reading:

Ferguson, *Empire*.

Haller, *Eugenics*.

Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*.

Roosevelt, *An Autobiography*.

Questions to Consider:

1. Why did racism, which is now regarded as disgraceful, once enjoy high public esteem?
2. What arguments and evidence could Rhodes, Roosevelt, Lodge, and Mahan use to support the claim of Anglo-Saxon superiority?

Lecture Seventeen
No Vote for Women

Scope: Today we like to believe that in all essentials men and women are similar, equally gifted intellectually and equally capable of all work except the most physically strenuous. Early in the 20th century, by contrast, nearly all articulate Britons and Americans were more struck by the differences between men and women. Suffrage advocates in both countries argued that women's moral superiority and their natural affinity for charity, compromise, and nurture would improve the quality of politics if they were allowed to participate. Opponents of women's suffrage retorted that, on the contrary, women's intervention in politics would do nothing to improve politics but would destroy women's special virtues and qualities, making them mannish, bossy, and vulgar. Respectable medical opinion on both sides of the Atlantic agreed that women were oriented around their reproductive systems and prone to hysteria if overstimulated. One of the most articulate American opponents, Helen Kendrick Johnson, regarded women's suffrage as an attack on marriage, child bearing, and the family as the central institution in society and predicted that it would introduce strife into the heart of family life. In Britain, meanwhile, conservative opponents of women's suffrage pointed to the fact that radical suffragettes like Christabel Pankhurst seemed to be on the brink of insanity with their window-smashing campaigns and hunger strikes. In the end, women's work and service during World War I strengthened the case for their enfranchisement. Once women had the vote, conservative politicians in both countries scrambled to recruit them and found the reality of their participation far less odious than their anticipation of it. The first woman to sit in Parliament, Nancy Astor, was herself an American by birth, and a Conservative.

Outline

I. Ideas about the essential difference between men and women could be used to justify the prosuffrage and antisuffrage positions.

A. Middle-class Victorians on both sides of the Atlantic, men and women, developed a theory of "separate spheres." Women's role was to nurture children, to form their consciences, and to instill religious and moral values.

B. Advocates of votes for women used these ideas selectively to promote suffrage. Women's superior moral qualities would elevate the tone of politics from its degraded condition.

C. Antisuffragists used the same ideas with a different spin.

1. In their view, to enter a world of argument, force, and coarseness would brutalize women and rob them of their special qualities.

2. Antisuffragists saw their worst fears confirmed in the conduct of the radical Women's Social and Political Union in Britain.

3. They added that Christian civilization might well be jeopardized if women entered political life.

4. So long as women lacked the vote, they could influence all citizens without the suspicion that they were interested parties.

D. Opposition to suffrage was, in effect, the natural conservative position.

E. Some elite women, however, argued that their education gave them a better entitlement to vote than ignorant working men.

II. The debate over suffrage was affected by other political and intellectual trends of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, especially the rise of socialism.

A. Conservatives saw a continuum between socialism, free love, and women's participation in politics.

B. At the other end of the political spectrum, the threat of German military power appeared in the debate.

C. The debate was sometimes cast in the language of evolution.

III. Women's service throughout both economies during World War I was indispensable; it strengthened the suffragist position and led to a constitutional change in both nations.

A. Feminists were disappointed to see that most women voted the same way as their fathers or husbands.

B. Former opponents of suffrage were quick to note that women tended, if anything, to be politically more conservative than men.

C. The history of the antisuffragists has been all but forgotten; the price of defeat is oblivion.

Suggested Reading:

Auchterlonie, *Conservative Suffragists*.

Camhi, *Women against Women*.

Dangerfield, *The Strange Death of Liberal England*.

Harrison, *Separate Spheres*.

Questions to Consider:

1. Why is it so difficult today to believe that the arguments against votes for women once seemed widely persuasive?
2. Was it paradoxical for antisuffrage women to campaign publicly against the entrance of women into public life?

Lecture Eighteen
American Conservatives after World War I

Scope: The 1920s was a period of prosperity throughout the United States, in which vast numbers of citizens acquired their first motor cars, refrigerators, radios, and gramophones. A trio of conservative Republicans occupied the White House—Warren G. Harding, Calvin Coolidge, and Herbert Hoover—all content to preside over a society in which it began to seem possible that everybody could get rich. Isolated groups in the universities deplored what they saw as a general yielding to materialism. One was the New Humanists, a group of conservative intellectuals led by Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More, who insisted that mankind has a higher spiritual destiny than mere consumerism. Another was the Southern Agrarians, centered in Nashville, Tennessee, who regarded the rural South as a repository of virtues that the rest of the nation was beginning to forget. The South alone has suffered defeat and failure, they wrote, and it must teach the rest of the nation that human aspirations are sure to be chastened. More upbeat than either of these groups but also conservative in his own way was H. L. Mencken, the most popular American journalist of the 1920s, who poured scornful cold water over progressive and perfectionist notions on the one hand, while mocking "old-time religion" and rural life on the other.

Outline

I. After World War I, conservative Republicans rejected the League of Nations, shunned the Russian Revolution, and retreated from international politics.

A. In the closing years of the Wilson administration, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge led the conservative resistance to American participation in the League of Nations.

B. While Italy and the Soviet Union created a new form of total politics, the United States government shrank, giving maximum scope to free enterprise.

1. The Russian Revolution of 1917 terrified American conservatives, who feared a comparable upheaval at home.

2. Since 1776, America had been an inspiration to revolutionaries everywhere, but after 1917 it became the world's counterrevolutionary leader.

II. Presidents Harding and Coolidge embodied two sides of the American small-government conservative tradition.

A. Harding campaigned on the slogan of a "return to normalcy" even though, ironically, normalcy was a neologism. His best appointees, Andrew Mellon at Treasury and Herbert Hoover at Commerce, favored economy and efficiency.

B. Coolidge embodied the old Puritan tradition in his personal life.

1. He favored minimal federal government.
2. He favored business interests over labor and agriculture.

C. A prolonged economic boom through the 1920s benefited most elements of society.

III. Isolated conservative intellectuals protested against what they saw as the gross materialism of their era.

A. The New Humanists sought to impose a sense of restraint on human appetites and to appeal to a more exalted conception of life.

1. Irving Babbitt protested against the rise of utilitarianism in education, against the scientific method, and against mass democracy.
2. Paul Elmer More judged cultures by austere absolute standards and could find nothing to praise in contemporary literature.
3. Norman Foerster saw Babbitt and More as luminous figures in a new humanism and treated their rebukes to worldliness as prophetic.
4. Liberal critics dismissed the New Humanists for their lack of creativity and for their "faculty-club" unworldliness.

B. The Southern Agrarians eulogized the neglected wisdom of rural life, and they used an idealized vision of the South as a scourge against the rising urban world. Their anthology *I'll Take My Stand: The South and the Agrarian Tradition* (1930) attributed all virtue to the rural South and all vice to the urban North.

C. The satirist H. L. Mencken, an unashamed elitist, poured scorn on the conventions and follies of his era and became one of the most popular writers of the 1920s.

1. A Baltimore journalist, he was also the first American interpreter of Nietzsche—and exhibited a ruthless Nietzschean streak of his own.
2. He scorned and hated the Puritanical values, evangelical Christianity, and rural life.

Suggested Reading:

Hoeveler, *The New Humanism*.

Singal, *The War Within*.

Teachout, *The Skeptic*.

Twelve Southerners, *I'll Take My Stand*.

Questions to Consider:

1. Why was the United States able to follow a political trend completely different from that of the rest of the industrial world in the 1920s?
2. What are the strengths and weaknesses of groups that criticize materialism in the name of true conservatism, such as the New Humanists and the Southern Agrarians?

Lecture Nineteen
Opposing the New Deal

Scope: The onset of the Great Depression transformed American conservatism. Following a decade of minimal government and widespread prosperity, President Hoover and the Republican Party found themselves forced onto the defensive in the fallout of the Wall Street crash. After losing the election of 1932, they looked with horror on the New Deal, fearing that Franklin Roosevelt would centralize federal power in a way comparable to the rising European tyrants Mussolini, Stalin, and Hitler. Widespread unemployment and a pervasive sympathy for the suffering of vulnerable citizens, meanwhile, cost H. L. Mencken much of his old popularity; his jibes and jests now seemed more heartless than amusing. A handful of isolated elitists such as Albert J. Nock and Ralph Adams Cram nevertheless continued to argue against democracy. While Hitler's power increased and the Second World War began, American conservatives argued whether the United States should stand behind Britain in the defense of European civilization or whether it should remain aloof from a conflict in which America had no vital interest.

Outline

I. After losing the presidency in the election of 1932, Herbert Hoover wrote and spoke extensively against the encroachment of federal power.

- **A.** In his earlier career, Hoover had been a Progressive Republican rather than a member of the Old Guard.
- **B.** As president, he took cautious steps to remedy Depression conditions but refused to pay direct relief to the unemployed.
- **C.** He deplored the power shifts of the New Deal.
  - **1.** Hoover protested against the New Deal in the name of liberalism.
  - **2.** He regarded Roosevelt as a potential European-style dictator.
  - **3.** He was again alarmed by Roosevelt's attempt to tamper with the Supreme Court.
- **D.** Robert Taft, unblemished by defeat, became leader of the Senate conservatives.

II. The critique of democracy and mass society voiced by American conservatives ever since the era of the Federalists could still be heard from Albert Jay Nock and Ralph Adams Cram.

A. Nock's *Our Enemy, the State* made an impassioned plea on behalf of decentralized government and libertarianism. His *Memoirs of a Superfluous Man* (1943) became a cult classic that was influential to the next generation of conservatives.

B. Ralph Adams Cram shared Nock's belief that most people have no capacity for self-government or sustained thought and that society must be organized to prevent them from doing harm. Cram rejected the individualistic theory of modern art.

C. Jose Ortega y Gasset's *Revolt of the Masses* (1930; English translation 1932) sounded a cautionary note about the rising power of the masses.

III. Conservatives divided over how to respond to fascism and to the rise of Hitler, with significant numbers taking the isolationist position.

A. Uncertainty about the meaning of fascism gave it a limited appeal among conservatives in the early 1930s. There was much less doubt about Soviet communism, which American conservatives hated from the start.

B. Charles Lindbergh's leadership gave popular credibility to the isolationist cause, at least until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Senator Robert Taft voiced a common skepticism about whether America had made any significant gains from its role in the previous war.

Suggested Reading:

Cram, *Convictions and Controversies*.

Diggins, *Mussolini and Fascism*.

Hoover, *The Challenge to Liberty*.

Nock, *Memoirs of a Superfluous Man*.

Questions to Consider:

1. Which aspects of the New Deal most offended Herbert Hoover's sense of propriety?

2. Why were many American conservatives slow to appreciate the threat of fascism and Nazism in the 1930s?

Lecture Twenty
The Tory Party from Bonar Law to Churchill

Scope: A million British soldiers died in the catastrophe of World War I: Britain emerged from the ordeal sobered and psychologically wounded. Politically, the war struck a mortal blow to the Liberal Party, and Labour emerged to take its place in the two-party system. The Conservatives held office throughout most of the interwar years while Labour struggled to demonstrate—not very convincingly—that it could govern; the parties created a coalition in reaction to the emergency conditions of the Great Depression. The Conservative leaders Bonar Law, Austen Chamberlain, and Stanley Baldwin were second-raters lacking in charisma. They could do little to change the perception that Britain's greatest days were past, that its empire must soon come to an end, and that high levels of unemployment and poverty were destined to be permanent features of British industrial life. Worst of the lot was Neville Chamberlain, who in the late 1930s made the fatal error of appeasing rather than resisting Adolf Hitler. Winston Churchill, who had defected to the Liberal Party in 1904, defected back to the Conservatives in 1924 but lacked the full support of his colleagues, many of whom looked on him as a man of doubtful loyalty and as a vestige of the old Victorian era, one who still thought in terms of Britain as an imperial great power. The crisis of 1939 and 1940, however, which proved how wrong Chamberlain had been, also marked a sudden rise in Churchill's fortunes. Vindicated by events, he was called to the premiership in May 1940 and revitalized British prestige, morale, and willpower during the dangerous months of the Battle of Britain.

Outline

I. Conservatives dominated the coalition government of World War I and the politics of the 1920s.

- **A.** The coalition won the election of 1918 under the leadership of Lloyd George.
- **B.** A Conservative victory in 1922 marked the eclipse of the Liberal Party.
- **C.** Stanley Baldwin replaced Bonar Law early in the new administration.

II. Winston Churchill is widely regarded as the greatest British conservative of the 20th century, yet in many respects he was unrepresentative.

A. First elected to Parliament as a Conservative in 1900, he "crossed the floor" to the Liberals in 1904 in protest against Joseph Chamberlain's tariff proposals.

B. His ascent to senior ministerial positions came under the patronage of the Liberal leaders Herbert Asquith and Lloyd George.

1. Churchill supported Lloyd George over the "people's budget" and the Parliament Act that diminished the power of the House of Lords.

2. While still in his 30s, Churchill was first lord of the Admiralty, presiding over the greatest navy in the history of the world.

3. The failure of his Gallipoli scheme discredited Churchill and led to his year of service on the Western Front.

4. Recalled to the government by Lloyd George, he was minister of munitions in the closing stages of the war.

C. He rejoined the Conservative Party in 1924 and was chancellor of the Exchequer for Stanley Baldwin from 1925 to 1929.

D. Churchill's outspokenness and tactlessness throughout the 1930s kept him out of office, but during those years his conservatism became more emphatic.

1. From the beginning of the Russian Revolution, he was a passionate anticommunist.

2. He remained dedicated to the British Empire, especially to British India, at a time when both major parties had begun to question its durability.

3. He never doubted that war was a permanent part of the human condition, and he hated its industrialization.

E. The severity of the Great Depression led to the creation of another coalition government from 1931 to 1935, but it gave no office to Churchill.

III. Churchill and Neville Chamberlain embodied the two sides of British conservatism in the late 1930s and at the beginning of World War II.

A. Churchill was the first major British politician to anticipate a renewed military threat from Germany.

B. Neville Chamberlain continued to hope that appeasement of Hitler would preserve peace. He won rapturous applause for conciliating Hitler at Munich in 1938.

C. Hitler's continued aggression soon shattered the delusory hopes of Munich, and Britain declared war when Hitler invaded Poland in September 1939. Chamberlain invited Churchill to join the government as first lord of the Admiralty.

D. Successive disasters in early 1940 led to Chamberlain's resignation.

1. Establishment Conservatives would have preferred Lord Halifax over Churchill as his successor.

2. In the ensuing months, Churchill gradually won over the Conservative skeptics, thanks largely to British success in the Battle of Britain.

Suggested Reading:

Blake, *The Conservative Party*.

Graubard, *Burke, Disraeli, and Churchill*.

Jenkins, *Churchill*.

Sullivan, *Eminent Churchillians*.

Questions to Consider:

1. How was the Conservative Party able to adapt to new conditions as Britain became more thoroughly democratic?

2. Were the complaints made against Churchill by Chamberlainite Conservatives justified?

Lecture Twenty-One
The Reaction to Labour and Nationalization

Scope: Churchill guided Britain, in alliance with the United States and the Soviet Union, to victory in World War II but was at once repudiated by the electorate as the war came to an end. To much of Britain, he represented the wrong kind of conservatism: backward looking, elitist, dedicated to class distinctions and to the empire. His successor as prime minister, the Labour leader Clement Attlee, nationalized major parts of the British economy and began to dissolve the empire. Churchill supervised the recovery of the Conservative Party from this debacle and led it back to power in 1951. He and his successors—Anthony Eden, Harold Macmillan, and Alec Douglas-Home—found, however, that they would not be able to reverse most of the Attlee revolution of the foregoing years. They too accepted the new National Health Service; the nationalized educational system; and the nationalized coal, steel, railway, and shipbuilding industries. Eden's failure to carry out the invasion of Suez in 1956 without President Eisenhower's approval demonstrated once and for all that Britain was no longer a world power. Despite these chastening encounters with decline, the Conservatives continued to believe in capitalism and to deplore escalating rates of taxation, overmighty trade unions, and the continued erosion of Britain's competitive position in the world. Their fortunes appeared to be at a low ebb in 1965, when they had just lost another election and 91-year-old Churchill died.

Outline

I. Winston Churchill led a coalition wartime government but lost the general election of 1945 to Labour leader Clement Attlee.

A. Churchill—always a warrior and fascinated by every aspect of war—dedicated himself almost entirely to foreign policy.

1. He worked tirelessly to involve the United States, recognizing that Britain alone would be unable to defeat Nazi Germany.

2. He was determined to preserve the British Empire if possible, but his allies Roosevelt and Stalin were equally determined not to let him.

B. Churchill left the running of domestic affairs to his deputy prime minister, Clement Attlee.

1. Attlee had also enjoyed a privileged upbringing. He was an idealistic socialist, a wounded World War I veteran, and a professor at the London School of Economics.

2. The Beveridge Report, written by an influential Liberal politician during the war and outlining a comprehensive welfare state, created almost millennial hopes among Britons.

C. As soon as the war against Hitler ended, the wartime coalition broke up and, in the ensuing election, Attlee defeated Churchill.

1. Churchill campaigned on preserving the empire and declared the prospective welfare state too expensive and too repressive.

2. Attlee's victory gave the Labour Party its first overall parliamentary majority.

3. Between 1945 and 1950, Labour nationalized transport, medicine, iron and steel, coal mining, education, and other major industries, despite Conservative protests about cost and viability.

4. Britain granted independence to India and Israel.

D. Churchill, as leader of the opposition, dedicated himself to shoring up the Anglo-American alliance against the Soviet threat.

II. When they returned to power in 1951, the Conservatives had to decide how to react to profound changes in British life and equally profound changes in Britain's place in the world.

A. They quickly discovered that the nationalized health and education systems were too popular to discard.

1. Whether to denationalize the major industries became a long-running source of dispute in the party.

2. Anticolonial uprisings in Kenya and Malaya were costly and difficult to suppress.

B. Churchill finally retired from the premiership at age 80, in 1955.

C. His protégé and successor, Anthony Eden, miscalculated the American reaction to the Suez adventure of 1956 and was forced to resign.

III. Harold Macmillan succeeded to the premiership in 1957 and helped the Conservatives repair the damage created by the Suez Crisis.

A. He presided over the decolonization of Africa.

B. He won reelection in 1959 with the slogan "You've never had it so good."

C. His attempt to take Britain into the Common Market (now the European Union) failed.

D. The Profumo Affair (1963), an election loss to Labour (1964), and the death of Churchill (1965) cast heavy shadows over the Conservatives' prospects.

1. John Profumo was a junior minister in the War Office who was revealed to have had an affair with a call girl, Christine Keeler, who was also sleeping with a Russian military attaché.

2. Macmillan retired in 1963 and was replaced as Conservative leader by Alec Douglas-Home.

3. Churchill's death in 1965 prompted a wave of national and international tributes but could not disguise the fact that the Conservative Party was in disarray.

Suggested Reading:

Francis and Bargielowska, *The Conservatives and British Society*.

Horne, *Macmillan*.

Jenkins, *Churchill*.

Macmillan, *Tides of Fortune*.

Questions to Consider:

1. What features of his work finally reconciled the Conservative rank and file to the leadership of Winston Churchill?

2. How effectively did Anthony Eden and Harold Macmillan respond to the challenge of Labour Party socialism?

Lecture Twenty-Two
American Anticommunism and McCarthyism

Scope: Two events of 1917 changed the world. The first was American entry into World War I; the second was the Russian Revolution. Anglo-American conservatives, already afraid of socialism, were horrified by the militant communism of Lenin's Bolsheviks, and anticommunism gradually became the defining feature of American conservatism. Massive Soviet gains in Europe during World War II, along with the success of the Chinese Revolution in 1949, suddenly made communism appear like a great red tide that might flood across the rest of the world. To make matters worse, the Truman administration discovered (thanks to revelations by Whittaker Chambers and others) that communist sympathizers in America had passed nuclear secrets to the Soviets during the war, hastening their ability to create their own nuclear weapons. This was the basis of the long cold war standoff and the circumstances that gave rise to McCarthyism inside America. McCarthyism was a populist form of conservatism that demanded loyalty oaths, a high level of consensus, and a suspicion of unconventional ideas. Liberal anticommunists said McCarthyism was the evil twin of communism itself. Conservatives retorted that McCarthy, though perhaps a blunt instrument, knew where America's greatest peril lay and knew that America was fighting for its life against a ruthless foe.

Outline

I. The Soviet Union rose to world power status during World War II.

- **A.** Between 1917 and 1939, Lenin and Stalin consolidated their power in the Soviet Union, annihilated all opposition, and undertook a crash course in industrialization.
  - **1.** They embarrassed the Western powers in World War I by publishing all the secret treaties.
  - **2.** In the Russian Civil Wars (1918–1920), 13,000 American troops fought against the Bolsheviks.
  - **3.** Soviet five-year plans led to rapid industrialization.
  - **4.** Nearly all the Old Bolsheviks, and anyone who opposed Stalin's will, were killed or sent to the gulag.

B. Stalin allied with Hitler in 1939 for the conquest of Poland and was taken unawares when German armies invaded the Soviet Union in 1941. Soviet armies bore the brunt of German military power over the next four years and suffered heavier casualties than any other belligerent in the war.

C. Stalin bitterly resented Roosevelt and Churchill for not launching the D-Day invasion of Western Europe until 1944.

1. Even as the allied American and Soviet armies converged on Germany in 1945, the seeds of the cold war had been sown.

2. Stalin violated the Yalta Accords of 1945 and kept an iron grip on the whole of Eastern Europe.

3. The Chinese Revolution of 1949 and Soviet acquisition of nuclear weapons the same year underlined fears about the spread of communist power.

II. In the nuclear age, espionage seemed more threatening than ever before, and American anticommunists came to believe that the U.S. government, as it struggled to lead the free world, was infected with spies and Soviet sympathizers.

A. Conservatives and liberals alike were concerned about the issue; security programs were begun under President Truman.

B. Whittaker Chambers's accusations against Alger Hiss became one of the most celebrated confrontations over communism in the early cold war era.

1. Chambers, as a Soviet courier, had received confidential documents from Hiss, a New Deal bureaucrat, during the 1930s.

2. Hiss's first trial ended in a hung jury, but he was convicted of perjury in the second.

C. Numerous conservative politicians used the anticommunist issue in the late 1940s and early 1950s to advance their careers.

D. Senator Joseph R. McCarthy (R-WI) used the issue to court publicity during the Korean War years (1950–1953).

1. He exploited issues of social class to depict the rich as latent traitors and to depict ordinary Americans as loyal.

2. American Catholics found the issue highly congenial and a way of asserting their loyalty and their conservatism against attacks that their fealty to the pope was un-American.

3. "McCarthyism" is the general name given to the era's loyalty oaths, censorship, and smear tactics.
4. McCarthy's cynicism and his overreaching discredited his program.

E. Lunatic fringe groups such as the John Birch Society came to believe that communists had actually captured the U.S. government.

III. Conservative writers argued that communism was a horrible parody religion and that repressive measures against it were necessary.

A. William F. Buckley and L. Brent Bozell published *McCarthy and His Enemies* in 1954, arguing that the senator, though sometimes heavy handed, was justified.

B. Whittaker Chambers's *Witness* (1952) achieved rapid classic status among anticommunist conservatives, as it depicted both the lure and the catastrophic dangers of communism.

C. Influential ex-communist writers turned to conservatism in the anxious years of the early 1950s. James Burnham became a leading strategic intellectual with strong government connections.

Suggested Reading:

Allitt, *Catholic Intellectuals and Conservative Politics in America*.

Diggins, *Up from Communism*.

Nash, *The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America*.

Tanenhaus, *Whittaker Chambers*.

Questions to Consider:

1. Were conservatives' fears of communism justified by the events of the 1940s at home and abroad?
2. Did Whittaker Chambers's *Witness* sound new themes in conservative writing, or would his arguments have felt familiar to conservatives from earlier eras?

Lecture Twenty-Three
American Traditionalists

Scope: While McCarthyism made headlines, a quieter form of American conservatism was taking shape; for the first time, a self-identified conservative movement was becoming intellectually influential. One part of it was traditionalist. Historians like Ross Hoffman rediscovered the wisdom of Edmund Burke and argued that it was as timely to America facing the threat of communism as it had been to England facing the threat of the French Revolution 200 years before. Richard Weaver, a literature scholar at the University of Chicago, looked even further back for inspiration and, in *Ideas Have Consequences*, lamented what he thought of as the decline of civilization since the Christian Middle Ages. The most widely noticed traditionalist of the early 1950s was Russell Kirk, whose book *The Conservative Mind* traced an Anglo-American conservative lineage from Burke down to such giants of his own era as T. S. Eliot. Weaver, Kirk, and Hoffman all believed in the natural law, the idea that positive laws ought to follow the structure of being that could be discovered in nature itself. This principle, strong in Catholic tradition, caught on widely in the 1950s even among non-Catholic writers like Walter Lippmann and Peter Viereck, contributing a new respectability to conservative ideas.

Outline

I. While America after World War II enjoyed a massive rise in living standards and idolized innovation, a group of conservative intellectuals made the case for remembering and venerating tradition.

- **A.** Richard Weaver argued that Western civilization should look back to its classical and medieval heritage.
  - **1.** In *Ideas Have Consequences* (1948), he traced modern fallacies back to the work of William of Ockham (d. 1349).
  - **2.** He deplored the rise of scientific specialization.
  - **3.** He favored the ideal of fraternity over that of equality.
- **B.** The Jesuit theologian John Courtney Murray argued for a renewed adherence to the natural law and claimed that it was embodied in American ideals and institutions.

C. Other traditionalists argued that in the face of communist threats, the wisdom of Edmund Burke was as relevant as it had been in the face of the French Revolution.

II. Russell Kirk became America's leading exponent of traditionalist conservatism with his surprise bestseller *The Conservative Mind* (1953) and encouraged the idea that America was experiencing a new conservative renaissance.

A. He became a conservative during his World War II service on a chemical warfare base.

B. Kirk wrote his thesis at St. Andrews in Scotland, and it became *The Conservative Mind*. The book's critical and commercial success delighted and amazed him.

C. Kirk, like Ross Hoffman, placed Burke front and center in his pantheon and judged all other conservatives in light of what he argued were Burke's central principles.

1. He summarized the six universal principles, or canons, of the conservative outlook.

2. He also identified the five greatest threats to conservatism since Burke.

3. These movements were threatening because they violated the natural law foundations of reality, despised tradition, believed in the perfectibility of man, and advocated political and economic leveling.

D. Passionately anticommunist, Kirk warned his contemporaries that American capitalism, like communism, was a materialist system that neglected spiritual values.

E. It is possible to regard Kirk as the creator, rather than merely the recorder, of the Anglo-American conservative tradition.

1. He drew a veil over such issues as slavery and the American Civil War.

2. In his personal life, he cultivated the image of himself as a rustic sage in remote Mecosta, Michigan.

III. Natural law ideas, central to the work of Richard Weaver and Russell Kirk, also influenced the journalist Walter Lippmann and the historian Peter Viereck.

A. Lippmann's *Essays in the Public Philosophy* (1955) endorsed the idea that natural law offered our civilization a firm moral foundation.

B. Peter Viereck became the favored new conservative for many liberal intellectuals. His argument for a conservative view of what were often thought of as liberal goods helped establish the movement's reputation among suspicious early observers.

Suggested Reading:

Kirk, *The Conservative Mind*.

Lippmann, *Essays in the Public Philosophy*.

Viereck, *Conservatism Revisited*.

Weaver, *Ideas Have Consequences*.

Questions to Consider:

1. Why did Weaver, Kirk, Hoffman, and others make the case for the revival of tradition with particular force in the late 1940s and early 1950s?
2. Was it reasonable for Kirk to allege that communism and capitalism were dangerously similar—both materialist approaches to the world?

Lecture Twenty-Four
Libertarianism

Scope: A third strand of the new American conservatism of the 1950s, along with anticommunism and traditionalism, was libertarianism. Libertarians, heirs of Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, and William Graham Sumner, had virtually unlimited faith in the powers of the free market and deplored state intervention in the economy. While traditionalists looked on the family as the basic unit of society, libertarians exalted the individual and regarded personal liberty as the highest possible good. While traditionalists sought the wisdom of the ancients, the scholastics, and Edmund Burke, libertarians found little of value in the work of anyone earlier than Smith. Two Austrian economists, Friedrich von Hayek and Ludwig von Mises, both exiles to America from Nazi Germany, wrote persuasive academic works on behalf of economic liberty, but their influence was overshadowed by that of the émigré Russian novelist Ayn Rand. Rand's two blockbusters, *The Fountainhead* (1943) and *Atlas Shrugged* (1957), sold in the millions and made economic individualism sound immensely attractive, manly, and dynamic. Rand's villains were New Deal bureaucrats and halfhearted socialists who believed in a planned society; her heroes were visionary entrepreneurs. President Eisenhower's Republican Party had accepted much of the heritage of the New Deal, much to the dismay of such libertarian spokesmen as Henry Hazlitt and Murray Rothbard. In 1960 and again in 1964, they encouraged the presidential aspirations of Arizona senator Barry Goldwater.

Outline

I. The growth of the New Deal in America and the rise of state socialism in Britain prompted libertarian polemics in favor of free enterprise, liberty, and the minimal state.

A. The Vienna school economists Friedrich von Hayek and Ludwig von Mises wrote influential statements justifying the free market.

1. In *The Road to Serfdom* (1944), Hayek warned that concentrated state economic power robs men of their freedom and is hopelessly inefficient.

2. Von Mises, in *Human Action* (1949), argued that the infinite complexity of human behavior makes economic planning impossible or tyrannical.

B. A group of American economists and journalists also made the case for libertarianism.
1. Henry Hazlitt's *Economics in One Lesson* (1946) made the case against the developing Keynesian orthodoxy.
2. Hazlitt and other libertarians refounded Albert Jay Nock's journal *The Freeman* in 1950.

C. Milton Friedman (1912–2006) was both the most intellectually astute advocate of libertarianism and its most popular advocate.
1. *Capitalism and Freedom* (1962) popularized his views against government regulation.
2. His *Monetary History of the United States* (1963) cast doubt on standard explanations of the Great Depression and blamed government policy of withdrawing money from circulation.
3. His Chicago colleague George Stigler observed the inability of government regulators to reduce prices.

II. No one did more to popularize libertarian views than the eccentric Russian émigré novelist Ayn Rand.

A. In *The Fountainhead* (1943), she celebrated a great architect's determination to fulfill his vision and not compromise with conformist "drones" or lackeys of the state.

B. She founded objectivism, a cross between a cult and a libertarian intellectual club. Among its more distinguished members was Alan Greenspan, future head of the Federal Reserve.

C. *Atlas Shrugged* (1957), an immense bestseller, imagines the worldwide catastrophe that would ensue if the world's great capitalists went on strike.

D. She was widely admired and drew new recruits to conservatism in the 1950s and 1960s, many of whom later defected (as she saw it) to other parts of the movement.

E. She was also widely mocked and parodied by critics, including Whittaker Chambers, who argued that the world of atomized supermen she imagined in her fiction was the antithesis of real conservatism.

III. Murray Rothbard (1926–1995) was briefly an enthusiast of Rand but soon became an independently important figure for libertarian intellectuals.

A. He studied under von Mises at New York University.

B. He sent an admiring letter to Rand, but she rebuffed him when she discovered that he didn't smoke and that he had married a religious woman.

C. Denying that the Soviet Union posed a massive threat to the United States, he resisted the steady growth of the military-industrial complex and the increase of centralized state power.

Suggested Reading:

Friedman, *Capitalism and Freedom*.

Hazlitt, *Economics in One Lesson*.

Rand, *Atlas Shrugged*.

Von Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom*.

Questions to Consider:

1. How did libertarians struggle to balance their faith in minimal government with their fears of Soviet communism?
2. Is it possible for a novelist like Ayn Rand to have an important and lasting effect on citizens' political and economic ideas?

Lecture Twenty-Five
National Review and Barry Goldwater

Scope: William F. Buckley Jr. published the first issue of *National Review* in 1955, and it soon became the central journal of the new conservative movement. Buckley—wealthy, diplomatic, and skilled as a writer and speaker—found ways to bring together members of the disparate conservative groupings in America. *National Review*, from the outset, was staunchly anticommunist, anti–big government, and sympathetic to traditional values and virtues. Its libertarian and traditionalist contributors rarely saw eye to eye, but Buckley was able to prevent internal tensions from breaking out in public, and he tempted such luminaries as Russell Kirk and Whittaker Chambers into working for him. Buckley recognized, however, that he had to be careful to win intellectual respectability in the mainstream media and therefore refused to endorse the paranoid John Birch Society, whose members believed that the communist conspiracy was not just an outside threat but had already taken over the U.S. government. He also rejected Ayn Rand's brand of merciless libertarianism. His brother-in-law L. Brent Bozell, meanwhile, ghostwrote *The Conscience of a Conservative*, which Barry Goldwater used as the manifesto for his presidential bids of 1960 and 1964. Although Goldwater lost badly in 1964 to Lyndon Johnson, his campaign set in motion a conservative takeover of the Republican Party itself, whose effects became increasingly apparent in the 1970s.

Outline

I. William F. Buckley Jr. had the plenitude of gifts to turn disparate conservative intellectual groups into a movement and to unify them around his journal *National Review*.

A. The 6th of 10 children born to an exceptionally wealthy, talented, and ambitious family, he grew up in privileged circumstances despite the Great Depression.

1. His father was a millionaire in the oil business.

2. Young William grew up partly in Mexico, partly in Connecticut; was schooled in England and France; and enjoyed regular European vacations.

B. After army service at the very end of World War II, he attended Yale, where he became editor of the *Yale Daily News*.
   1. His first book, *God and Man at Yale*, condemned his alma mater for denigrating Christianity and capitalism.
   2. He served briefly in the CIA in Mexico, but a yearning for publicity and the limelight brought him back to the United States, where he cowrote *McCarthy and His Enemies* with his brother-in-law L. Brent Bozell.

C. He launched *National Review* in 1955, and it soon became the flagship journal of the new conservative movement.
   1. Important early figures at the journal were James Burnham and Frank Meyer (the advocate of "fusionism").
   2. Buckley had an eye for new talents in journalism, such as Garry Wills and Joan Didion.
   3. He persuaded Russell Kirk and Whittaker Chambers, the two most famous conservative writers of the 1950s, to contribute regularly.

D. Delighting in confrontation, Buckley attacked President Eisenhower's conciliatory style in domestic and foreign policy.
   1. He denounced Soviet premier Khrushchev's visit to the United States in 1959.
   2. *National Review* was unmoved by the civil rights movement, and feared it might be the entering wedge of more big government.
   3. Buckley's *Up from Liberalism* (1959) was the closest he came to writing a general statement of his political philosophy.

II. Barry Goldwater, the conservative Republican U.S. senator from Arizona, became an attractive potential presidential candidate and won *National Review*'s support in 1960.

A. Goldwater, a handsome World War II veteran and successful businessman, advocated rolling back the heavy hand of government.

B. He was a hardline cold warrior, favoring rollback rather than containment in American foreign policy.

C. L. Brent Bozell ghostwrote his book *The Conscience of a Conservative* (1960).

D. Goldwater made a respectable showing in the 1960 Republican primaries but yielded to Vice President Richard Nixon, who then narrowly lost to John F. Kennedy.

III. The conservative movement grew rapidly stronger in the early 1960s.

- **A.** Buckley presided over the formation of the Young Americans for Freedom (YAF), an important conservative youth group, in 1960.
  - **1.** His friend M. Stanton Evans drafted its manifesto, the Sharon Statement.
  - **2.** YAF had more members, but drew less press attention, than the left-wing youth movement Students for a Democratic Society (SDS).
- **B.** Goldwater won the Republican presidential nomination in 1964, to the consternation of liberal Republicans.
  - **1.** The Republican convention at the San Francisco Cow Palace had the mood of an evangelical revival.
  - **2.** Goldwater's campaigning was almost defiantly tactless, and he made himself vulnerable to accusations of extremism.
  - **3.** Lyndon Johnson, wearing the mantle of the martyred President Kennedy, won a stunning victory over Goldwater.
- **C.** Conservatives began a grassroots campaign to take over the Republican Party in the mid- and late 1960s, with profound long-term consequences.

Suggested Reading:

Buckley, *Up from Liberalism*.

Goldwater, *The Conscience of a Conservative*.

Judis, *William F. Buckley, Jr.*

Nash, *The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America*.

Questions to Consider:

1. What qualities enabled William F. Buckley Jr. to create a coherent movement out of apparently fractious elements?
2. Were the accusations of extremism leveled against Barry Goldwater justified?

Lecture Twenty-Six
Upheavals of the 1960s

Scope: The conservative movement gained adherents during the crises of the 1960s, despite Goldwater's defeat. Conservative writers insisted, first, that America's limited mission in Vietnam was doomed to fail. Having committed troops there, they should aim for victory, destroying North Vietnamese power rather than merely trying to prevent its spread to the South. Second, after fighting a rearguard on behalf of racial segregation, many of them accepted the Civil Rights Act (1964) and Voting Rights Act (1965) but opposed the rapid development of affirmative action programs, which they saw as a violation of the tradition of individual rights. Third, they deplored the rising youth culture on college campuses and the demonstrations and activism that often accompanied it. Equally bad, in their view, was the reluctance of liberal college administrators to repress it. Worst of all were the mass demonstrations of 1968, when as they saw it, society was beginning to unravel. When civil order is threatened, they wrote, stern measures for the restoration of the law are the necessary first step, and in these conditions repression can be a civilizing force. Under pressure of these events, *National Review* writer Frank Meyer reemphasized the theory of "fusionism," pointing out that the radical individualists, the traditionalists, and the anticommunists in the movement needed each other; they shared a common faith in civilization and a common objection to everything that American liberalism stood for. Never enthusiasts for Nixon, they supported him in 1968 but would have preferred the new governor of California, Ronald Reagan.

Outline

I. Most of the new conservatives supported military action in Vietnam but deplored what they saw as the halfheartedness of President Johnson's containment policy.

A. William Buckley and James Burnham argued that the armed forces, once committed, should fight to win, using all the weapons at their disposal.

B. They overcame their small-government scruples to argue in favor of the draft.

C. Two splinter groups, Murray Rothbard's libertarians and L. Brent Bozell's militant Catholics, disagreed with the war policy.

1. Rothbard steadfastly denied that the Soviet Union posed an imminent threat to the United States, or that the Vietnam mission was justifiable.

2. Bozell founded *Triumph* in 1966 for orthodox Catholic conservatives.

3. He began to argue against the American role in Vietnam and to denounce American tactics.

II. Conservatives feared the rise of black militancy in the wake of the civil rights movement.

A. *National Review* conservatives condemned the Civil Rights Act and Voting Rights Act as federal government empire-building.

B. They reacted to the rise of black militancy and the Black Panthers with calls for repression.

C. They regretted the rapid European decolonization of Africa, many of whose countries were ill prepared for self-government.

III. The activist Supreme Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren appeared to conservatives to be further upsetting national stability, especially with its decisions relating to religion and the First Amendment.

A. Decisions of 1962 and 1963 prohibited prayer and Bible reading in public high schools. Conservatives lamented these decisions' secularizing effect, since many of them saw the cold war in religious terms, as the fight for Christendom.

B. Bozell's *The Warren Revolution* (1966) was the first of many late 20th-century conservative broadsides against judicial activism.

IV. Youth culture and university unrest drew critical conservative attention in the late 1960s.

A. William Buckley, a fixture on the college debate circuit, was dismayed by occupations, disruption of unpopular speakers, and weak administrators' responses.

B. Were the riotous scenes at the Democratic national convention in Chicago in 1968 premonitions of anarchy and social breakdown?

V. The early political career of Ronald Reagan demonstrated that conservatives would be the long-term beneficiaries of the 1960s.

A. Reagan, a movie star in the 1930s and 1940s, had cooperated with Hollywood McCarthyism as head of the Screen Actors Guild.

B. His speech on behalf of Goldwater drew favorable Republican notice in 1964 and led to the offer of a gubernatorial candidacy in 1966.

C. Reagan campaigned against Berkeley radicalism and won an upset against Edmund Brown Sr., who had underestimated him.

Suggested Reading:

Allitt, *Catholic Intellectuals and Conservative Politics in America*.

Gitlin, *The Sixties*.

Nash, *The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America*.

Wills, *Nixon Agonistes*.

Questions to Consider:

1. Why were the 1960s such a turbulent decade, and why were conservatives well placed to benefit from it politically?

2. What made Ronald Reagan such an attractive figure to American conservatives?

Lecture Twenty-Seven
The Neoconservatives

Scope: Among the earliest and sharpest critics of the new conservatives in the 1950s had been a group of liberal social scientists centered at Berkeley, Harvard, and Columbia, including Daniel Bell, Nathan Glazer, Samuel Huntington, and Daniel Patrick Moynihan. In the 1960s, however, many of them, reacting to the decade's social turbulence, began to raise doubts about the governability of their society and about the need for less far-reaching government programs. In 1965, Bell launched a new journal, *The Public Interest*, with Irving Kristol, dedicated to such practical policy questions as urban renewal, law and order, education, and racial politics. Before long, they and their contributors noticed a strong moral element in their ostensibly neutral analysis and admitted that they were implicitly arguing for traditional virtues. Although many of them had grown up on the political left, they gradually became known as the "neoconservatives" and, for the most part, accepted the label. Less tradition-oriented than most of the *National Review* group, and more confident that government programs can sometimes be benign, they nevertheless found themselves converging with their former antagonists, often to their own astonishment.

Outline

I. Daniel Bell's anthology, *The New American Right* (1955), was the most concentrated attack on the new conservatives in the 1950s.

- **A.** It used social-psychological models to explain their conduct, rather than engaging in an analysis of ideas.
- **B.** At its worst, it insinuated a continuity between European fascism and American conservatism.
- **C.** This generation of sociologists was influenced by Theodor Adorno's *The Authoritarian Personality*.
- **D.** Richard Hofstadter described the conservatives' approach to politics as part of the "paranoid style" and dismissed them as "pseudo-conservatives."
- **E.** William Buckley and Russell Kirk answered, in reviews, that if anyone needed psychological treatment, it was the liberal intellectuals.

II. Liberal social scientists were unnerved by the social upheavals of the 1960s and began to fear that America was becoming ungovernable.

- **A.** Proud of their resistance to McCarthyism, they were not accustomed to being attacked from the left.
- **B.** The new left regarded liberal intellectuals as supporters of the military-industrial complex.
- **C.** As senior academics, they often suffered the brunt of student criticism in the campus uprisings.
- **D.** Samuel Huntington speculated about the destabilizing character of too much political involvement, in direct contradiction of the idea that all citizens should take an interest in politics.

III. Daniel Bell and Irving Kristol launched *The Public Interest* in 1965 as an ostensibly nonideological policy journal.

- **A.** Its contributors emphasized accurate, statistically informed studies of urban and social problems and offered practical solutions.
  - **1.** Many of the contributors were members of the New York intellectual family, mostly secular Jews.
  - **2.** Kristol himself was a former Trotskyist, long accustomed to arguing against Stalinists.
- **B.** Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Nathan Glazer had shown, in *Beyond the Melting Pot* (1963), that ethnic groups do not disappear in America. This discovery had implications for American racial policy after the civil rights movement.
- **C.** Moynihan's report on African American families (1965) caused a furor and contributed to Moynihan's alienation from mainstream liberalism.
- **D.** Glazer and other contributors began to criticize affirmative action.
  - **1.** It was based on a false idea about what society is actually like.
  - **2.** It cast doubt on minorities' achievements and provoked a white backlash.
- **E.** Edward Banfield's *The Unheavenly City* (1970) won widespread praise from conservatives for its harsh summary of inner-city problems.
  - **1.** Banfield singled out the "preconventional morality" of the urban underclass.
  - **2.** The riots, he argued, were for "fun and profit" and were not political rebellions.

F. Norman Podhoretz brought *Commentary* into the neoconservative orbit. In 1970, it began to attack feminism, black radicalism, and the McGovern movement in the Democratic Party.

IV. Among the neoconservatives' most distinctive ideas were the concept of the new class, the law of unintended consequences, and the theory of mediating structures.

A. The new class, according to their theory, thrives in bureaucracy and is sentimentally attached to the adversary culture rather than to the values of the bourgeois middle class.

B. The law of unintended consequences codified the idea that the most ambitious government programs will have the most unexpected consequences, many of them malignant.

C. Peter Berger, Richard Neuhaus, Michael Novak, and others developed the idea of mediating structures that stand between the individual and the state, generating healthy individuals and a healthy society. These include family, church and synagogue, and voluntary organizations.

D. In the late 1970s, neoconservatives also began to write with greater appreciation about capitalism.

Suggested Reading:

Banfield, *The Unheavenly City*.

Dorrien, *The Neoconservative Mind*.

Kristol, *Two Cheers for Capitalism*.

Steinfels, *The Neoconservatives*.

Questions to Consider:

1. What events and conditions led this group of ex-radical liberals to change their political identities in the 1960s and 1970s?

2. Why was the controversy surrounding the Moynihan report so intense?

Lecture Twenty-Eight
The Neoconservatives and Foreign Policy

Scope: In the 1970s, Saigon fell to North Vietnamese troops, the Soviet Union built a world-spanning navy, and revolutions broke out in Iran and Nicaragua. The world seemed less susceptible to American control than at any time since the defeat of Germany and Japan. Just as the neoconservatives came to share conservatives' views on domestic issues, they started to see conservatives as essentially right on big questions of foreign policy as well—especially the idea that there is always going to be war and that it's best to prepare for it and expect the worst. Rejecting President Carter's claim that considerations of human rights should eclipse realpolitik, they argued that it was sometimes necessary to make alliances with authoritarian regimes for the sake of resisting totalitarians. Several former Vietnam-era peaceniks, including Michael Novak and Norman Podhoretz, publicly apologized for having underestimated the mendacity of communism and swore not to let themselves be deceived again. In an analysis of Soviet intentions, a neoconservative group, Team B, interpreted the Soviets as more aggressive and more willing to use nuclear weapons than the CIA's own Team A. Led by Paul Nitze and the Committee on the Present Danger, Team B lobbied Congress not to ratify the recently negotiated second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II).

Outline

I. The outcome of the Vietnam War prompted many neoconservatives to reconsider their ideas about communism.

- **A.** As liberal intellectuals in the 1960s, many of them had become disenchanted with the war, especially after the Tet Offensive of 1968.
- **B.** The fall of Saigon (1975) and its sequels, however, led to mass imprisonment or liquidation for Vietnamese who had cooperated with the United States or the Republic of Vietnam.
- **C.** Pol Pot's genocide in Cambodia gave further horrifying evidence of the dangers of ideological fanaticism.

D. Several neoconservatives recanted their old views and reasserted a militant anticommunism. Podhoretz, in *Why We Were in Vietnam*, apologized for his earlier attitude and rebuked liberals who refused to reconsider.

E. As President Ford's ambassador to the United Nations in 1975–1976, Daniel Patrick Moynihan made stern assertions of American patriotism.

1. His success there led to his election as U.S. senator from New York in 1976, though still as a Democrat.

2. Moynihan became the first prominent neoconservative to win a major elective office.

II. To many neoconservatives, Israel's situation demonstrated the need for national strength, resolve, and a full appreciation of external threats.

A. Pride at Israel's achievement in the Six Day War (1967) was compounded by anxiety over its momentary exposure in the Yom Kippur War (1973).

1. *Commentary* devoted part of every issue to Israeli affairs, often pointing to American analogies.

2. The 1973 oil crisis demonstrated American vulnerability to fluctuations in Middle Eastern politics.

B. Neoconservatives disliked President Carter's attempt to make human rights the paramount concern of his foreign policy.

1. When Carter withdrew his support from abusive rulers in Iran and Nicaragua, the result was revolutions that created more repressive regimes.

2. Jeanne Kirkpatrick, a foreign policy expert, proposed a distinction between authoritarian regimes that might sometimes enjoy American support and totalitarian regimes that were beyond the pale.

3. Neoconservatives strongly opposed Andrew Young as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations.

III. The continuing growth of Soviet military power led neoconservatives to argue for a more skeptical attitude toward détente and more resolve in building up arsenals.

A. They observed with alarm the growing reach of the Soviet navy and its continuing search for third world clients.

B. They doubted the wisdom of the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaties (SALT I and SALT II), because they thought the Soviets would interpret them as signs of American weakness rather than as genuine avenues to peace.

C. Team B, dominated by neoconservative policy analysts, offered a more pessimistic view of Soviet intentions than the CIA's Team A.

1. Paul Nitze, a Johns Hopkins professor, former deputy secretary of defense, and SALT I negotiator, was one of the founders of the Committee on the Present Danger in 1976.

2. The committee urged the United States not to sign the SALT II treaty, whose actual effect it said would be to facilitate Soviet superiority.

IV. Two crises at the end of the 1970s, the Iran hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, confirmed the neoconservatives' worst fears and led many of them to decide on a change of party allegiance.

A. Carter's inability to rescue the hostages, and the diplomatic outrage of their captivity, projected a dangerous image of American weakness.

B. The Soviet incursion into Afghanistan confirmed neoconservatives' worst fears about communist aggression. In the long run, the incursion would prove disastrous, but it seemed menacing in 1979.

Suggested Reading:

Dorrien, *The Neoconservative Mind*.

Ehrman, *The Rise of Neoconservatism*.

Gerson, *The Neoconservative Vision*.

Podhoretz, *Why We Were in Vietnam*.

Questions to Consider:

1. What decisive events drew the neoconservatives toward a more pessimistic view of the international world?

2. How was Daniel Patrick Moynihan able to make the jump from Harvard professor to U.S. senator?

Lecture Twenty-Nine
Christian Conservatives and the New Right

Scope: From the 1920s to the 1970s, most evangelical Protestants in America avoided direct involvement in politics. In their view, God wanted them to save souls one by one rather than transform the nation politically. The lifestyle changes of the 1960s and 1970s, however—especially the rise of feminism, the sexual revolution, the gay rights movement, and the Supreme Court's decision in *Roe v. Wade* (1973)—prompted some among their leaders to rethink the question. The reclusive theological writer Francis Schaeffer argued that the world was turning to sin and wickedness because so few Christian voices were raised in public against these developments. Jerry Falwell (a minister from Lynchburg, Virginia) founded the Moral Majority in 1979 as an evangelical pressure group to lobby Congress and to influence elections. It quickly mobilized hundreds of thousands of voters and contributed to Ronald Reagan's election victory over President Carter in the election of 1980, even though Carter was an outspoken evangelical. It tried to reach out to Jewish and Catholic voters too, though with only limited success. More successful as an ecumenical venture was Operation Rescue, an antiabortion action group whose members were willing to face prison on behalf of preventing abortion. Scandals rocked the evangelical megachurches in the late 1980s, but the Moral Majority passed on its mantle to a grassroots organizing group, Ralph Reed's Christian Coalition, in the early 1990s.

Outline

I. The sexual revolution of the 1960s, the women's movement, and the gay liberation movement all prompted a Christian conservative response in the 1970s.

A. The sexual revolution greatly diminished the taboo against pre- and extramarital sex.

1. In popular culture, including Hollywood, censorship diminished rapidly in the 1960s, and depictions of graphic sexuality increased.

2. Literature such as Hugh Hefner's *Playboy* and Helen Gurley Brown's *Sex and the Single Girl* (1962) encouraged sexual exploration.
3. Effective contraceptives, especially the pill, made the separation of sex and procreation easier than ever before.

B. The abortion law reform movement began in the mid-1960s and enjoyed an unexpected victory with the Supreme Court's decision in *Roe v. Wade* (1973).

C. The gay rights movement came out with the Stonewall Riot of 1969.

D. Congress passed the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) in 1972 and sent it to the states for ratification.

II. This combination of social and legal changes energized conservative Christian voters, Catholic and Protestant, who created a variety of resistance movements.

A. Phyllis Schlafly, a Catholic lawyer, led Stop ERA, a grassroots women's campaign against the Equal Rights Amendment.
1. She feared that various women's privileges would disappear and that women would be made to fight in combat positions.
2. She also feared that the ERA would increase the power of the federal government.
3. Her movement prevented the necessary three-quarters of the state governments from ratifying the ERA, which never became part of the Constitution.

B. Early opposition to abortion came mainly from Catholic conservatives.
1. The first antiabortion protestors were Catholics from the group around the *Triumph* magazine.
2. James McFadden founded the *Human Life Review* after the *Roe* decision to campaign against permissive abortion.
3. John T. Noonan, a Catholic law professor at Berkeley, wrote the most powerful case against legalized abortion.

C. The evangelical Protestant churches had long been divided about whether to concentrate solely on saving individual souls or to be involved in social and political reform.
1. Dispensational premillennialists favored the former and anticipated the Rapture.

2. Francis Schaeffer (1912–1984) argued for saving the world from Satan.

D. Jerry Falwell, a minister from Lynchburg, Virginia, founded the Moral Majority in 1979.

1. Falwell, aided by Paul Weyrich, Terry Dolan, Richard Viguerie, and Howard Phillips, built a powerful lobbying organization, which contributed to Reagan's victory.
2. Even though President Carter was an evangelical Christian, the Moral Majority campaigned against him.
3. Its principal issues were negative: opposition to the ERA, to feminism, to abortion, and to homosexuality.

E. Creation scientists simultaneously campaigned against the teaching of evolutionary biology in public schools. Unfavorable court decisions prompted many Christian conservatives to advocate home schooling instead.

III. The Reagan administration disappointed Christian conservatives, who found it difficult to gain congressional support for their objectives.

A. The libertarian side of the new conservatism objected to legislation on moral questions.

B. The abortion question did not line up on the Republican-Democrat axis.

C. Randall Terry created Operation Rescue in the hope that massive disobedience would force the issue.

D. The evangelical scandals of the later 1980s damaged the credibility of the Christian right.

IV. Ralph Reed's Christian Coalition took over from the Moral Majority in the 1990s and concentrated on grassroots organization. It encountered the dilemma of having to choose between the candidates who were most likely to win and those with the right convictions.

Suggested Reading:

Allitt, *Religion in America since 1945*.

Capps, *The New Religious Right*.

D'Souza, *Falwell before the Millennium*.

Liensch, *Redeeming America*.

Questions to Consider:

1. What are the distinctive characteristics of populist conservatism?
2. Why were Catholic and Protestant conservatives able to collaborate in the new Christian right?

Lecture Thirty
Margaret Thatcher's Counterrevolution

Scope: Between 1960 and 1980, Britain left behind its imperial past, joined the European Economic Community, and accepted a shrunken role in world affairs. Economic continuity was prevented by a fundamental disagreement between the two major parties, with Labour favoring state socialism and Conservatives favoring capitalism. Overmighty trade unions, bitter industrial relations, and a long succession of disastrous strikes in the 1970s made "Britain" a byword for economic dysfunction and decline. Margaret Thatcher, a shopkeeper's daughter from Grantham, was an unlikely figure to rise to the leadership of the Conservative Party. She came, socially and geographically, from humble origins and was in every way outside the magic circle of Tory privilege. But she was a brilliant organizer, a first-class speaker, inexhaustibly hard-working on every political question, and when necessary could terrify allies and adversaries into submission. She won the general election of 1979, declared her resolve not to permit the decline to continue, and then succeeded where her male predecessors in the Conservative leadership had failed. She denationalized the major industries, won a face-off with the most powerful unions, stimulated an era of economic recovery, and even won a war against Argentina over the future of the Falkland Islands. Bitterly hated by the British left and personally unpopular on her own side of the House of Commons, she was nevertheless the decisive personality of her era and left an impression on the country as vivid as that left 40 years before by Winston Churchill.

Outline

I. British conservatism after World War II was very different from its American counterpart because it confronted a completely different situation.

A. A generation of male Conservative Party leaders accepted the nationalized industries while trying to protect Britain's private sector. They recognized that some parts of the state sector, especially health and education, were popular and were providing citizens with opportunities never previously enjoyed.

B. Trade unions found themselves in a more powerful situation than ever before because industries no longer had to make a profit and could be subsidized with state funds.

1. The 1960s and 1970s witnessed a succession of bitter strikes in the major industries as workers demanded better pay and conditions.

2. Labour governments were often embarrassed by unsanctioned ("wildcat") strikes.

3. Governments of both parties permitted inefficient industries to continue operating as a way of preventing widespread unemployment.

4. The tax burden on the productive (and mainly private) part of the economy and on individuals became steadily more burdensome.

C. Centralized administration of major industries soon became bureaucratically top-heavy. Without the incentive of competition, they became less efficient.

D. British industries were increasingly unable to stay abreast of European, American, and Japanese competitors.

E. Each general election signaled a profound change of direction in economic affairs, but the overall decline in the British economy, compared to its rivals, was inexorable.

II. Margaret Thatcher gained the leadership of the Conservative Party in 1975 and won the general election of 1979, becoming Britain's first female prime minister.

A. A shopkeeper's daughter from Grantham and an Oxford graduate, she was an outsider to the traditional circle of Conservative leaders.

B. Without debts to the "old boys' club," she was more willing than her predecessors to be confrontational and ideologically assertive.

C. She was determined to restore the British economy to private ownership and free enterprise.

1. She undertook the privatization of railroads, telecommunications, power production, and manufacturing.

2. Her willingness to accept rising levels of unemployment made her bitterly unpopular in the early 1980s.

D. She faced off against the most powerful trade unions and defeated them. She refused to make concessions to the powerful coal miners' union in a strike that lasted more than a year (1984–1985).

E. She recognized that selling council houses to their renters would create a potential new pool of Conservative voters.

III. Prime Minister Thatcher shared President Reagan's view of the Soviet Union and the cold war, and she revived the jeopardized Anglo-American special relationship.

A. She was prime minister throughout his two terms of office, and they frequently expressed mutual admiration.

B. She cooperated in updating American nuclear missiles on British territory as part of NATO.

C. When an Argentinean dictator seized the Falkland Islands in the South Atlantic, Thatcher had no hesitation in dispatching a military task force to regain them.

D. Thatcher won reelection in 1983 on a wave of public patriotism.

E. A Euro-skeptic, she insisted on renegotiating the terms of British participation in the European Economic Union and was reluctant to compromise any element of British sovereignty.

Suggested Reading:

Blake, *The Conservative Party*.

Charmley, *A History of Conservative Politics*.

Cosgrave, *Thatcher*.

Thatcher, *The Path to Power*.

Questions to Consider:

1. Why was Prime Minister Thatcher able to act decisively in economic matters where her Conservative predecessors had prevaricated?
2. Did Britain stand to gain more from its American allies than from its European partners by the 1980s?

Lecture Thirty-One
Monarchs and Prime Ministers

Scope: Margaret Thatcher was finally ousted from the Conservative leadership in 1990. Her successor, John Major, gave further evidence that the party was no longer the preserve of aristocrats. He came from a modest background; his father had worked in music halls and for a time ran a business making decorative garden gnomes. Major himself did not attend college but made an effective career in banking and then politics. Prime minister for more than seven years and winner of the 1992 general election in his own right, he was able to consolidate the Thatcher counterrevolution because by the time he left office, his party had been in power without interruption for 18 years. The end of the cold war during his premiership weakened the prestige of socialism everywhere, and his Labour rivals finally prepared themselves to repudiate what had become to them a burden and even, for some, an embarrassment. Meanwhile, the most emotional event of the 1990s for many Britons, the sudden death of Princess Diana in 1997, demonstrated the continuing emotional appeal of royalty. Ever since the Glorious Revolution three centuries earlier, the monarchy too had been adapting itself to changing times and circumstances, becoming one of the foundations of British political stability.

Outline

I. John Major inherited Margaret Thatcher's mantle of leadership in 1990 when she was ousted in that year's party crisis.

A. The accumulated grievances of a decade were combined with Thatcher's rash insistence on introducing an unpopular new revenue device, the poll tax.

B. Narrowly failing to win on the first ballot (gaining 204 out of a necessary 208 votes), she withdrew and signaled her preference for John Major.

C. Major's early history and career progress were further testimony to the Conservatives' willingness to adapt and change; he was as much an outsider in the 20th century as Disraeli had been in the 19th.

1. Major declared that he was not "son of Thatcher," but of the available candidates he was the one closest to her views.
2. His premiership ended the strenuous ideological struggles of the Thatcher decade and revived the sense of political moderation that had been characteristic of such predecessors as Stanley Baldwin.

D. Major's surprise victory in the 1992 election (comparable to the American surprise victory of Truman in 1948) consolidated many of the Thatcher reforms.

E. Only after that did Labour finally begin to shed its burden of an unpopular attachment to socialism, emerging under Tony Blair as "New Labour."

II. Throughout this period, much of the British public followed the activities of the royal family, who simultaneously transcended politics and defined many of the attributes of conservatism. The death of Princess Diana in a 1997 road accident prompted an unprecedented outpouring of grief.

A. The fact that Americans were almost as involved as Britons in the aftermath of Diana's death demonstrated that they were still far from immune to the radiance of the monarchy.

B. Observers noted with surprise that the mystique of monarchy survived even its increasing subjection to media scrutiny.

III. The role of the monarchs in Britain's unwritten constitution had shifted gradually since the Glorious Revolution.

A. In the 18th century, the court was still the nation's center of patronage.

B. No monarch after George III attempted to veto legislation that had passed through Parliament, marking a decline in their formal power.

1. The monarch remained a vital figure in the constitutional crises of 1832 and 1910–1911.
2. King George V was obliged to choose a prime minister in 1922.
3. The king's or queen's speech at the opening of Parliament is written by the incumbent prime minister, and the monarch is enjoined from openly expressing partisan sentiments.

C. The abdication crisis of 1936 demonstrated the limits of acceptable royal conduct.

D. Britain found that continuity in its heads of state, coupled with changes in its head of government, is an entirely workable system that adds an element of stability.

1. George VI became a symbol of British resolution and imperturbability during World War II.

2. Queen Elizabeth II carried on his work and has been an exemplary representative of British stability and continuity.

Suggested Reading:

Bogdanor, *The Monarchy and the Constitution*.

Paxman, *On Royalty*.

Reitan, *The Thatcher Revolution*.

Wilson, *The Rise and Fall of the House of Windsor*.

Questions to Consider:

1. What factors account for the rapid rise to leadership of John Major?

2. Why has the monarchy been such an effective contributor to British political stability?

Lecture Thirty-Two
Reagan Triumphant

Scope: Reagan was to American conservatism what Thatcher was to British conservatism. Coming to power a year after her, by winning the 1980 election, he agreed with her on all the big questions. Like her, he believed that capitalism was morally defensible, Soviet communism was evil and should be combated as fiercely as possible, and excessive government spending was a drag on the economy—and, worse, was a moral affront to the citizens. Reagan had risen to prominence in the Hollywood of the 1930s and 1940s, had made a successful jump to television in its pioneer days of the 1950s, and then had become a Republican activist in the Goldwater campaign of 1964. Elected governor of California in 1966 and 1970, he positioned himself as the enemy of campus activists and black militants, finding both stances popular among the electorate. Coming to Washington in 1981, he alarmed parts of the electorate and policy establishment by denouncing the Soviet Union as an "evil empire" and declaring his intention to hasten its demise. The checks and balances of the Constitution prevented him from sweeping away federal programs with quite the relish he had intended, but he promoted a new attitude in favor of unregulated business and economic growth. Embodying the conservative movement of the foregoing decades, he also embodied some of its contradictions. Profamily social conservatives, especially the Moral Majority, felt disappointed that in practice he would give little support to their agenda. They remained loyal to him anyway, not least because of his ability to make conservatism seem normal, friendly, relaxed and all-American, qualities it had certainly not exhibited in the 1950s and 1960s.

Outline

I. Ronald Reagan, after two successful terms as governor of California, made a successful bid for the Republican presidential nomination in 1980 and then won the election over the incumbent president, Jimmy Carter.

A. Carter had faced a combination of slow economic growth, the 1979 fuel shortage, and the Iran hostage crisis.

1. Edward Kennedy's challenge to Carter in the 1980 Democratic primaries violated the usual consensus for a sitting president.
2. The failed hostage rescue mission intensified the sense of America as a floundering giant.

B. Reagan brought a new mood of optimism and self-assurance to the White House.
1. His "morning in America" rhetoric was infectious.
2. He demonstrated, better than any recent conservative predecessor, the capacity for enjoyment and relaxation.
3. His sympathy for the libertarian side of conservatism prevented him from acting on the new Christian right's agenda.

C. Reagan survived an assassination attempt and won renewed popular sympathy and support.

D. "Reaganomics" gave the alluring promise of lower taxes and higher revenues.
1. The Laffer curve demonstrated the paradoxical relationship between the two.
2. Irving Kristol, George Gilder, and Michael Novak made the moral and spiritual case for the free market, while demonstrating the new influence of Washington think tanks.

E. Reagan miscalculated the changed popular mood on environmental questions, and his interior secretary, James Watt, soon became an embarrassment.

II. Reagan rejected the concept of détente and denounced the Soviet Union as an "evil empire."

A. He authorized an immense military buildup, which contributed to severe budget overruns.

B. At the same time, he was serious about trying to rid the world of nuclear weapons, much to the consternation of neoconservative intellectuals.

C. His cold war attitudes led to an ideologically based set of interventions in Latin American revolutions and raised again the question of whether America should ally itself with tyrannical regimes.

D. Reagan enjoyed a constructive working relationship with Margaret Thatcher.

III. The conservative intellectuals who had spent the previous generation struggling for influence found that they still had little access to power.

A. Conservative politicians were more preoccupied with reelection and questions of power than with getting the ideas exactly right. The long-promised assault on federal gigantism soon fizzled, and the government spent more money than ever before.

B. The failure of Reagan's nomination of Robert Bork to the Supreme Court demonstrated the intensity of liberal opposition.

C. Reagan easily defeated Walter Mondale in the 1984 election, but the Iran-Contra scandal damaged his credibility and effectiveness.

Suggested Reading:

Collins, *Transforming America*.

Critchlow, *The Conservative Ascendancy*.

McDonald, *The Presidency*.

Wills, *Reagan's America*.

Questions to Consider:

1. Why might conservative intellectuals have had mixed feelings about the Reagan years?

2. Which elements of conservatism did Reagan best embody, and which did he neglect?

Lecture Thirty-Three
The End of the Cold War

Scope: When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989 and the Soviet Union followed it onto the dustbin of history two years later, American conservatives were taken by surprise. They had been so afraid of communist power for so long—despite their constant assertion that it was a hopelessly inefficient system—that they were slow to accept the evidence coming out of Eastern Europe. Still, they felt vindicated, especially when newly opened Soviet archives proved that many of the Americans they had long suspected of espionage had indeed been spies. America was left as the world's sole superpower. Should it now withdraw into itself and resume the historic foreign policy of isolationism, or should it try to exert its power to change the rest of the world in ways consonant with America's beliefs and interests? Neoconservatives favored the second alternative; heirs of the older conservative tradition favored the former. Almost at once, the United States faced a decision when Saddam Hussein of Iraq invaded Kuwait. The United States decided to take the interventionist path. President George H. W. Bush responded by building an anti-Iraq alliance through the United Nations and invading Kuwait to repel Iraq. Neoconservatives were gratified, though some thought Bush had missed an opportunity to overthrow Hussein once and for all. Meanwhile, two persuasive neoconservative writers offered contrasting scenarios for the future. In *The End of History*, Francis Fukuyama anticipated a decline in global conflict as all the nations of the world now agreed on the superiority of liberal democracy. Samuel Huntington, by contrast, feared a future of greater conflict, one he described in his *Clash of Civilizations*.

Outline

I. Conservatives celebrated the demise of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe in 1989 and then the collapse of the Soviet state itself in 1991.

- **A.** They felt vindicated in their belief that their own system was more durable, more prosperous, and more prone to promote freedom and stability.
- **B.** Some conservative writers were slow to be convinced that communism had genuinely perished.

C. They warned that the end of the cold war would be a "bitter victory" if the former Soviet countries adopted the worst characteristics of the Western democracies, rather than their best.

II. Conservatives debated whether the United States, after the long crises of opposing Nazism and communism, should now revert to the traditional conservative posture of isolationism or use its supremacy to transform the world on behalf of democratic capitalism.

A. Paleoconservatives, led by Patrick Buchanan, favored the isolationist option.

B. Neoconservatives favored a "forward" foreign policy.

C. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 provoked the first crisis of the post–cold war world.

1. President George H. W. Bush assembled a United Nations coalition and imposed sanctions.

2. When Saddam Hussein refused to withdraw, the UN forces invaded Kuwait and expelled Iraq.

3. Conservatives debated the theoretical issues raised by the war, and their implications for the future.

4. Jewish neoconservatives accused Pat Buchanan of anti-Semitism for his sharply antiwar position.

D. The foreign policy crises of the 1990s demonstrated that action and inaction could each be perilous.

III. Conservative intellectuals disagreed about whether the end of communism promised a more peaceful world or the onset of more acute conflicts.

A. Francis Fukuyama's *The End of History* argued that the entire world was converging around systems of democratic capitalism.

B. Samuel Huntington countered that conflicts, which until now had been intra-Western, were giving way to a "clash of civilizations."

C. The events of the 1990s offered illustrative testimony to both theories.

D. In domestic politics, a conservative revolt in 1992 contributed to the defeat of President George H. W. Bush.

1. Pat Buchanan repudiated Bush's foreign and domestic policies and was endorsed by *National Review*.

2. Ross Perot's campaign also took votes from the Republican Party.

Suggested Reading:

Allitt, *The Conservatives*.

Collins, *Transforming America*.

Critchlow, *The Conservative Ascendancy*.

Gerson, *The Neoconservative Vision*.

Questions to Consider:

1. Why did the United States win the cold war, and was it a victory facilitated by conservative actions?
2. Is it reasonable to describe the neoconservatives' world-transforming plans as in any way conservative?

Lecture Thirty-Four
Paleoconservatives and Theoconservatives

Scope: As we saw last time, not all American conservatives were happy with a foreign policy based on trying to democratize the world. "Paleoconservative" is the name given to advocates of the older conservative tradition, that of Russell Kirk and Richard Weaver, who looked back to the classical and medieval sources of our civilization and were skeptical of Woodrow-Wilson-esque plans to "make the world safe for democracy." Southern descendants of the Agrarians, such as Mel Bradford and Clyde Wilson, were particularly well represented in this group, but so were keepers of the flame of small-town, decentralized life and opponents of federal centralization like Sam Francis; their journal was *Chronicles of Culture*. Libertarians too, who had always regarded anticommunism as a distorting force, saw the 1990s as an opportunity to dismantle the monstrous military-industrial complex. A third distinct group in that decade was the group of ecumenical religious writers organized by Richard John Neuhaus around the journal *First Things*. They deplored the secularization of American life and tried to restore the idea, familiar throughout much of American history, that this was a Judeo-Christian society. In a controversial symposium in 1996, they came close to arguing that religious Americans might have to declare war against their own government if it continued to sanction the mass killing of unborn children, a phenomenon they compared to the Nazi Holocaust of the 1940s.

Outline

I. The paleoconservatives deplored the new prominence of neoconservative ideas in the 1980s and 1990s and rallied around Pat Buchanan in the elections of 1992, 1996, and 2000.

  A. One group traced its lineage to the Old South and to the Southern Agrarians of the 1930s.

    1. Their journal was *Southern Partisan*, founded in 1981.

    2. It was vulnerable to the accusation of racial insensitivity and of sentimentalizing the old slave South.

3. Mel Bradford hoped to be their standard bearer inside the federal government as director of the National Endowment for the Humanities.
4. Neoconservative protests led to the appointment of William Bennett instead.

B. The *Chronicles* group were midwesterners who also favored a decentralized political life. *Chronicles of Culture* was founded in 1977 by the Rockford Institute in Illinois.

C. A dispute at a 1986 meeting of the Philadelphia Society brought smoldering resentments between the neo- and paleoconservatives into the open.

II. Libertarians saw the end of the cold war as an opportunity to revive their fortunes and dismantle the great warfare state.

A. Murray Rothbard had been discouraged by the Libertarian Party's inability to attract voters and hoped he could improve its image by making an alliance with other conservative groups.

B. At a 1989 meeting at the Rockford Institute, libertarians and paleoconservatives together founded the John Randolph Club.

C. Llewelyn Rockwell of the Ludwig von Mises Center combined libertarian economic ideas with cultural conservatism and sympathized with Rothbard's general outlook.

D. The nature of the American political system imposed severe disadvantages on the Libertarian Party.

III. The theoconservatives were religious intellectuals with a more cerebral approach to politics than that of the new Christian right, and they became more influential in the 1990s because of the work of Richard J. Neuhaus.

A. Catholics had always played a prominent role in the conservative movement.

B. Neuhaus, a former radical and a Lutheran minister, published two influential books on religion and politics in the late 1980s, *The Naked Public Square* (1984) and *The Catholic Moment* (1987).
1. He converted to Catholicism and became a priest.
2. After separating from the Rockford Institute, he founded the *First Things* journal in 1990.

3. *First Things* gave prominence to such evangelical activists as the former Watergate conspirator Charles Colson and to Jewish writers like Rabbi David Novak.
4. Neuhaus and Colson collaborated on the 1994 statement "Evangelicals and Catholics Together," emphasizing their shared heritage and concerns.

C. Theoconservatives raised the possibility that the government's complicity with abortion might force them to abandon America.

D. The *First Things* symposium of 1996 on "The End of Democracy" caused a sharp intraconservative dispute.

Suggested Reading:

Gottfried, *Conservatism in America*.

Neuhaus, *The Naked Public Square*.

Raimondo, *An Enemy of the State*.

Scotchie, *The Paleoconservatives*.

Questions to Consider:

1. Why might citizens be attracted to the outlook of the *Southern Partisan* and *Chronicles of Culture*?
2. How did Richard Neuhaus understand the proper relationship between religion and liberty in post–cold war America?

Lecture Thirty-Five
Culture Wars

Scope: Allan Bloom, a University of Chicago philosophy professor, published *The Closing of the American Mind* in 1987, and to his astonishment, it became a national bestseller. A prolonged howl of anguish against the decline of civilization, it was particularly harsh in its condemnation of youth culture, rock music, hedonism, and overindulgent parenting. Bloom sought the wisdom of the ancients and appealed against trendy and "relevant" approaches to education. At the same time, E. D. Hirsch published *Cultural Literacy*, which deplored the decline of a nationally shared fund of knowledge. On behalf of rigor in the arts and scholarship, Hilton Kramer founded *New Criterion* in 1982; he too hated the substitution of political relevance for aesthetic excellence in literature and painting. These cultural protests from conservatives, who took on the role of their generation's guardians of civilization, came to a head in a controversy over the writing of national standards for the study of history. Lynne Cheney, head of the National Endowment for the Humanities, led the charge against what she saw as the biased, "hate-America" curriculum produced by Gary Nash and his team at the University of California, Los Angeles. The curriculum gave more attention to Harriet Tubman than to George Washington, referred frequently to the Ku Klux Klan and the Trail of Tears while passing over Edison and Carnegie in silence, and put Rockefeller on trial for economic crimes. Roger Kimball suggested in *Tenured Radicals* that the new left, defeated on the streets in the 1960s, had now taken over the academy and was subverting the minds of impressionable youth with leftist propaganda. Collectively, these culture warriors argued that conservatives had won the battle for national politics but lost the battle for the souls of young Americans.

Outline

I. In the 1980s and 1990s, American conservatives feared that they had won the political struggle but lost the battle for American culture.

A. Allan Bloom's *Closing of the American Mind* (1987) described the country as a wilderness of rock music, pornography, ignorance, and self-indulgent hedonism.
   1. Bloom's recommendations included a return to classical wisdom and much more rigorous, elitist education.
   2. To Bloom's surprise, the book became a bestseller and occasioned great soul-searching throughout the nation.
   3. Academic reviewers rejected Bloom's assertion, accusing him of sexism, racism, elitism, and opposition to multiculturalism and pluralism.

B. More democratic but equally dismayed by trends in American education was E. D. Hirsch, with his program of *Cultural Literacy* (1987).
   1. He hoped to restore a common fund of cultural knowledge among all Americans.
   2. Critics regarded him, too, as an elitist and as insensitive to minority issues.

II. Conservative literary and art critics feared that the quest for political correctness and contemporary relevance had trumped time-honored artistic criteria.

A. Hilton Kramer's *New Criterion* (founded in 1982) made a sophisticated case for high standards and a transcendence of politics in the arts.
   1. Unlike earlier conservative critics, Kramer was an admirer of modern art and did not think of it as part of the communist conspiracy.
   2. He emphasized that capitalism, far from being philistine, was the ideal economic system to nurture the arts.

B. Conservative intellectuals deplored the use of federal funds to underwrite art shows that many citizens regarded as blasphemous or pornographic.

C. Roger Kimball deplored the politicization of academic life in *Tenured Radicals* (1990) and *The Long March* (2000).
   1. He theorized that new left radicals, having lost the battle in the streets in the 1960s, had taken it to the college classroom instead.
   2. *The Long March* lamented the long shadow cast by the countercultural heroes of the 1960s.
   3. Kimball, a friend of Kramer, also wrote for *New Criterion*.

D. Numerous conservative imitators deplored the degradation of academic standards, the politicization of higher education, and academics' greed and empire-building tendencies.

E. Conservative student journals, such as the *Dartmouth Review* (founded 1980), also began to complain against political correctness and fashionable ideologies.

III. A controversy over whether the United States should have national standards for the study of history, and what they should consist of, exposed the gulf between conservative and liberal ideas of the American past.

A. Lynn Cheney, head of the National Endowment for the Humanities, commissioned the standards, and Gary Nash at UCLA headed the team that wrote them.

B. Cheney regarded the team's 1994 draft as little better than anti-American propaganda, and Congress compelled the team to modify them.

C. A second draft, in 1996, was more nuanced but still refused to give conservatives the celebratory curriculum they had anticipated.

D. Whether history is supposed to teach moral lessons—and if so, which ones—remained open to question.

Suggested Reading:

Bloom, *The Closing of the American Mind*.

Hart, *Poisoned Ivy*.

Kimball, *Tenured Radicals*.

Nash, *History on Trial*.

Questions to Consider:

1. Why were conservatives' cultural concerns so acute in the 1980s and 1990s?
2. Were conservatives justified in arguing in favor of a national history curriculum that celebrated the nation's most positive achievements?

Lecture Thirty-Six
Unresolved Paradoxes

Scope: The attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, inaugurated a new era of American politics and prompted conservative soul-searching about how best to respond to new threats. Those with a historical view could, however, take consolation from the fact that the nation had now endured for more than 200 years with a Constitution that was durable enough, but also adaptable enough, to change with the changing times. British conservatives too could take pleasure in the capacity of their own system, hammered out in the conflicts of the 17th century, to remain viable in the 21st. Part of the unspoken awareness of Anglo-American conservatives was that nearly all their domestic antagonists, whether liberal or socialist, were also dedicated to preserving these constitutional arrangements. Neither country had ever given rise to a significant revolutionary movement; communism had been extremely weak and ineffectual in both and was now extinct. In other words, nearly all conservatives enjoyed a high measure of consensus even with their ostensible adversaries and enjoyed the benefits of life in what might be thought of as a broadly conservative environment. How they should react to new challenges remains a question of vital concern, but Anglo-American conservatives, whatever their short-term anxieties, have reason to approach the future in a mood of quiet confidence.

Outline

I. I have declined to talk in detail about the conservative politics of the years since 2000 because of their proximity and their controversial character.

- **A.** Historians prefer to take the long view and leave current events to journalists.
- **B.** It is unlikely that the American election results of 2008 had a shattering effect on conservatism, even if its consequences for particular political groupings were severe. Conservatism as an attitude, a frame of mind, persists through all transient crises of circumstance.

C. Recent developments in Britain suggest a comparable story there.
  1. The Conservative Party has been out of office since 1997, but that is partly due to the fact that Tony Blair made the Labour Party acceptable to most conservative Britons.
  2. The nature of a two-party system makes a revival in the fortunes of the Conservative Party extremely probable.
  3. One theme that has come through in the lectures about British conservatism, I hope, is its extraordinary adaptability to changing times and circumstances.

II. The two greatest changes in Anglo-American conservatism since the 18th century have been its reconciliation with capitalist economics and its reconciliation with democratic politics.

A. Industrial capitalists seemed more of a threat than a support for British traditional life in the late 18th and early 19th centuries.
  1. Their factories offered an entirely new kind of work, alien, mechanized, and noisy.
  2. Their preference for free trade was at first anathema to the landed classes.
  3. After the 1850s, the two came to terms and laid the economic foundations of modern conservatism.

B. Commercial and industrial wealth encountered fewer opponents in America because they did not have to displace a powerful and entrenched landed aristocracy.
  1. The slave-owning planters of the South are only a partial exception to this rule, because they owed their prosperity to the invention of spinning and weaving machines and the transatlantic cotton trade.
  2. By the 1870s, conservatism in America was fully compatible with advocacy of the free market and industry, as William Graham Sumner and Andrew Carnegie demonstrated.

C. Conservative elites in both countries resisted the spread of democracy because, as they saw it, democracy destroyed the benign social hierarchy and corrupted republican virtue while enabling demagogues to thrive.
  1. Edmund Burke in England and the American Federalists were as shocked at the idea that the poor and uneducated should vote as we would be by the idea that the poor and uneducated should perform intricate surgical operations.

2. Such episodes as the Bank War and the rise of Andrew Jackson appeared to support their worst fears.

D. Conservatives found it easy to scoff at the idea of women as voters because it was something new and because it appeared to challenge deeply held views about appropriate gender roles.

E. Brilliant politicians and writers on both sides of the Atlantic reconciled conservatism with democracy in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

1. Abraham Lincoln and Theodore Roosevelt argued for faith in democracy as itself a venerable part of the American tradition.
2. Benjamin Disraeli sponsored the Second Reform Act, which signaled the continuing approach to democracy in Britain.
3. G. K. Chesterton argued in *Orthodoxy* (1908) that tradition and democracy, far from being opposites, are entirely complementary.
4. Conservative leaders discovered the potency of deference and emulation.
5. Conservatism outlived mass religiosity in Britain.

III. Conservatism was vindicated in its confrontation with communism and in its ability to attract the members of rising middle classes in both countries.

A. The conflict between liberal democracy and communism was perhaps the greatest world conflict of the 20th century.

1. Communism was based on the hope of a transformation of human nature.
2. Embattled from the outset, and linked to the long Russian tradition of autocracy, it became ruthless and repressive in practice.

B. A wide agreement in the United States about the need to contain the Soviet threat between 1945 and the late 1980s brought the cold war to a successful close without the use of nuclear weapons.

C. Despite recent electoral reversals in America and the Conservative Party's long visit to the wilderness in Britain, it is reasonable to anticipate a long future for conservatism in both countries.

Suggested Reading:

Chesterton, *Orthodoxy*.

Muller, *Conservatism*.

Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*.

Scruton, *The Meaning of Conservatism*.

Questions to Consider:

1. What characteristics and qualities of conservatism have made it so durable in the English-speaking world?
2. Why is it reasonable to expect a continued vitality for conservatism in the foreseeable future?

Timeline

1594	Richard Hooker's *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity* argues for limited monarchy.
1649	Parliament executes King Charles I for making war against his people.
1688–1689	King James II flees and Parliament invites William III and Mary II to become joint monarchs.
1776	American Declaration of Independence.
1783	Treaty of Paris ends American Revolutionary War; William Pitt the Younger (age 24) becomes prime minister.
1789	American Constitution comes into effect; French Revolution begins.
1791	Edmund Burke's *Reflections on the Revolution in France*.
1806	Death of William Pitt the Younger.
1815	Battle of Waterloo ends Napoleonic threat.
1820	Missouri Compromise.
1830	Daniel Webster's speech, "Second Reply to Hayne."
1831–1832	Alexis de Tocqueville's visit to the U.S. (basis of his *Democracy in America* [1835 and 1840]).
1832	Jackson's veto sets off the "Bank War"; formation of the Whig Party in U.S.; First Reform Act in Parliament extends franchise and corrects abuses.

1846	Robert Peel's Conservative government shatters over repeal of Corn Laws.
1850	Compromise of 1850 demonstrates rising tensions over slavery.
1860	Election of Abraham Lincoln, first Republican president.
1867	Conservative government passes Second Reform Act.
1874	Benjamin Disraeli elected prime minister of UK.
1890	Alfred T. Mahan's *Influence of Sea Power upon History*.
1896	Brooks Adams's *Law of Civilization and Decay*.
1901	Theodore Roosevelt becomes U.S. president.
1904	Winston Churchill (age 30) leaves Conservative Party and joins Liberals.
1910–1911	Constitutional crisis (UK) over "people's budget" and Parliament Act.
1914–1918	World War I.
1918	Posthumous publication of *The Education of Henry Adams*.
1919	Henry Cabot Lodge leads Senate opposition to the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations.
1920	American women gain the right to vote (19th Amendment) despite conservative opposition.
1922	King George V chooses Stanley Baldwin to be Conservative prime minister rather than Lord Curzon.

1924 ..... H. L. Mencken founds *The American Mercury*.

1925 ..... Winston Churchill rejoins Conservative Party and becomes chancellor of the Exchequer.

1928 ..... All British women entitled to vote.

1932 ..... Herbert Hoover loses presidential election to Franklin Roosevelt and begins to lead conservative opposition to the New Deal.

1937 ..... Neville Chamberlain becomes Conservative prime minister and attempts appeasement of Hitler.

1939 ..... Outbreak of World War II: Churchill recalled to Board of Admiralty.

1940 ..... Churchill replaces Chamberlain as prime minister.

1944 ..... Friedrich von Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom*.

1945 ..... Attlee defeats Churchill and begins nationalization of British economy.

1948 ..... Richard Weaver, *Ideas Have Consequences*.

1951 ..... Churchill elected as Conservative prime minister (age 77).

1953 ..... Russell Kirk, *The Conservative Mind*.

1955 ..... William F. Buckley Jr. founds *National Review*.

1956 ..... Suez crisis destroys Anthony Eden and ends British Empire.

1958 ..... Ayn Rand's *Atlas Shrugged*.

1964	Barry Goldwater as conservative Republican loses election to Lyndon Johnson.
1965	Irving Kristol and Daniel Bell found *The Public Interest*.
1968	Tet Offensive in Vietnam; election of Richard Nixon.
1970	Election of Edward Heath—Margaret Thatcher serves as minister of education.
1974	Watergate prompts resignation of President Nixon.
1975	Thatcher wins Conservative Party leadership election after Heath loses to Harold Wilson in two general elections.
1976	CIA director George H. W. Bush appoints Team B to study Soviet threats.
1979	Margaret Thatcher elected prime minister in UK.
1980	Ronald Reagan elected U.S. president.
1982	Reagan supports Thatcher in Falkland Islands War.
1984	Charles Murray, *Losing Ground*.
1986	Mikhail Gorbachev becomes Soviet premier and begins policies of glasnost and perestroika.
1989	Francis Fukuyama published "The End of History" in the *National Interest*; demolition of Berlin Wall signals end of Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe.

1990	Thatcher resigns after three election victories; John Major succeeds her as Conservative prime minister (UK).
1991	U.S. leads UN forces against Iraq in Kuwait; Communism ends in Soviet Union.
1994	Conservative victory in American midterm elections.
1997	Tony Blair's "New Labour" defeats John Major in general election.
2000	William Kristol and Robert Kagan, *Present Dangers*.
2001	Attacks on World Trade Center and Pentagon.

Glossary

abolitionist: An advocate of the abolition of slavery before the American Civil War. Conservatives, North and South, were skeptical of the idea and feared that radical abolitionists would shatter society in their pursuit of their ideal.

Bill of Rights: In British history, it is the legislation of 1689 that limited the powers of the king after the Glorious Revolution and guaranteed the rights of citizens. In American history, it is the name given to the first 10 constitutional amendments, most of them copied from the British antecedent of 100 years before.

Burkean: A supporter or advocate of the ideas of Edmund Burke, the most articulate English-language opponent of the philosophes and the French Revolution.

captive nations: American conservatives' name for the countries of Eastern Europe that were seized by the Soviet armies in the last year of World War II and incorporated into the Warsaw Pact system behind the Iron Curtain.

constitutional monarchy: A political system, such as Britain's, that includes a monarch but restricts his or her powers with constitutional guarantees.

containment: The theory according to which American foreign policy was guided during the cold war. Soviet nuclear weapons made it impossible to liberate Eastern Europe; containment was a policy of sustained pressure at all points to forestall the further growth of communism.

culture wars: Disputes between conservatives and liberals in the United States of the 1980s and 1990s on such questions as education, lifestyle, homosexuality, and feminism.

defender of the faith: One of the titles of the king or queen of England, who is also the head of the Church of England.

divine right: The theory held by the Stuart monarchs that they were appointed by, and answerable only to, God.

egalitarianism: The belief that all people in a society are, and ought to be, essentially equal and that policy should work to promote equality of condition.

elitism: The belief that a small minority, by virtue of its superiority over the rest of society, is entitled to special opportunities and privileges.

Federalist: An advocate or supporter of the federal constitution, as written in 1787 and adopted the following year. Also, a member of the political group around presidents Washington and Adams and Secretary of the Treasury Hamilton in the early republic.

Federalist, The: A collection of essays published in 1787–1788 in support of the federal constitution. It has become a conservative classic.

Glorious Revolution: The bloodless revolution by which the Stuart monarchy ended in 1688, to be replaced by a Parliament-appointed monarchy under William III and Mary II.

habeas corpus: The right in Anglo-American law against arbitrary arrest and against detention without trial, both of which are central to stable, limited government. Its suspension by both governments during the American Civil War led to accusations of tyranny against their respective leaders.

hedgers and ditchers: Two factions in the House of Lords in 1911. Hedgers favored accepting the Parliament Act, which would limit their powers, because the alternative was to be overrun by newly appointed peers. Ditchers favored "fighting in the last ditch" to oppose the act.

House of Commons: Lower chamber of Parliament. Membership by election, with franchise extended in 1832, 1867, 1884, and 1928 by Reform Acts.

House of Lords: Upper chamber of Parliament. Membership by inheritance of noble title, not by election.

Jacksonian democracy: The one-man, one-vote system of national politics that horrified American Whigs of the 1830s.

judicial review: The principle, established by Chief Justice John Marshall in the early 19th century, that the Supreme Court is empowered to adjudicate the constitutionality of legislation.

liberals: In the 19th century, supporters of the free market and advocates of free trade and minimal government. In the 20th century, the definition changed to signify supporters of large-scale government intervention on behalf of social justice and economic stability.

Libertarians: Advocates of minimal government who believe the free market is the most effective mechanism for solving problems usually addressed by the state.

loyal opposition: The minority party in a parliamentary democracy, whose role in criticizing the incumbent government is recognized as a valid and necessary element of limited government. The term was first used in Parliament in the early 19th century.

mediating structures: In neoconservative theory, organizations that stand between the individual and the state and give coherence to society: in particular, the family, the church, and the voluntary association.

MP: Member of Parliament.

neoconservatives: Former Democrats, dismayed by the direction of their party in the 1960s and 1970s. They argued in favor of tough cold war policies and doubted the capacity of central government to solve deep-seated social problems.

new conservatives: Journalists' and historians' name for the cluster of conservative intellectuals gathered around William F. Buckley Jr.'s *National Review* and Russell Kirk's *Modern Age* in the 1950s and early 1960s.

objectivist: Advocate of the ideas of Ayn Rand and Nathaniel Branden, who developed a philosophy of life based on self-interest illustrated in her novels *The Fountainhead* and *Atlas Shrugged*.

original sin: The religious idea that there is a fundamental flaw in human nature that makes government necessary. In religious and secular guise it is one of the central principles guiding conservative thought and practice.

paleoconservatives: Conservative intellectuals of the 1990s and early 2000s who deplored neoconservatives' influence on the conservative movement—especially their world-embracing foreign policy ideas.

philosophes: The French philosophers of the mid-18th century, much of whose work is gathered in the *Encyclopedia* of Diderot, who argued in favor of basing society on rational principles and scientific planning.

Protestant succession: The Act of Succession (1707; still in effect) specified that only a Protestant could become king or queen of England.

regicide: Killing the king (Charles I was judicially executed by Parliament in 1649).

remnant: Albert Jay Nock's term for the minority of truly educable people in society (among whom he included himself).

restoration: The decision among Britain's political elite to recall the king (Charles II) from exile in 1660 after the death of Oliver Cromwell, when they could see no alternative to achieve political stability.

revolution of 1800: The American presidential election of 1800, which brought Jefferson's Republicans to office. An essential moment in the development of American political stability because it bore witness to the willingness of the party in office to yield to the new election winner.

suffragist: Advocate of votes for women prior to 1920. One militant group of British suffragists were the Suffragettes.

theoconservatives: Nickname given to the religious conservatives gathered around Richard J. Neuhaus's nondenominational journal *First Things* in the 1990s.

Tory: In British history, a nickname for a conservative (still in use up to the present, and not derogatory). In American history, a supporter of the British during the Revolutionary War (derogatory).

totalitarian: The name given by opponents to 20th-century regimes that subordinated every aspect of national life to the all-powerful state. The classic examples are Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia.

traditionalists: Conservatives who assume the superiority of old, tried-and-true ways of addressing political and social problems. They are usually skeptical of libertarian approaches to conservatism.

underclass theory: Neoconservatives such as Edward Banfield and Charles Murray theorized that most urban problems were attributable to a dysfunctional "underclass" that lacks self-discipline, family integrity, and the capacity for self-advancement.

utilitarianism: The political-philosophical system, advanced by Jeremy Bentham and James Mill, that argues that society should be organized on behalf of the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people.

utopianism: Belief in the perfectibility of society, a belief against which conservatism has always warned because of its failure to accommodate the imperfect realities of human nature.

Whig: In British history, an opponent of arbitrary royal power in the 18th century. In American history, a member of the political party that opposed the Jacksonian Democrats in the 1830s, 1840s, and 1850s.

Biographical Notes

Adams, Henry (1838–1918): Grandson of President John Quincy Adams and great-grandson of President John Adams. Henry regarded himself as a part of America's political elite by right of birth but disdained the messy realities of campaigning for office in a democracy. His significance to conservative history is as a writer. As a Professor of History at Harvard in the 1870s, he influenced a generation of students of whom the most politically significant was Henry Cabot Lodge (subsequently Massachusetts senator and leading opponent of Woodrow Wilson). Adams despised many aspects of his own society, especially its democracy and egalitarianism. His book *Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres* (1904) argued the cultural superiority of the medieval French cathedral builders over the steam-power technologists of his own era. *The Education of Henry Adams* (1907) was his whimsical autobiography, which denied the widespread theory of social evolution and argued that America had gone into a steady decline over the decades of his life.

Adams, **John** (1735–1826): Second president of the American republic (1796–1800) after a distinguished career as a politician and diplomat for Massachusetts and the Continental Congress. Adams was a Federalist who feared the rise of democracy and believed that only a landowning elite should be permitted to vote and to govern. He wrote extensively on political philosophy, notably *Thoughts on Government* (1776), which advocated checks and balances to restrain transient enthusiasms and prevent tyranny. That book influenced many of the early state constitutions. Despite his role in the American Revolution, Adams hoped that Britain would defeat Napoleon in the wars of the French Revolution.

Buckley, William F., Jr. (1925–2008): The single most important figure in the revival of American conservatism after World War II. At the age of 30, the independently wealthy Buckley launched his new journal, *National Review*, to bring together America's scattered conservative writers and to provide all of them—anticommunists, traditionalists, and libertarians—with a forum. A first-rate publicist, he used his forensic skills to become a television personality, hosting the long-running show *Firing Line* (1966–1999). An unsuccessful but theatrical run for mayor of New York in 1965 increased his visibility, as did his work on behalf of Barry Goldwater's failed Republican presidential campaign in 1964. Buckley was careful to quarantine the conservative movement against contamination from the Watergate scandal in 1972–1974 and never regarded Nixon as a real conservative. By contrast, he was an ardent enthusiast of Ronald Reagan and became, in effect, the grand

old man of conservative intellectuals once Reagan had won the White House in 1980. In the later years of his life, Buckley struggled to reconcile the warring factions of the conservative movement.

Burke, Edmund (1729–1797): Irish-born English politician and political writer. His significance to conservatism is due chiefly to his prescient book *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (1791). Already before the Terror and the invention of the guillotine, Burke predicted that the Revolution would have chaotic and bloody consequences. Denying the validity of the French revolutionaries' claim that they could design a rational planned society, Burke argued in favor of tradition, stability, and reverence for long-established practices and customs, however superficially illogical they might seem. American scholars such as Ross Hoffman and Russell Kirk began a Burke revival in the United States after World War II. Burke was always popular on this side of the Atlantic, because in the 1770s he had sympathized with the protests of the colonies against the mother country in the prelude to the American Revolution.

Calhoun, John C. (1782–1850): Vice president under Andrew Jackson; U.S. senator from South Carolina; and one of the most articulate advocates of limited government, states' rights, and the case for slavery. After an early career as a nationalist and war hawk in the era of the War of 1812, Calhoun gradually became preoccupied with the protection of slavery in the South. He was the leading Southern intellectual in the Nullification Crisis of 1832, in which he justified his state's right to nullify federal tariffs that favored Northern over Southern commercial interests. The states, he argued, were sovereign entities before the federal government came into existence and therefore could exercise their sovereignty against it when it affronted them. The crisis gave rise to nearly all the arguments that would be used again when the slave states seceded in 1860 and 1861.

Chamberlain, Neville (1869–1940): Conservative politician and prime minister. Son of Joseph Chamberlain, the charismatic Birmingham reformer who had switched his allegiance from the Liberal Party to the Conservatives in the 1870s, Neville was overshadowed in early life by his father and by his brother Austen, who was also for a time leader of the Conservative Party. An experienced parliamentarian by the 1930s (he had held most of the major offices), Chamberlain inherited the premiership from Stanley Baldwin in 1937. A centrist technocrat rather than a right-winger, he believed that the rising power of Hitler could be contained diplomatically, so he followed the policy of appeasement. Hitler interpreted appeasement as a sign of weakness and used it to his advantage, a point Chamberlain belatedly recognized when

the Nazis invaded Poland in 1939. He brought into his wartime government Winston Churchill, who then succeeded him as prime minister after the Nazi invasion of France. Chamberlain joined Churchill's coalition government in 1940 but died later that year from cancer.

Churchill, Winston (1874–1965): The most famous Briton of the 20th century. Churchill, son of a Conservative lord and a beautiful American heiress, had an adventurous early life in the wars of the British Empire and then entered Parliament at age 26 as a Conservative. Disagreements over tariff policy prompted him to join the Liberal opposition in 1904, and he remained a Liberal for the next 21 years, during which he achieved high office as first lord of the Admiralty and later as minister for munitions in World War I. After reconciling with the Conservatives in 1925, he was chancellor of the Exchequer under Stanley Baldwin, but he antagonized his party in the 1930s by arguing for rearmament against the threat of German resurgence and deploring the policy of appeasement. Hitler's relentless rise justified Churchill's fears and brought him back to the Admiralty when World War II began, and then to the premiership in May 1940. Though a brilliant and inspiring war leader, he was regarded by much of the electorate as unsuitable for reconstruction and was defeated in the general election of 1945, yielding to Labour leader Clement Attlee, who had been his deputy prime minister during the war. Churchill was elected Conservative prime minister for the first time in 1951 at the age of 77 and served only until ill health forced his retirement in 1954. By then, however, he was a Nobel Prize winner and one of the most acclaimed statesmen in British history.

Disraeli, Benjamin (1804–1881): Conservative Party leader and prime minister in the high Victorian era. Born Jewish, he was an extremely unlikely man to become the leader of the party whose base was the aristocracy and the Anglican country gentlemen. He came to prominence as a novelist, writing on the political and social problems of Britain as it industrialized, and he led the Young England movement, which romanticized medieval social relations and appealed to the upper classes' sense of noblesse oblige. Disappointed of a place in Robert Peel's 1841 government, he deplored Peel's repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 and became leader of the Conservatives, who continued to favor protectionism. Apart from two brief periods in office in the 1850s, Disraeli spent nearly 20 years as the Commons leader of the opposition. He ushered the Second Reform Act through the Commons in 1867 (the Earl of Derby in the Lords was prime minister) and finally became prime minister in his own right in the election of 1874. Queen Victoria preferred him to all her other prime ministers—he honored her with the title Empress of India.

Hamilton, Alexander (1755–1804): Aide-de-camp to General George Washington in the Continental Army and a leading advocate of the constitution in 1787. He cowrote the *Federalist* papers with James Madison and John Jay and became secretary of the treasury on the election of Washington as first president. He sought to build up the credit and credibility of the federal government by assuming all the debts incurred by the republic under the Articles of Confederation and all those incurred by the states, and by repaying them at par. His *Report on Manufactures* (1791) advocated a centrally directed economic policy, encouraging industrialization on the British model. Hamilton has long been an inspiration to American strong-government conservatives and anathema to libertarians.

Kirk, Russell (1918–1994): One of the principal figures in the post–World War II American new conservatism. Kirk's book *The Conservative Mind* (1953) traced the lineage of Anglo-American conservatism to Edmund Burke and showed the relevance of Burke's warnings against the French Revolution for his own era and his own country in its confrontation with communism. Kirk was a traditionalist who recognized a place for the free market in a free society but denied libertarian claims for the market as the solution to all social and political problems. He wrote on education for William Buckley's *National Review* and in 1958 founded a journal of his own, *Modern Age*, which approached the new conservatism as a scholarly endeavor. A prolific author, he was associated later in life with the paleoconservatives and was a critic of the rising neoconservatives.

Lincoln, Abraham (1809–1865): The Illinois lawyer who became the first Republican Party president and led the Union during the Civil War. As a young man he was a "Henry Clay Whig," favoring a national economic development policy and federal aid for the development of canals and railroads. An aspiring orator and admirer of Daniel Webster, he shared with Webster an exalted sense of the sacredness of the Union, but he was not an abolitionist. A compromise candidate at the Republican convention of 1860, he denied the legitimacy of the slave states' secession, asserting that they were in rebellion. His principal war aim was to restore the integrity of the Union, and he was willing to take whatever measures proved necessary to do so, including suspending habeas corpus and liberating all slaves in the rebellious states (1863). His Gettysburg Address and his Second Inaugural Address have become conservative classics, though he is more admired by strong-government Hamiltonian conservatives than by Jeffersonians.

Marshall, John (1755–1835): Virgina Federalist in the early republic, diplomat, congressman, and secretary of state. He was appointed chief justice of the Supreme Court by President John Adams just prior to Adams's losing the election of 1800, and he served on the court until his death in 1835. He established the principle of judicial review, giving the court the right to decide whether legislation was constitutional. This authority increased the significance of the court and gave it, as an unelected body of experts, the role of restraining the popular democratic passions.

Mencken, H. L. (1880–1956): Journalist and editor of the *American Mercury*, the irreverent highbrow journal of the 1920s. Mencken, who was one of the first Americans to translate Nietzsche, was dismissive of democracy and scorned sentimental treatments of "the common man." He was also an outspoken critic of organized religion, especially the evangelical Christianity that was characteristic of American rural communities. He wrote a famous series of articles about the Scopes Trial in Dayton, Tennessee (1925), and concentrated his scorn on William Jennings Bryan for his attempts at defending the inerrancy of the book of Genesis against the Darwinian hypothesis. Mencken's popularity declined sharply in the 1930s, which witnessed a renewed respect for demotic culture.

Peel, Robert (1788–1850): Conservative prime minister, 1834–1835 and 1841–1846. His father was an immensely wealthy industrialist who had bought his way into the nobility, a pattern that was to become common in the 19th century, as industrial wealth began to compete with that of the landed aristocracy. Peel's first claim to fame is his founding of the world's first modern police force for London, whose members were nicknamed "bobbies" or "peelers" after him. He became prime minister in 1841 but brought his own ministry to an end in the crisis of 1846. The Irish famine, brought about by a potato blight that destroyed the principal crop of the Irish peasant majority, prompted him to repeal the Corn Laws, which kept cheap food imports out of Britain. Most of the Conservatives regarded this repeal as a betrayal of their interest, and the party divided into a loyal minority of Peelites, who accepted repeal, and a majority of protectionists, who followed the parliamentary leadership of Benjamin Disraeli.

Pitt, William (the younger; 1759–1806): The youngest prime minister in British history, Pitt accepted the office in 1783, when he was 24 years old, and held it without interruption for the next 18 years. An exceptionally gifted young man with high connections (he was the son of another long-serving prime minister), he came into office just as Britain was acknowledging its defeat in the American Revolutionary War. A brilliant

parliamentarian and an early supporter of reforming Parliament, he gradually became more conservative, especially once the outbreak of revolution in France threatened to spread to England. He recognized that, unlike all previous Anglo-French wars, the conflict that broke out in 1793 and would last almost uninterrupted until the final defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo (1815) was more ideological than dynastic. Skeptical at first of Edmund Burke's denunciation of the French Revolution, he later came to see how prescient Burke had been. He resigned in 1801 when King George III refused to approve of Catholic emancipation, but he resumed office in 1804 when a temporary Anglo-French truce broke down. He died two years later, still in office, at the age of 46.

Roosevelt, Theodore (1858–1919): Republican president (1901–1909) who tried to promote conservative virtues in an era of mass democracy and industrialization. As a young man, Roosevelt lamented that he had missed the chance to fight in the Civil War. With a well-developed sense of noblesse oblige, he also deplored the reluctance of many in New York's elite to participate in politics, which he saw as the duty of privileged men. Rising quickly in Republican politics, he left his job as assistant secretary of the navy under President McKinley in 1898 in order to participate in the Spanish-American War. The success of his regiment, the Rough Riders, led in quick succession to his election first as governor of New York and then as vice president of the United States. The assassination of McKinley just after his second inauguration pitched Roosevelt into the White House. He sought to promote social harmony by curtailing unregulated corporate power at home. In foreign policy he sought to build a world-bestriding navy (the Great White Fleet) and endorsed the views of his friend Alfred Thayer Mahan, an advocate of naval power as the key to imperialism.

Thatcher, Margaret (b. 1925): The first woman to be prime minister of Britain, and the longest serving prime minister of the 20th century (1979–1990). Nicknamed "the Iron Lady" by Soviet critics, she accepted it as an honor and demonstrated a ferrous toughness throughout her administration. Dismayed by years of relative economic decline and worsening inefficiency in the nationalized industries, Thatcher began a strenuous policy of denationalization and privatization. She also confronted Britain's mighty trade unions and broke them—even the National Union of Mineworkers, which had proved too strong for several of her predecessors. Despite the union's fierce opposition, Thatcher closed inefficient mines all over the country. Ideologically sympathetic to her contemporary President Reagan, Thatcher enjoyed his support during a short war against Argentina

in 1982, after its dictator attempted to seize the Falkland Islands, a British possession in the South Atlantic. Her imperiousness and her willingness to fire uncooperative subordinates ultimately led her into a serious blunder: imposition of the ruinously unpopular poll tax. Her own party voted no confidence in her, and she was forced to relinquish her office to John Major in 1990.

Webster, Daniel (1782–1852). New Hampshire–born lawyer and politician who became an influential Massachusetts senator and was a Whig leader during the Jacksonian era. He was an outspoken supporter of a national economic development policy and a talented lobbyist for New England commercial interests. Webster's significance for conservative history is his passionate advocacy for the Union, best expressed in his "Second Reply to Hayne" (1830), a two-day speech that packed the Senate and provoked tears from many listeners. Lincoln's idea of the sacrosanct Union was one he learned from Webster, and it was the antithesis of the states' rights view espoused by John C. Calhoun.

Bibliography

Allitt, Patrick. *Catholic Intellectuals and Conservative Politics in America, 1950–1985*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993. I first broke into print with this study of the connection between the new conservatism of the 1950s and the Catholic Church, which was one of many organizations undergoing profound changes in the 1960s and 1970s.

———. *The Conservatives: Ideas and Personalities throughout American History*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009. In this text, I offer a straightforward summary history of conservatism on this side of the Atlantic, from *The Federalist* to the fall of the World Trade Center. If I do say so myself, this is the ideal book to accompany the lectures!

———. *Religion in America since 1945: A History*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2003. If it were not bad form to blow one's own trumpet, I would describe this book as the perfect source from which to learn about the topic. In it, I emphasize the diversity and complexity of American religious life since World War II.

Ashworth, John. *Agrarians and Aristocrats: Party Political Ideology in the United States, 1837–1846*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1983. An intelligent account of the confrontation of the Jacksonian Democrats of the 1830s, who believed in democracy and equality (for white men), and the Whigs, who favored elitism and the rule of a virtuous minority.

Auchterlonie, Mitzi. *Conservative Suffragists: The Women's Vote and the Tory Party*. London: Tauris, 1988. Aristocratic British women thought they had a much better right to the vote than working-class men, and their fathers and husbands sometimes agreed.

Banfield, Edward. *The Unheavenly City*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1970. Banfield, a Harvard Professor of Urban Affairs in the late 1960s, poured cold water on Great Society reformers' hopes with this book. He argued that most urban problems don't get solved; we just have to learn how to get along with them. Profoundly conservative in its anti-utopian mood.

Bannister, Robert. *On Liberty, Society, and Politics: The Essential Essays of William Graham Sumner*. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1992. Sumner was the most influential social Darwinist of late 19th-century America, and Bannister has collected his most persuasive essays, whose collective message is that government governs best that governs least.

Bartlett, Irving. *Daniel Webster*. New York: Norton, 1978. The best single-volume biography of the Massachusetts senator and brilliant orator whose vision of the Union inspired Abraham Lincoln.

———. *John C. Calhoun*. New York: Norton, 1993. Calhoun was the most eloquent exponent of the states' rights and proslavery point of view. Bartlett's biography is manageable in length and style, explaining without ever endorsing the South Carolinian's views.

Blake, Robert. *The Conservative Party from Peel to Thatcher*. London: Methuen, 1985. The standard account of British conservatism over the last two centuries. The author, himself a vigorous Conservative, treats everyone who is not a Conservative with a tone of gentle denigration, while amicably building up everyone on his side of the great divide.

Bloom, Allan. *The Closing of the American Mind*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987. The University of Chicago philosopher was astonished when this angry and difficult book became an unexpected bestseller, thereby disproving its author's own central hypothesis.

Bogdanor, Vernon. *The Monarchy and the Constitution*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. The fact that Britain is still a monarchy is itself vivid testimony to the enduring power of conservative ideas and emotions. Bogdanor guides readers through the Byzantine complexity of the monarchy's role in the unwritten British constitution.

Brown, Wallace. *The Good Americans: The Loyalists in the American Revolution*. New York: Morrow, 1969. You can't understand the Revolution unless you realize that tens of thousands of American colonists opposed the idea of independence. This is their story.

Buchanan, Patrick. *Right from the Beginning*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1988. The paleoconservative leader, who also played a prominent role in the Nixon and Reagan administrations, describes his early development as a conservative in cold war America and acknowledges his debts to Buckley, Kirk, and others.

Buckley, William F. *Up from Liberalism*. New York: Bantam, 1968. Originally published 1959. There are dozens of editions of this book, and you can almost certainly get a used copy from amazon.com for less than a dollar. Buckley was never a systematic writer, but this is as close as he came to writing his own manifesto. Full of pungent insight, wit, and cutting denunciations of liberal platitudes.

Burke, Edmund. *Reflections on the Revolution in France*. Edited by Frank M. Turner. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003. Originally published in 1790, this is the book that many conservatives regard as the foundational text of their philosophy, with its lucid explanation of how to think conservatively and how to avoid the kind of terrifying upheavals that were then beginning to afflict revolutionary France.

Butler, Lord, ed. *The Conservatives: From Their Origins to 1965*. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977. An account of British Toryism from a man who lived and breathed it, never doubting its rightness. The author's sympathies inadvertently help the reader understand the general frame of mind.

Camhi, Jane J. *Women against Women: American Anti-Suffragism, 1880–1920*. Brooklyn, NY: Carlson Publishing, 1994. A reminder that the votes-for-women question created strange alliances; radical women sometimes opposed suffrage, and conservative women sometimes favored it.

Cannadine, David. *History in Our Time*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998. Cannadine is one of the two or three best historians of Britain now working, and these essays on the transformation of postimperial Britain sparkle with insight and anecdote.

Capps, Walter H. *The New Religious Right: Piety, Patriotism and Politics*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1994. This is the place to begin learning about the Moral Majority and how its leaders blended evangelical zeal with political conservatism in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Carnegie, Andrew. *Autobiography*. Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1986. Originally published 1920. Carnegie was a Scottish immigrant to Pittsburgh who rose almost literally from rags to riches and became one of the two or three wealthiest men in the world. Dominating the iron and steel industry in the late 19th century, he was also a writer on questions of political economy and an inveterate self-justifier.

Charmley, John. *A History of Conservative Politics: 1900–1996*. Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 1996. A short, matter-of-fact summary history of British conservative politics and the Conservative Party throughout the 20th century. A good place to begin learning the topic.

Chernow, Ron. *Alexander Hamilton*. New York: Penguin, 2004. Lively and informative biographical study of the leading Federalist, including his work as a soldier, writer, and practical politician in the first administration under the Constitution.

Chesterton, G. K. *Orthodoxy*. Garden City, New York: Doubleday Image, 1959. Originally published 1908. Chesterton, the English language's leading master of paradox, stands up for tradition, godliness, and virtue—and makes them seem infinitely preferable to innovation, sin, and vice.

Churchill, Winston. *Great Contemporaries*. New York: Putnam, 1937. For much of his life, Churchill made a good living as a writer, and in this, one of his greatest books, it's easy to see why. A series of superb word-portraits of his contemporaries, written at a time when Churchill was in the political wilderness, it crackles with wit, insight, and unforgettable phrases.

Coleman, Bruce I. *Conservatism and the Conservative Party in Nineteenth-Century Britain*. London: E. Arnold, 1988. It is often difficult to understand why minor issues (like a subsidy to the Maynooth Seminary) became major political flashpoints. Coleman is very effective at putting them in context and explaining their significance.

Collins, Robert M. *Transforming America: Politics and Culture in the Reagan Years*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007. Sensible account of how conservatives came to power in 1980 and the problems they encountered in trying to put their ideas to work.

Cosgrave, Patrick. *Thatcher: The First Term*. London: Bodley Head, 1985. Margaret Thatcher's sheer unexpectedness was matched by her iron will and flinty determination. An admiring biography written just after her second general election victory, when she appeared to be stopping and reversing the long decline of the British economy.

Cram, Ralph Adams. *Convictions and Controversies*. Boston: Marshall Jones, 1935. It may not be easy to get hold of a copy of this old volume, but do what you can. America's best-ever Gothic revival architect ruminates on the beauty of ancient things and the horribleness of new ones in paragraphs that glitter with insight.

Critchlow, Donald T. *The Conservative Ascendancy: How the GOP Right Made Political History*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007. The standard work on how conservatives came to dominate the Republican Party and how they ran America between 1980 and 2004.

Dangerfield, George. *The Strange Death of Liberal England*. New York: Smith and Haas, 1935. A close study of the years 1910–1914 in England, with beautiful chapters about the "people's budget" and the crisis of the House of Lords. Reprinted regularly since its publication more than 70 years ago and still easy to find.

Dickinson, H. T. *Britain and the French Revolution, 1789–1815*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989. British leaders and aristocrats were terrified that the French revolutionary "contagion" would spread to Britain, and they did everything they could to prevent it, including repression and the generation of patriotic propaganda. Knowledge of events across the Channel profoundly affected this era of British history.

Diggins, John P. *Mussolini and Fascism: The View from America*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972. It wasn't clear in the 1920s and 1930s what "fascism" meant, and for a while Mussolini's experiment enjoyed the sympathetic attention of American observers. Diggins recreates those years and warns readers not to be too censorious.

———. *Up from Communism: Conservative Odysseys in American Intellectual History*. New York: Harper and Row, 1975. Four rich intellectual biographies between one pair of covers. Diggins's subjects, Max Eastman, Will Herberg, John Dos Passos, and James Burnham, were all seduced by the promise of communism as young men, then came to see it as the greatest menace in the world.

Donald, David. *Lincoln*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995. If you only ever read one book about the life of Abraham Lincoln, this is the one you should turn to. Donald puts a lifetime of learning into it, and every sentence provides revelations.

Dorrien, Gary. *The Neoconservative Mind: Politics, Culture, and the War of Ideology*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993. An immensely informative study of neoconservatism as it grew out of Great Society liberalism in the 1960s and 1970s. Dorrien is unsympathetic to neocons but is also the most scrupulous scholar of their trajectory; he understands them without endorsing them.

D'Souza, Dinesh. *Falwell before the Millennium: A Critical Biography*. Chicago: Regnery Gateway, 1984. A sympathetic account of the Lynchburg televangelist's early days, written by one of the current masters of conservative propaganda.

Duffy, Michael. *The Younger Pitt*. New York: Longman, 2000. It's possible to make the case for Pitt as the first true conservative prime minister in British history. Duffy gets right to the point in this no-nonsense account of how the 24-year-old genius became, and remained, Britain's leader through the dangerous years of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars.

Earle, Edward Mead, ed. *The Federalist*. New York: Modern Library, n.d. Originally published 1787. The foundational essays on American political philosophy that Hamilton, Madison, and Jay wrote at high speed as a series of newspaper columns to encourage acceptance of the constitution. Every educated citizen should read them.

Ebeling, Richard. *The Age of Economists: From Adam Smith to Milton Friedman*. Hillsdale, MI: Hillsdale College Press, 1999. A spirited history of the classical tradition in economics from a dedicated libertarian. This is the book in which you'll find the fullest sympathy for Adam Smith, Friedrich von Hayek, and Milton Friedman.

Ehrman, John. *The Rise of Neoconservatism*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995. An explanation of how this influential conservative faction developed a foreign policy that owed a larger ancestral debt to Woodrow Wilson than to George Washington's Farewell Address.

Ellis, Joseph J. *Passionate Sage: The Character and Legacy of John Adams*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001. Ellis is a great storyteller who enters imaginatively into the lives of the people whose biographies he writes, but he is an excellent scholar too. By reading this book you'll learn what it was like to actually be John Adams.

Faber, Richard. *Beaconsfield and Bolingbroke*. London: Faber and Faber, 1961. An inventive comparison of two conservative leaders who lived 150 years apart but shared many of the same traits of character and temperament.

Ferguson, Niall. *Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World*. London: Penguin, 2003. Ferguson is the current wunderkind of British historiography and a prolific historian of Britain's role in the world. Immensely readable and thought provoking.

Foerster, Norman. *Humanism and America*. New York: Farrar and Reinhart, 1930. It won't be easy to find a copy of this book if you don't have access to a university library or a big-city collection. But if you can find it, it offers the best introduction to the work of the interwar years' New Humanists, Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More.

Francis, Martin, and Ina Z. Bargielowska, eds. *The Conservatives and British Society: 1880–1990*. Cardiff, UK: University of Wales, 1996. A series of essays that collectively address the question, Why did a party of the upper classes consistently win electoral support from working-class Britons? In their scholarly way, the contributors come up with some complex but persuasive answers.

Frederickson, George. *The Inner Civil War: Northern Intellectuals and the Crisis of the Union*. New York: Harper and Row, 1968. Intellectual supporters of the Union in the 1860s were not always antislavery and certainly did not all favor democracy. Frederickson shows that many of them welcomed the Civil War as a blood purge that might cleanse the nation of its corruptions.

Friedman, Milton. *Capitalism and Freedom*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. The University of Chicago Nobel laureate explains the superiority of capitalism in straightforward language in this highly persuasive and widely admired manifesto.

Gallagher, Gary, and Alan Nolan, eds. *The Myth of the Lost Cause and Civil War History*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000.

No sooner had the South lost the Civil War than it began to romanticize the prewar plantation world and the heroism of the Confederate soldier. Such ideas built a largely imaginary world that descendants like Margaret Mitchell mistook for history.

Garraty, John A. *Henry Cabot Lodge: A Biography*. New York: Knopf, 1953. Lodge was the villain in Woodrow Wilson's universe, the man who kept the United States out of the League of Nations. But Garraty capably demonstrates the internal consistency of Lodge's ideas and the reasonableness of his anti-Wilsonian conservatism.

Genovese, Eugene. *The World the Slaveholders Made*. New York: Pantheon, 1969. Genovese is the great historical genius of the last few decades in America whose work has transformed our understanding of slavery and Southern conservatism.

Gerson, Alan. *The Neoconservative Vision: From the Cold War to the Culture Wars*. Lanham, MD: Madison Books, 1996. A clear-sighted account from inside the neoconservative movement about its characteristics and its leading characters. Don't read it through; just look up appropriate topics in the index and read it episodically.

Gitlin, Todd. *The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage*. New York: Bantam, 1987. A former leader of Students for a Democratic Society offers a radical interpretation of the 1960s, brimming with acute observations about what motivated the restless protestors and why their movement eventually failed.

Goldwater, Barry. *The Conscience of a Conservative*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007. L. Brent Bozell, who actually ghostwrote this manifesto for the Arizona senator and launched his presidential aspirations, said, "Goldwater didn't really know much about conservatism until he read this book."

Gottfried, Paul. *Conservatism in America: Making Sense of the American Right*. New York: Palgrave, 2007. Gottfried is among the most articulate of the paleoconservatives and as a Jew is well-placed to refute allegations that the paleocons are anti-Semites. A superb short history from that faction's vantage point.

Graudbard, Stephen. *Burke, Disraeli, and Churchill: The Politics of Perseverance*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961. An American historian of Britain points out that these three—probably the most famous conservative trio in British history—were all outsiders to the conservative mainstream, yet each made himself indispensable. Graudbard is equally good on their lives and on their writings.

Hague, William. *William Pitt the Younger*. London: HarperCollins, 2004. A thorough and well-grounded biography of the man who became prime minister at the age of 24 and held the position for almost all the rest of his life.

Haller, Mark. *Eugenics: Hereditarian Attitudes in American Thought*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1963. Long before Hitler thought about creating a master race, a dedicated group of American scientists and asylum custodians were trying to encourage the breeding of the "fit" and to prevent the reproduction of the "unfit," sometimes by forced sterilization.

Hampsher-Monk, Iain. *The Political Philosophy of Edmund Burke*. New York: Longman, 1987. There are dozens of books on Burke's ideas by now, many of them contentious and difficult. This one has the virtue of being relatively straightforward and of separating information from opinion.

Harkness, Douglas. *Bolingbroke: The Man and His Career*. London: Staples Press, 1957. Bolingbroke was one of the many wayward geniuses of British conservative history. His dalliance with the Jacobite pretenders to the throne in the 1710s did the cause more harm than good and ruined his own career.

Harrison, Brian. *Separate Spheres: The Opposition to Women's Suffrage in Britain*. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978. From Brian Harrison, I learned this insight: Before women had the vote, advocates of women's suffrage sounded ridiculous, but once they got the vote, it was the opponents of women's suffrage who sounded ridiculous, which makes it difficult for us to take them seriously today.

Hart, Ben. *Poisoned Ivy*. New York: Stein and Day, 1984. A crowd of cheeky undergraduates at Dartmouth, sick of political correctness on campus, founded a magazine and caused havoc among the forces of sanctimonious self-righteousness on campus. It's gauche and sophomoric, but you'll feel a guilty pleasure as you read it.

Hazlitt, Henry. *Economics in One Lesson*. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1946. An early libertarian tract, full of homely wisdom. Wormwood and gall to liberals, nectar to free marketers.

Heilbroner, Robert. *The Worldly Philosophers*. New York: Simon and Schuster Touchstone, 1980. A highly readable and engaging history of economics from the 18th century to the present. Heilbroner wrote it before he turned 30 and admitted, in the preface to a later edition, that he would not have been willing to generalize so confidently if he had left it until later in life. We all gain from his original precocity.

Hibbert, Christopher. *Disraeli: A Personal History*. London: HarperCollins, 2004. Disraeli was the ultimate outsider in British politics—not from the elite, not college educated, and a Jew—yet he rose to become the ultimate insider: Conservative prime minister. Hibbert's is one of the liveliest of the many biographies of this mysterious and brilliant man.

Hoeveler, David. *The New Humanism: A Critique of Modern America*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1977. A leading American intellectual historian offers an evenhanded appraisal of the New Humanists, pointing out the grave weaknesses that accompanied their sometimes shrewd insights.

Hoover, Herbert. *The Challenge to Liberty*. New York: Scribner's, 1934. The bitterly disappointed ex-president was afraid that Franklin Roosevelt was going to follow Mussolini and Stalin down the road to dictatorship; he spoke out in anguish against the prospect.

Horne, Alistair. *Macmillan: The Official Biography*. London: Macmillan, 1989. Official biographies are usually stuffy, long-winded, and full of special pleading. Horne avoids these pitfalls in a spirited account of the Churchillian prime minister (1957–1963), who realized that the end of the British Empire had come at last.

Howe, Daniel Walker. *The Political Culture of the American Whigs*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979. Immensely influential among academics, this is the book that every historian of antebellum politics wishes he or she had written. In convincing detail, Howe shows the reader what the world looked like to American Whigs and explains why their rival Democrats' views were so alarming.

Hurd, Douglas. *Robert Peel: A Biography*. London: Orion, 2007. Peel's character was full of contradictions and has given rise to countless interpretations from admirers and detractors. Hurd evenhandedly works

through the great prime minister's life and work to show that he was indeed devious but never descended to mere Machiavellianism.

Jenkins, Roy. *Churchill: A Biography*. New York: Plume, 2001. There are hundreds of books about Churchill, many of them sycophantic. Jenkins, who has himself been the holder of many high offices in British politics, offers a balanced and beautifully written account, showing Churchill's many faults as well as his astonishing virtues.

Jenkins, T. A. *Disraeli and Victorian Conservatism*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996. Sober, stately, methodical, and persuasive; Jenkins brings to life the complexity of British Conservative politics in the middle decades of the 19th century.

Johnson, Paul. *A History of the American People*. New York: Harper Perennial, 1999. Johnson, a British conservative, wrote this provocative and controversial history of the United States, which approaches almost every episode from an unexpected point of view, as a counterpart to his equally intriguing *History of the English People* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1985). Both are maddening and delightful by turns, and there isn't a dull sentence in either book.

Judis, John. *William F. Buckley, Jr.: Patron Saint of the Conservatives*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988. Judis was a leftist editor, guaranteed not to sympathize with Buckley's ideas, but he couldn't help admiring the man. In this book, he wrote what is to date the best account of how Buckley's millionaire lifestyle and polemical writing fitted together.

Kimball, Roger. *Tenured Radicals: How Politics Has Corrupted Our Higher Education*. New York: Harper and Row, 1990. An immensely learned and intelligent man gives in to the temptation to spin a conspiracy theory. According to Kimball, a group of jaded 1960s radicals later accomplished on college campuses what they had failed to achieve on the streets.

Kirk, Russell. *The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Eliot*. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1953. Kirk creates, or traces, a conservative lineage in Anglo-American history, from Edmund Burke down to T. S. Eliot. Evocative and beautifully written, the book is also a lament for a society in danger from internal materialism and external communist threat.

———. *John Randolph of Roanoke*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951. One brilliant eccentric tells the story of another in this minor classic about the life of a crotchety Virginia genius in the early republic.

Kristol, Irving. *Two Cheers for Capitalism*. New York: Basic Books, 1978. A collection of the influential neoconservative's articles, mostly from *The Public Interest* and *The Wall Street Journal*. Among his targets were business leaders, who seemed strangely unwilling to make the case for their own role in society as morally defensible.

Liensch, Michael. *Redeeming America: Piety and Politics in the New Christian Right*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993. A valuable, if rather heavy, scholarly account of populist evangelical conservatism, which goes more deeply into the connections than Capps and does so with more impartiality than D'Souza.

Lippmann, Walter. *Essays in the Public Philosophy*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1955. After witnessing the totalitarian excesses of the mid-20th century, America's most famous columnist fell back on the traditional wisdom of the natural law, which he ably summarized and explained in this short book.

Lock, F. P. *Edmund Burke*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998. One of the best and most evenhanded of the many biographies of Burke. Equally good on his political life and on his intellectual significance.

Macmillan, Harold. *Tides of Fortune: 1945–1955*. London: Macmillan, 1969. Disguising the misery of his personal life, Macmillan records his surprising rise as a public man, from the back benches to 10 Downing Street, thanks partly to his friendship with Churchill and Eisenhower, the era's Anglo-American giants.

Mahan, Alfred Thayer. *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1890. An American Navy captain gave a series of lectures on sea power to his cadets in the 1880s and then turned them into the most influential book on sea power ever written. It was the bible of the German and Japanese navies until World War II.

McDonald, Forrest. *The Presidency: An Intellectual History*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995. Just because the president is immensely powerful, especially in foreign policy, doesn't mean that he was bound to be. McDonald traces the history of presidential power and the debate that has surrounded it, from the era of Washington into the late 20th century.

Mill, John Stuart. *Principles of Political Economy*. Edited by Jonathan Riley. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994. Originally published 1848. One of the two or three most influential books of the 19th century, far more widely read in its day than Marx's *Capital*, and a foundational text of economic liberalism.

Morgan, Edmund. *The Birth of the Republic, 1763–1789*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956. Half a century old, but still one of the most dependable short histories of the Revolution, covering all the major issues and particularly good on the participants' self-understanding.

Muller, Jerry Z. *Conservatism: An Anthology of Social and Political Thought from David Hume to the Present*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997. An anthology of passages from the all-time conservative greats, which are long enough to give you a good sense of their authors' mood and style. It includes illuminating passages from European authors for comparison with the Anglo-Saxons who are the focus of this course.

Nash, Gary B. *History on Trial: Culture Wars and the Teaching of the Past*. New York: Knopf, 1997. Nash twice drafted a national history curriculum—and twice infuriated conservatives by emphasizing suffering, persecution, and the downtrodden in the nation's past, while slighting its achievements. He justifies his curriculum and rebukes his critics.

Nash, George. *The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America Since 1945*. New York: Basic Books, 1976. The classic account of how traditionalists, libertarians, and anticommunists organized after World War II to create a movement that was at first purely intellectual but then (with Goldwater) became politically active.

Nelson, William H. *The American Tory*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961. Nelson clearly understands and sympathizes with Americans who disliked and feared the revolutionary ferment of the 1760s and 1770s; he shows you how reasonable their point of view was, at least according to their standards.

Neuhaus, Richard J. *The Naked Public Square*. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1984. Neuhaus is the leader of America's theoconservatives, and this statement of the dangers confronting a society that has excluded God from public life has become a classic summary of his views.

Nisbet, Robert. *Conservatism: Dream and Reality*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986. American social philosopher explains the ambiguities intrinsic to philosophical conservatism, and its difficult encounter with economic liberalism and welfare-state politics.

Nock, Albert Jay. *Memoirs of a Superfluous Man*. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1943. The outrageously entertaining life story of a libertarian writer who was utterly unashamed of despising the common man, hating democracy, and regarding himself as one of the tiny handful ("the remnant") of real human beings on earth. No dull pages in this volume, which is packed with shocking sentiments.

O'Gorman, Frank. *British Conservatism: Conservative Thought from Burke to Thatcher*. New York: Longman, 1986. The most important texts from British conservative history, with a capable and insightful editor's introduction.

Paine, Thomas. *The Rights of Man*. New York: Knopf, 1994. The book written to answer Burke's *Reflections*, by the man much better known in America as the author of *Common Sense*, the pamphlet that inspired the Declaration of Independence.

Paxman, Jeremy. *On Royalty*. London: Viking, 2006. Paxman, skeptical of the monarchy, watched the national outpouring of grief at the death of Princess Diana and realized that he had not adequately understood why democratic peoples can still love kings, queens, and (most of all) fairy tale princesses.

Podhoretz, Norman. *Why We Were in Vietnam*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982. The editor of *Commentary* magazine explains why he opposed America's role in Vietnam when it was happening but later changed his mind. A neoconservative mea culpa.

Popper, Karl. *The Open Society and Its Enemies*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1950. The classic philosophical condemnation of totalitarianism. Planned societies are destined to be tyrannical, said Popper, and 20th-century history provided plenty of terrible illustrations of his theme.

Quinton, Anthony. *The Politics of Imperfection: The Religious and Secular Traditions of Conservative Thought in England from Hooker to Oakeshott*. London: Faber and Faber, 1978. The transcript of a lecture series on the principal figures and incidents of British conservative history, emphasizing its anti-utopian characteristics.

Radosh, Ronald. *Prophets on the Right*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1975. Sympathetic account of the conservatives who opposed America's entry into World War II and carried on the tradition of Washington's Farewell Address.

Raimondo, Justin. *An Enemy of the State: The Life of Murray Rothbard*. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2000. By turns admirable and infuriating, this is a book that would have been better if its author had disciplined himself to stay in the background. Instead, he breaks in constantly and revives certain intraconservative arguments, rekindling all their old bitterness.

———. *Reclaiming the American Right: The Lost Legacy of the Conservative Movement*. Burlingame, CA: Center for Libertarian Studies, 1993. A cranky libertarian devotes half his pages to tracing conservative history and the other half to denouncing more recent conservatives who have, in his view, betrayed the cause.

Rand, Ayn. *Atlas Shrugged*. New York: Random House, 1957. An immense fantasy about capitalist utopia. Read it as a teenager and you'll think Rand is almost divine. Read it when you're 50 and you'll roar with laughter at the naïveté of your own dimly remembered youth.

Reitan, Earl. *The Thatcher Revolution*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003. Reitan, an American historian of Britain, explains in layman's terms how Margaret Thatcher transformed the basic rules of British political and economic life, and how John Major and Tony Blair carried on where she left off. Bread-and-butter political history; never incandescent but always informative.

Roosevelt, Theodore. *An Autobiography*. New York: Scribner's, 1913. The larger-than-life egomaniac and first executive lays down the law on every topic in the best prose ever written by an American president.

Rubinstein, W. D. *Britain's Century: A Political and Social History, 1815–1905*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. Superb general history of 19th-century Britain by one of its best American historians. A good place to start for an overview of the kingdom and the empire.

Scotchie, Joseph, ed. *The Paleoconservatives: New Voices of the Old Right*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1999. The best collection of paleoconservative writings, all put in the appropriate context by an intelligent introduction.

Scruton, Roger. *The Meaning of Conservatism*. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2001. One of the leading philosophical conservatives in recent British history speculates on what conservatism is and whether it involves definite principles of its own or is merely reactive to other ideas.

Singal, David. *The War Within: From Victorian to Modernist Thought in the South, 1919–1945*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982. The South was the most economically backward part of the republic between the Civil War and the New Deal. Not surprisingly, it gave rise to some of the most interesting, and the most eccentric, conservative ideas.

Smith, Adam. *An Inquiry into the Wealth of Nations*. Edited by Kathryn Sutherland. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993. Originally published 1776. The fount of traditional capitalist wisdom. Smith recognized that the

beginnings of the Industrial Revolution, taking place around him in the 1770s, demanded a radical rethinking of traditional notions of wealth, work, value, and commerce.

Steinfels, Peter. *The Neoconservatives: The Men Who Are Changing America's Politics*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979. The first systematic study of the neoconservatives, undertaken by the editor of the liberal Catholic journal *Commonweal*. Steinfels did not like the neocons or their ideas, but he recognized intellectual firepower when he saw it, and he explained their significance for the future with great prescience.

Sullivan, Andrew. *Eminent Churchillians*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1994. Churchill was not always a hero; in the 1930s, his warlike utterances made him sound more like a dinosaur. Sullivan sketches the people who opposed his ideas and their disputes with the handful who shared his view that sooner or later Britain would have to fight Hitler.

Tanenhaus, Sam. *Whittaker Chambers: A Biography*. New York: Random House, 1997. Excellent biography of the man who brought Alger Hiss to justice. Tanenhaus explains how Chambers started out as a communist, only to discover the full horror of Stalinism, and then dedicated his life to opposing it.

Tate, Adam. *Conservatism and Southern Intellectuals*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2005. Solemn, systematic, and scholarly; a methodical account of the principal themes in southern conservatism in the 19th and 20th centuries.

Teachout, Terry. *The Skeptic: The Life of H. L. Mencken*. New York: HarperCollins, 2002. Mencken generates strong opinions, pro and con. Teachout loves Mencken's writing but doesn't try to hide the shortcomings of the Sage of Baltimore.

Thatcher, Margaret. *The Path to Power*. New York: HarperCollins, 1996. Thatcher, never excessively troubled by personal modesty, tells all and compels you to admire her astonishing capacity for hard work and ideological resolve.

Tucker, David M. *Mugwumps: Public Moralists of the Gilded Age*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1998. Patrician Northerners of the post–Civil War era, the mugwumps favored honest government and an end to political corruption and ethnic "machine" voting. They sighed for the imagined virtues of the early republic.

Twelve Southerners. *I'll Take My Stand: The South and the Agrarian Tradition*. New York: Harper and Row, 1962. Originally published 1930.

The manifesto of the Southern Agrarians, denouncing industrialization and singing the praises of simple farming life. None of the authors was a farmer.

Varey, Simon. *Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke*. Boston: Twayne, 1984. A short, concise, and straight-to-the-point biography of the early 18th-century Tory leader.

Viereck, Peter. *Conservatism Revisited*. 2nd ed. New York: Free Press, 1962. Originally published 1949. Viereck was every liberal's favorite conservative in the 1950s and 1960s. He detested most of the actual conservatives then active in American politics, particularly the swashbuckling Goldwaterites.

Von Hayek, Friedrich. *The Road to Serfdom*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944. Hayek, an economist exiled from Nazi Germany, wrote this condemnation of big government in England during World War II, and it caught on as a libertarian classic on both sides of the Atlantic.

Weaver, Richard. *Ideas Have Consequences*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948. Weaver, a displaced southerner working unhappily in Chicago, traced what he saw as the decline of Western civilization to a fatal mistake in medieval philosophy by William of Occam. No conservative did more to credit the power of ideas over society.

Wells, John. *The House of Lords: From Saxon Wargods to a Modern Senate*. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1997. American readers unfamiliar with the British constitution will find this introductory guide to the history of the House of Lords illuminating and entertaining.

Wilentz, Sean. *The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln*. New York: Norton, 2005. One of the many academic histories that would be better if only it were shorter. In places it's an almost day-by-day account of American life in the 1830s. No one can doubt Wilentz's authority and learning, so this is the book you should open if you want all the details.

Wills, Garry. *Nixon Agonistes*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970. A searing indictment of the president, written long before Watergate made headlines. Wills, a graduate of *National Review* conservatism, argues that Nixon was the living embodiment of American liberalism. An intellectual tour de force.

———. *Reagan's America: Innocents at Home*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1987. It's always a good idea to read Garry Wills's books because he looks at well-known subjects in a way that makes them seem a little strange and unfamiliar. This history and meditation on the Ronald Reagan phenomenon is no exception.

Wilson, A. N. *The Rise and Fall of the House of Windsor*. New York: Norton, 1993. The novelist and critic offers a shrewd overview of the royal family's role in British public life over the last century. His tone and style make a bracing contrast to the fawning tone of much royal writing.

Wilson, Charles Reagan. *Baptized in Blood*. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1980. Southern veneration of the lost cause led them to think of Stonewall Jackson as a martyr, not just a casualty, and to see the entire southern struggle as a great Christian undertaking against the godless Yankees. Wilson's book is academic in the best sense: accurate but also vivid and surprising.

Wood, Gordon. *The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1789*. New York: Norton, 1969. The blockbuster academic history of the Revolution. Generations of graduate students have tussled with it, and all have benefited.